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The Communication Decency Act (CDA) was an amendment to the 1996 
Telecommunications bill signed into law by President Clinton. The CDA was supported by 
the Republican members of  Congress and by the Christian Coalition who had helped to the 
get the Republicans elected. The CDA was designed to place limits on accessibility to 
obscene speech in cyberspace.  Days after being signed into law, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit stating that the CDA was an unconstitutional breach of  the 
First Amendment.  It was declared unconstitutional by both the District Court in 
Pennsylvania and by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The CDA came to my attention as a user ofthe technology.  I am a frequent user the 
Internet participating in newsgroups, listservs, email conversations, and the World Wide Web 
(WWW).  Iwas introduced to the technology in 1985 as OSU was beginning to connect to 
other campuses.  This was prior to the introduction of  Microsoft Windows and we used DOS 
to access our programs.  It is also prior to the WWW so documents on other campuses were 
accessed by using Gopher. 1 have remained an involved participant in the growing 
technology.  Over the years I have taught hardware and software classes, watched the growth 
of  news  groups, listservs and the WWW·and in time, not only joined the conversations, but 
became a listserv administrator.' My participation in listservs and the other dynamic parts of 
cyberspace have made me particularly interested in how the CDA legal debate would play 
out. 
Further, I consider myself to both feminist and a civil libertarian. As a feminist I have 
worked for many years to end violence against women and children. ·Part of  this work has 
included an exploration of  how pornographic speech may contribute to domestic violence and rape.  Through my work I have become convinced that there is a connection to the 
images that portray woman as one-dimensional, sexualized creatures, and crimes against 
women and children. 
As a civil libertarian I believe equally in the values embedded within the Bill of 
Rights.  I have long cherished the ability to say what I chose without having to be concerned 
about being arrested.  I have enjoyed participating in rallies to protest a variety of  things 
without fearing imprisonment.  Further, I was given the opportunity to intern at the ACLU in 
San Francisco.  This experience taught me a great deal about threats to the Bill of  Rights, 
including legislative erosion.  When I returned to OSU, I was elected President ofthe OSU/ 
Corvallis chapter of  Amnesty InternationaL  In this role I became more fully aware of  how 
rare the guarantees in the Bill of  Rights are.  And I became more committed to working to 
preserve them.  However, more often than not my feminist beliefs are in some conflict with 
my civil libertarian beliefs.  I have from time to time trying to reconcile these nvo parts of 
my belief system, and the CDA was one more opportunity for this personal struggle. 
Last, I have been privileged to serve as a member the Corvallis City Council.  During 
those four years, I watched as citizens come before the Council and try to persuade us to 
create policy that reflected their world views.  I was fascinated to listen to people structure 
their arguments. Through these arguments it would become clear what different people 
cherished and considered non-negotiable. Once the public testimony was over, we would 
discuss which set of  values were salient as we created policy for 50,000 people. 
As I watched the CDA debate unfolding in Congress and again before the courts, I 
was intrigued to watch the same process unfolding. Further, as a someone who participated in 
the growing cyber-culture I keenly aware that this group was all but absent in the larger legislative and judicial conversations. As I embarked on my analysis of  the CDA, I was 
interested to see if  this seeming similarity in the process of  creating policy continued.  I was 
also interested to see ifthis invisible group ever became visible. 
I was then left to choose a methodology and like all rhetoricians, I had many to 
choose from.  I explored several methodologies but always came back to fantasy theme 
analysis (FTA) as the one with the greatest potential to tell me what I was interested in 
learning.  I am at heart, a social scientist interested in why people do the things they do.  I am 
curious about how the decisions people make, effect other people.  In analyzing the CDA I 
could have chosen a strictly legal analysis and examined case law and precedence as an 
attorney would, but I would have learned very little about why the groups made the 
arguments they did and in tum,how they effected a judicial decision.  Similarly, other 
rhetorical methods would not have provided me with the richness of  information I eventually 
obtained.  FTA provided a way to learn about how the three groups involved discussed 
pornographic speech, and in tum how they weigh that against the First Amendment of  the 
U.S. Constitution.  Last, it provided a way to examine how the three groups conceptualized 
the technology known as 'cyberspace' as it relates to the intermingling of  pornographic 
speech and free speech. 
Further, FTA allows for an examination of  the larger issues the shape legal arguments 
and rulings.  Legal decisions do not occur in a social vacuum.  Attorneys; judges and 
legislators are aware of the larger cultural coriversations surrounding the various issues they 
deal with. The relative harm and legality of  obscene speech has been a part of  the American 
dialogue for over a hundred years.  The varying viewpoints are discussed in high schools and 
colleges, debated on radio call-in shows, and can be counted on to make an appearance in the legislatures of  the nation.  These larger conversations appear to be about convincing parents, 
the general public and governing bodies that a danger exists that must be addressed.  In the 
case of  the CDA, the Christian Coalition was able to convince the US Congress that a 
particular social problem existed, that it had extended to cyberspace and that it needed a 
legal solution.  Their solution was then challenged by the ACLU and it was left to the 
Supreme Court to make a legal ruling about a social phenomena.  In this way they're not only 
adjudicating a legal question, they are also acting as policy makers. 
As policy makers, the Supreme Court stretched the reach. of  the U.S. Constitution and 
applied it to cyberspace.  They determined which set of  values would take precedence as 
conversations about the space evolved, at least within some audiences.  They continued a 
tradition that free speech can be limited in only a few, well-defined and immediate cases. 
They may have considered pornographic speech to be a danger, but they did not see it as an 
immediate danger nor one big enough to risk criminializing speech acts. 
Having said this it must be restated that the actual decision wasn't my real interest, the 
arguments leading to the decision were.  I was interested to see who was present and absent 
from the conversation.  And in how those who are present, structured the nature of  the 
problem and in tum, the solution.  There was potential for any of  the players to assert that 
cyberspace was such as unique space that the US Congress lacked the authority to create 
laws there.  In fact, this assertion was made by one of  the District Court judges, but was not 
argued before the Supreme Court.  There was also the potential for the dangers of 
pornographic speech or the promise of  the First Amendment to be reaching reconceptualized. 
Neither of  these happened either.  Instead, this was much like every other debate that  pits the 
First Amendment against pornographic speech.  That part of  the conversation was interesting only in that it was so unoriginal. 
There was one part of  the argument that proved to be enlightening, the search for an 
analogy for the 'Internet.  The current legal standard for detennining whether something is 
obscene requires that speech be judged against a contemporary community standard. 
Further, legal procedure requires that judicial decisions be based in legal precedents.  In this 
case the analogy would detennine which set existing laws would be used to detennine what 
would be allowed, but this conversation went beyond legal precedents.  In this case, the 
attempts to compare the space to something knows was also about detennining what the 
community would be. Was the Internet like a local newspaper or more like a town crier?  Or 
was it a completely unique space that requires a new conception of 'community?'  And who 
would detennine this?  Would it be the Congress, the courts, the users of  the space? 
It  was these different conceptions of  community that intrigued me. This one concept 
seemed to lie at the heart of  everything else.  In the end, this analysis was an exploration of 
what a community might look like and really detennines that. Whose Community is it Anyway? The CDA and Cultural Conflicts over 
Speech and Pornography 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1996 President Clinton signed the Telecommunication Act of  1996, 
ending more than a year of  debate and compromise. Embedded within the bill was 
the Communication Decency Act (CDA), an amendment intended to limit indecent 
speech in cyberspace.  Within days of  the President signing the law into effect, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), on behalf of  9 plaintiffs, filed suit. They 
sought an immediate injunction and asked that the law be declared an 
unconstitutional breach of  the First Amendment. The ACLU was quickly joined by 
a coalition that brought the number of  plaintiffs to 47;  the two complaints were 
consolidated into one case and sent to the Pennsylvania District Court for a ruling. 
The District Court agreed that the CDA not only violated the First Amendment, but 
also the Fifth Amendment guarantee of  due process. To further strengthen the 
decision, the ACLU asked that the Supreme Court affirm the lower court ruling. 
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and, on June 26, 1997, the Supreme 
Court agreed that the CDA violated the First Amendment of  the US Constitution. 
They did not rule on the Fifth Amendment issues. 
This one case served to move the debate about cyberspace from the realm of 
academia to the front pages of  popular magazines, the nightly news and into daily 
conversation. This one law has served to shape the discussion not only about what 
is appropriate in this new media, but also about the nature of  the media itself. It  has also highlighted a tension between existing users, new users and world 
governments. 
CYBERSPACE 
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Cyberspace, also called 'the internet,' or simply 'the net' is a world of 
electronic pulses generated and received by computers. These electronic pulses of 
information travel from computer to computer via telephone lines or satellite linle 
In this way, an international connection of  connections has been developed, 
allowing instantaneous global communication. As it presently exists, the net can be 
accessed by anyone with a computer, a modem and the correct software. 
This 'connection of  connections' is an outgrowth of  the Cold War. The 
decentralized network structure was originally developed by the Defense 
Department as a way to prevent sabotage of  national defense computers.  During 
the 1960's, Defense Department staff  realized that if  one computer was sabotaged, 
the entire national defense system was in jeopardy. The answer was to create a way 
for packets of  information to travel along a variety of  routes to the chosen 
destination. It  was this separation of information that gave, and continues to give, 
the internet its strength as a communication medium. During the 1980's, the 
internet was opened to academia as a way to speed research. With the advent ofthe 
graphical user interface, the World Wide Web became possible, which in tum made 
the internet accessible to people with little computer experience. For the first time, 
it was available to the general pUblic. In the late 1990s internet service providers 
became widely available, providing an easy way for people to log on and see what 3 
all the excitement was about.  Estimates in  1996 were that in excess of  40 million 
people worldwide are  'seeing what all the excitement is about' and that by the end 
of  decade there may be more than 500 million (Mandel 5). 
CDAHISTORY 
The conservative Christian Coalition was a force to be reckoned with during 
the 1994 election. With their assistance, the Republican party regained control of 
the US Congress for the first time in forty years.  This translated into not only a 
shift in the controlling party, but also a shift from a moderately liberal, to a fairly 
conservative Congress. The Christian Coalition drafted a document titled the 
Contract with American Families  in which they outlined their legislative hopes. 
One goal of  the Contract was to eliminate pornography on the increasingly popular 
internet: 
Christian Coalition urges Congress to enact legislation to protect 
children from being exposed to pornography on the Internet. Criminal 
law should be amended to prohibit distribution of, or making available, 
any pornography, soft core or hard, to children, and to prohibit 
distribution of  obscene hard core pornography to adults (Christian 
Coalition). 
The entire Contract with American Families was presented to the l04
th 
Congress. 
For their part, the Republican majority within the 104th  Congress was 
interested in  asserting 'traditional family values'  through the laws they created. 
Soon after the Christian Coalition issued their Contract with American Families, 
the leadership of  the 104th  Congress presented the people of  America with their 
Contract with America.  This Contract set the Congressional goals for the first 100 days. Goal number four, The Family Reinforcement Act read, 
Child support enforcement, tax incentives for adoption, strengthening 
rights of  parents in their children's education, stronger child 
pornography laws, and an elderly dependent care tax credit to reinforce 
the central role of  families in American society (Contract). 
This goal may have seemed quite ambitious for the newly elected Congress, 
particularly given that there were nine others encompassing everything from a 
balanced budget to international relations; however, during those first 100 days, 
hundreds of  bills were introduced with an eye toward fulfilling these "contractual 
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agreements." One bill introduced to meet these obligations was the Communication 
Decency Act (CDA).  The CDA was intended to address pornography in 
cyberspace and stated 
that any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, or other 
communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent... 
in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary ·community 
standards (US Congress, S314). 
was a violation of  the law, with criminal penalties.  In drafting this language, the 
members of  Congress combined language from the Comstock Act of  1873 and the 
Supreme Court case Miller v California. Despite assistance from the Christian 
Coalition, the bills' sponsor was unable to get the votes needed to pass the CDA. 
He was however, able to have it attached as an amendment to the larger 
Telecommunications bill, which was successfully passed by both houses of 
Congress. On February 8, 1996 President Clinton signed the Telecommunications 
Bill,  including the CDA amendment, into law. 
On February 11, the ACLU filed for an injunction in District Court to prevent enforcement of  the CDA. The ACLU believed that the CDA was an 
unconstitutional breach of  First Amendment guarantee to free speech. They 
asserted that the law infringed on a speakers' ability to speak freely without 
government imposed restrictions on the content. They argued further that the 
guidelines for this content were unclear and contrary to existing law. 
The District Court judges agreed. On June 11, 1996 the Court ruled 
unanimously that the CDA was unconstitutional.  To further strengthen their 
position, on October 31, 1996 the ACLU filed a Motion to Affirm with the 
Supreme Court, requesting that they confirm the lower courts opinion. The 
Supreme Court heard this case and in June 1997 agreed with the lower court that 
the CDA did in fact, violate the first amendment of  the Constitution.  This action 
had the effect of  nullifying the CDA. 
5 OBSCENITY 
The debate over obscenity is hardly a new one. Earliest discussions of  what 
would later be called 'obscene' can be traced to blasphemy laws; laws that were 
concerned with crimes against Christian doctrine and teachings. The crime of 
'obscenity' entered into English Common Law in 1727 (Tedford 121).  The first 
antiobscenity law in the United States was passed  in 1842 as a part of  the Tariff 
Act.  The law prohibited the "importation of  all indecent and obscene prints, 
paintings, lithographs, engravings and transparencies" (39). In 1865 the Postal Act 
stated that "no obscene book, pamphlet picture, print, or other character, shall be 
admitted into the mails of  the United States" (39).  This law was amended by the 
Comstock Act of  1873 prohibiting mailing of  any obscene material, or information 
about contraception or abortion. The law however, did not define 'obscene' 
although it is clear from its use that the material of  concern was primarily sexual in 
nature. 
These earliest struggles over speech with sexual content have continued 
well into the twentieth century. Twentieth century debates have centered on the use 
of  particular words, the use of  particular images, whether there was an appropriate 
time and place for words to be used,  the relative harm of  these words and images, 
and how all of  this would appear over radio and video. Similarly, these concerns 
began to be seen once again within the halls of  Congress. Over the years an 
assortment of legislation has been introduced to deal with this 'filth.'  This 
legislation has attempted to address an assortment of  media types, and in most 
6 cases,  the laws have then been referred to the Supreme Court for a ruling on 
whether they violated First Amendment rights to free speech. 
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SUPREME COURT & OBSCENITY 
The CDA was far from the first obscenity case the Supreme Court heard. 
The Supreme Court has reviewed and ruled on obscenity since the early days ofthe 
court. Through these  rulings, a legal test for obscenity has emerged. The current 
test was established in 1973 when the Supreme Court ruled that something is 
legally obscene if: 
the average person, applying contemporary community standards 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interests, whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, 
and  whether the work taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value (Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974). 
This ruling came to be known as "the Miller test" after the name of  the case, Miller 
v California and is the standard by which the CDA was judged. The Miller test has 
several layers, but the  'contemporary community standards'  clause is the pivotal 
section of  the standard, on which all else relies (Tedford 146). 
The term 'communIty standards' was first used by Justice Hand in 1916 as 
part ofthe ruling in United States v.  Kennerley. In his argument he discussed the 
"average conscience ofthe time,"  referring not to a local community, but to "'the 
community' as in the sense of  society at large" (De Grazia, 426).  In Pennekamp v 
Florida  (1946) the Justices stated that they "refused to tolerate a result whereby the 
constitutionallirnits of  free expression in the nation would vary with state lines." 
They went on to say "we see even less justification for allowing such limits to vary 
with town or even county lines  .. .it is after all a national constitution" (426).  In 1962, Justice Harlan argued  in Manual Enterprises, Inc.  v Day that "a standard 
based on a particular community would have the 'intolerable consequence of 
denying some sections of  the country access to material, there deemed acceptable, 
which in others might be considered offensive to prevailing community standards 
of  decency'"  (426). This national standard was challenged and changed in 1973 
when the court issued it's opinion in Miller v California.  In ~Titingthe opinion for 
the majority, Chief  Justice Burger states, 
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment 
limitations on the powers of  the state do not vary from community to 
community, but this does not mean that there are, or should be or can 
Qe, fixed, uniform national standards of  precisely what appeals to the 
"prurient interest" or is "patently offensive." These are essentially 
questions offact, and our nation is simply too big and too diverse for 
this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated 
for all 50 states in a single formulation, even assuming the prerequisite 
consensus exists (Supreme Court Reporter, 2618) .. 
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Despite this opinion from the Chief  Justice, the 104th Congress was clearly striving 
to return to a national standard for obscenity as evidenced by the inclusion of 
language from the \omstock  Act despite it having been earlier ruled invalid in the 
Miller v California decision (Tedford 146) .. 
In the debate surrounding the CDA there is one additional complication in 
that legally, pornography is not a form of  prohibited speech. Throughout the 
legislation and subsequent court briefs, the terms pornography, indecent speech and 
obscenity were used interchangeably. However, "'indecency' (unlike obscenity) is 
constitutionally protected speech ...  [and is] Subject only to "narrow and well-
understood exceptions (ACLU). 10 
CRITICAL METHOD 
Building on the work of Robert Bales' small group communication work, 
Earnest Bormann developed a methodology he called Fantasy Theme Analysis. 
Bales had learned that groups create unique stories through their interactions. 
Bormann believed that in any given situation, the people involved will tell 
themselves a unique story based on their unique perceptions. These stories in turn 
create separate 'realities,'  called fantasy chains. He recognized that not only do 
small groups create fantasy chains, but that social movements, political campaigns, 
and organizations do as well (Foss 289). The power ofthese realities can be seen in 
the way that the fantasy chain become part ofthe larger culture (Burgchardt 241). 
The success of  the fantasy is in persuading others of  the accurateness of  your 
reality.  Bormann developed symbolic convergence theory to explain the creation of· 
these fantasies and extended this theory to a methodology designed to examine 
these fantasies. 
There are two assumptions that undergird symbolic convergence theory, and 
, by extension, fantasy theme analysis. First, that language creates rather then reflects 
reality. As explained by Foss "symbols create reality because of  their capacity to 
introduce form and law into a disordered sensory experience. The chaotic and 
disorderly sensory world is organized and made manageable by the symbols that 
are devised to dominate it" (289). 
The second assumption is that the meanings individuals create join to form a shared reality. As people mingle and talk, they create a new reality, shared by 
both. They develop what Bormann called rhetorical visions, essentially, extended 
stories about how things are, should be or will be (Littlejohn 108). 
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Fantasy themes are a part of  these larger rhetorical visions. In this case, 
fantasy refers to "the creative and imaginative interpretation of  events" (Foss 290). 
According to Bormann, these fantasies follow the themes and structures commonly 
found in drama and  include a hero, a villain, a setting, plot lines, minor and major 
characters, and emotion. All of  these combine to create a fantasy chain that in turn, 
tells something about the motives of  the rhetor or group of  rhetors. 
When a critic is interested in examining a fantasy chain, the first step is to 
gather information about the event. This can be accomplished through library 
research, manuscripts, interviews, or direct observations (Burgchardt 246). The 
next step is to look for recurring themes or patterns in the text or dialogue. These 
themes could be in setting, characterizations of  the participants, or situations (246). 
Once a clear understanding of  the pattern is acquired, an in depth analysis can 
begin. 
The critic begins to examine who the involved parties are, and what roles 
they play.  Is there a clear hero or villain? Is the hero or villain a concept, such as 
freedom, rather than a particular person? Who or what provides legitimization for 
the drama? This could be a God, the people, the government or another abstract 
concept. And, how are the members ofthe group portrayed?  Are they unwilling 
participants? Tragic heroes? Agents of  a higher power? (246) 12 
Next, other elements, such as setting are examined. Where is the drama 
occurring? What events are common? What emotions are evoked or invoked by the 
characters? And, does the fantasy recruit new members? The end goal of  the 
analysis is to determine the success of  the fantasy chain in converting the 
uncommitted or unknowledgeable to the rhetorical visions. The "fantasy theme is 
rhetorically successful if  it works to gain the active participation of  listeners or 
readers. If  the fantasy catches on, or to use Bormann's words "chains out," it is 
repeatedly referred to over time, with various people adding to the dramatized 
discourse" (Sharf 82). 
MAJOR WORKS 
Quite a variety of  situations have been examined using thi.s methodology. 
Bormann began in 1972 by e~amining  the fantasy chains extant in Puritan 
communities of  colonial America. By examining sermons of  the era, he discovered 
that there were recurring fantasies within these communities designed to make 
colonial life a bit easier. Bormann states that "the Puritan rhetorical vision saw 
them as conquering new territories for God, saving the souls of  the natives, and, 
most importantly, as setting up in the wilderness a model religious community" 
(Burgchardt 247). Bomlann extended this inquiry into an examination ofthis 
fantasy as it chained out to shape the actions of  Abraham Lincoln more than a 
hundred years later. 
Bormann and other critics have not limited themselves to religious thought. Bonnann has also examined political events including those that led to Senator 
Eagleton withdrawing as Senator McGovern's running mate in the 1972 
Presidential campaign. Other critics have examined how psychiatry was perceived 
during and after the Hinkley trial, the campaign strategies of  the Carter and Ford 
campaigns, and the role the media played in connecting the Reagan inaugural and 
the Iran hostage release in 1981. 
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Analyses have also been done in such varied areas as romance novels, 
television shows, movies about nuclear war, media portrayals of  homosexuality, 
and the rhetorical visions of  unmarried mothers. Leigh Ford incorporates the good 
versus evil theme originally suggested by Bonnann, into an examination of  the 'Big 
Book' used by Alcoholic Anonymous. In this analysis, Ford finds that the fantasy 
serves to strengthen the bonds within the group, thereby making the struggle 
against alcoholism, a group struggle. The rhetorical vision itself  is that "alcoholism 
is a treatable illness of  bod)', mind and soul" (Ford 6). It  is the will of  the self, in 
the fonn of  selfishness, pitted against the will of  God. This competition serves to 
show the struggles between the villain and the hero. The 'Big Book' proceeds to lay 
out a twelve step process for overcoming the 'evil' of  self-will and by extension, 
alcoholism. Each of  the steps refers to giving oneselfto a higher power, or the hero. 
The fantasy includes an explanation of  why some alcoholics have not joined AA, 
simply that they have not hit bottom yet and have not therefore, recognized their 
own helplessness. This helplessness is a requisite step to surrendering to a higher 
power(13). Ford argues that this analysis supports Bonnann's belief  that there are 14 
universal, recurring themes. 
Critics have also incorporated Q-sort factor analysis into their fantasy 
analysis. By placing different fantasies onto cards and asking people to rank order 
them, the researcher is able to validate the proposed fantasy chain. This method has 
been employed in the aforementioned criticisms of  unmarried mothers and the 
creation of  Jimmy Carter's persona in the 1976 election. 
CRITICISMS 
The major critic of  fantasy theme analysis is G. P. Mohrmann.  Dr. 
Mohrmann argues that the "fantasy theme method is not a logically consistent 
extension of  the theoretical bases from which writers contend it derives, and second 
published critiques tend toward circularity" (Essay 110). 
By asserting that fantasy chains exist beyond the small group and in fact, 
permeate the larger culture, Mohrmann argues that Bormann misuses the work of 
Bales. Mohrmann states, "for Bales,.fantasy is the product of  psychodrama  tic 
interaction and is an idiosyncratic reality acting as a temporary buffer against the 
shock of  reality at large. His formulation does not allow the assumption that 
vestiges of  fantasies will appear in the manifest content of  other messages" (131). 
Bales was a student of  Freud and his theories permeate Bales' work. Mohrmann 
contends that Bormann ignores this, and in doing so, Bormanns' overall theory falls 
apart. 
From this, Mohrmann rejects that "a fantasy chain occurring in a small 
group will be replicated in form, content, and impact in newscast, a letter, a speech 15 
or any other mode of  communication" (Fantasy 308). Instead, he believes that there 
are common dramatic themes, plots, and arguments that recur. However, these are 
not necessarily connected to one another. And the tendency of  fantasy theme critics 
to point to these themes as evidence is simply employing a circular argument to 
prove their own theory. He states that "the logic proceeds: fantasy dramas make up 
social reality impelling action; this is a fantasy drama; this is a social reality 
impelling action." (Essay 122). 
Second, Mohrmann asserts that "misinterpreting Bales at almost every turn, 
the critics equate the naming of  dramatistic parts with the discovery of  social reality 
that compeJIed to action" (131). He goes on to argue that "the formulation lacks 
sophistication and invites mechanical application" (119).  He believes that the 
methodology encourages people to announce the existence of  a drama and then to 
set about proving its existence. Again, the theory uses a circular argument to prove 
the findings of  the theory. 
PROBLEMSIBENEFITS 
Aside from the criticisms offered by Mohrmann, I believe that there are 
additional concerns with this methodology. The critic must be extra diligent in 
accounting for personal bias and experience, particularly if  analyzing an event they 
have experience with. For example, if  a Viet Nam veteran were to analyze fantasy 
themes among other Viet Nam veterans, he would have to account for his own 
experiences and memories. This points to a second area of  concern, the impact of 16 
time. In the above example, the researcher may find that he is measuring the effect 
of  memory to change fantasy rather than an actual fantasy chain. The dramatis 
personae in 1970' may have changed by 1996. It  may be that in 1970', the soldier 
saw Ho Chi Minh as the villain, but by 1996, the US Government has become the 
villain. This change in the chain must be addressed rather than being ignored. 
Further, when examining historical data, the researcher must account for the 'filters' 
that they are looking through. By this I mean that each generation in each country is 
raised with a set of  values slightly different from the generation before. Over time, 
these values may change greatly. It  would not be appropriate to place twentieth 
century values on the events of  the fourteenth. For example, in examining the 
fantasy chains surrounding Joan d'Arc, it would be inappropriate to consider the 
role of  women based on the roles of 1999. This would tell us nothing about what 
the people of  the time thought. The records of  the time being studied must remain 
the central focus and voice for the research. 
This is also a time consuming method. A great deal of  research must be 
done before the analysis can begin. The researcher must consult a variety of  sources 
in an attempt to fully understand the events and possible fantasy themes. In doing 
so, the researcher must not lose sight of  the rhetorical vision being portrayed in the 
sources. It  is not a method for those after 'objective truth.' 
Having said that, I believe that this methodology has several strengths. 
Notably, that it attempts to account for the stories that a group tell themselves about 
an event, and in turn, about their world view. By examining the rhetorical 17 
viewpoint of  different sides of  an issue, abortion for example, it may be possible to 
break a long standing impasse. It may also be possible to predict actions of  the 
group. If  the fantasy chain of  suicide bombers is that their death will deliver them 
directly to a God, predictions can be made about their future actions. Predictions 
can also be made about possible reactions to an opposing rhetorical view. 
Another advantage of  this method is that attempts to account for the 
complexity of  human interaction. It  recognizes that people are ever changing and 
shape the world around them. It acknowledges that simply by interacting with other 
people, opinions and views change. And it is these changing views that lead to the 
actions people take. 
Last, this is a method that allows for an examination of  the effect of 
rhetoric, that is, persuasion. In charting changes in rhetorical visions over time, a 
researcher is charting changes in what is considered persuasive.  If  a fantasy chain 
continues and is reported, it has persuaded not only that it is the 'correct' version of 
reality, but that it is worthy of  being recorded. 
Fantasy theme analysis involves looking for recurring themes or patterns. 
This analysis of 'group speak' tells the rhetorician a great deal about what the group 
deems to be important, and by extension, what impact they are able to have in the 
larger culture. 
The debate surrounding the CDA was in many ways about the creation and 
continuation of  fantasy themes. Each of  the groups involved was interested in 
persuading that theirs was the correct visualization of  the space, the community, 18 
and the dangers within the space. Each was interested in defining who had the 
regulatory authority to govern that space. Fantasy theme analysis provides a way to 
examine how the rhetor groups conceptualized  these questions and then in tum, 
how they effected a legal decision. 
There were three distinct groups of  rhetors in this discussion. In this 
analysis, they are described as the Antiobscenity Crusaders, the Defenders of 
Liberty, and the Homesteaders. The 'Antiobscenity Crusaders' were represented by 
the US Congress, the Family Research Council, Enough is Enough and the 
Christian Coalition. The 'Defenders of  Liberty' were represented by the American 
Civil Liberties Union and their 47 co-plaintiffs  The 'Homesteaders' were 
comprised of  the users of  the technology. 
Using Fantasy Theme Analysis,  I will explore the rhetorical arguments 
made by these three very different groups. Using the  Supreme Court process as the 
analytic framework, I will examine the dramatic elements of  hero, villain, the 
emotions that dominate the drama,  the use of  an abstract concept to justify actions, 
and the overall rhetorical theme of  each group. 19 
ANTIOBSCENITY CRUSADERS 
"Each time the pornographers break through a new barrier, society's best reaction 
should be the honorable one - to protect children first. " 
-us Congress Brief 
The group known as the Antiobscenity Crusaders was made up of  members 
of  the US Congress, and Christian based organizations, the Christian Coalition, the 
Family Research Council and Enough is Enough. Additionally, 28 organizations 
filed a joint Am/cus brief The US Department of  Justice argued the case before the 
Supreme Court. 
The Antiobscenity Crusaders believe that pornography of  all kinds is 
rampant across the internet: 
Pornography, both soft core and hard core, is freely available on the 
Internet to virtually anyone with a home computer. Several magazines 
post pornographic images that can be viewed by anyone, including 
children, for free. There are also numerous sites on the Internet where 
hard core pornography depicting a variety of  explicit sexual acts, even 
rape scenes and bestiality, are available free and can be accessed with a 
few clicks of  a computer button (Christian Coalition) 
They also believe that children are particularly vulnerable to harmful effects 
that include the stunting of  normal development and the creation of  criminal 
behavior in the form of  rape. Enough is Enough, a Christian based antipornography 
group, explain in their court brief: 
The danger to children stems, at least partly, from disturbing changes in 
attitude which pornography causes. Replicated studies have 
demonstrated that exposure to significant amounts of  increasingly 
graphic forms of  pornography has a dramatic effect on how adult 
consumers view women, sexual abuse, sexual relationships, and sex in 
general. . ;This dulling of  the moral senses can affect the safety of women. As youth consume dramatically greater quantities of 
pornography, and as the Internet exposes them to a greater range of 
violent and deviant forms of  sexual conduct than ever before available, 
it is not irrational to fear that society could regress in its sense of  the 
viciousness and immorality of  rape. Children and adolescents who 
"learn" by early exposure to pornography will more easily accept the 
idea of  forced sex as reasonable and justified (Enough is Enough). 
The Antiobscenity Crusaders considered the Internet to be more than the 
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usual threat to the nation's children. They were accustomed to challenging printed 
pornography, movies, music, and other forms of  communication. The Internet 
however, provided a way to make material available without the content being 
monitored as it was in other mediums. This lack of  centralized oversight concerned 
them because they believed that without it "the Internet threatens to give every 
child with access to a connected computer a free pass into the equivalent of  every 
adult bookstore and video store in the country (United States, Oral Argument). 
The Antiobscenity Crusaders recognized that they would be unable to 
eradicate indecent speech in cyberspace just as they had been unable in the physical 
world.  This inability did not lessen their concern about the impact this material 
- . '  ' 
would have on any child who may access it.  Their solution was the 
Communication Decency Act which they believed would force people to put 
indecent speech into areas children were unable to get. Effectively, they were 
arguing that cyberspace should be zoned in much the same way that physical world 
had been.  In the physical world, zoning forced adult bookstores into areas distant 
from schools, day cares and churches. The Antiobscenity Crusaders believe that the 
CDA do the same for the internet by requiring an adult identification code for 21 
access. 
To accomplish this,  the Antiobscenity Crusaders had to show the court that 
this zoning scheme was rational and the goals of  this legislation was consistent with 
prior laws. They drew the Courts' attention to existing case law, and then tried to 
establish that the problems and therefore the solutions, were analogous. In this way 
they begin to build their case that there is a substantial problem with a 
Constitutionally sound solution. 
Next, the Antiobscenity Crusaders had to show the courts that the 
media and environments were similar, so that the solution would make sense. 
This led to a search for an analogy for cyberspace. This analogy would be 
used to ground the CDA in existing law, and was of  particular interest to the 
Supreme Court justices. During oral argument before the Supreme Court the 
attorneys present their case and are questioned by the Justices. When the 
Antiobscenity Crusaders presented their concept of  zoning cyberspace, the 
justices were interested in examining how, or if, cyberspace was like other 
places where speech occurred. Specifically, the Justices asked whether 
cyberspace was similar to television, telephones and a public library. With 
respect to libraries, the Antiobscenity Crusaders argued that cyberzoning was 
the electronic equivalent of  "tak[ing] the indecent stuff and put[ting] it in a 
different room" (United States, Oral Argument). 
Last,  they needed to show the Court that the CDA would not unduly 
restrict speech that was legally available to adults and that the rules in cyberspace would be consistent with the rules in other public spaces. 
Adults under the CDA need not avoid all the sex and nudity that would 
be prohibited or restricted to safe harbor hours on radio or TV under the 
broadcast standard of  indecency and its enforcement policies. Adults 
need only avoid sending to children, or displaying to minors on sites 
that are available to children, that type of  explicit sexual depiction or 
description that constitutes "online indecency" because its 
offensiveness is patently clear under the circumstances when 
considering the host of  variables of  value, intent, prurience, purpose, 
audience, subject matter, etc. As such, the type of  pornographic 
indecency that is unlawful to display to minors online encompasses all 
that would be unlawful to display or sell to minors in all public streets, 
places, and stores (Congress). 
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This is particularly important given that for over 80 years the court has ruled 
that adult cannot be reduced to what is appropriate for children. Instead adults must 
have the opportunity to engage in speech encompassing adult subjects and 
language. 
In short, the Antiobscenity Crusaders contend that indecent speech is a 
continuing threat to the nation's children and that the Internet may be the greatest 
threat ever.  The answer to this danger was a law that criminialized certain speech 
actions. They contend that their solution was the equivalent of  requiring zoning 
ordinances in cyberspace that would protect both the nation's children and the 
constitutionally protected speech of  adults. 
OVERALL THEME 
Every good story, and every fantasy chain, has a theme that encompasses 
the dynamics of  the overall story.  This theme provides a common thread for the 23 
other parts of  the story. It also serves to reenergize believers, recruit new members 
and explain to outsiders the mission ofthe group. 
The Antiobscenity Crusaders utilized a theme of  rampant pornography that 
poses an overwhelming threat to children. They also use a secondary theme of  a 
threat to women. In the face ofthis onslaught, they must do something. The 
"something" was the CDA and cyberzoning.  Through their argument they hoped to 
show the Court that cyberspace was analogous to other public spaces and as such, 
could be zoned as other public spaces had been. 
Through a primary theme of  endangered children the Antiobscenity 
Crusaders chose the most vulnerable users ofthe technology. This theme enabled 
them to tie together the number of  web sites, pornographic content, and existing 
laws that prevented children from accessing this material in other arenas.  It also 
enabled them to recruit organizations that focus on protecting children such as 
Mothers Against Sexual Abuse, Kidz Online and CHILD HELP USA that may not 
have participated otherwise. 
The secondary theme of  danger to adult women stems from the initial 
theme,  the threat comes from children damaged after  viewing pornographic 
images. Through the consumption ofthese images children become predatory. 
ABSTRACT CONCEPT 
An abstract concept is tied to the overall rhetorical theme in that it can give a 
higher purpose to the struggle seen in the theme. Rather than struggling against 24 
something for the sake ofthe struggle, a group relies on an abstraction to explain 
their activities.  The abstraction provides an ultimate legitimization for the drama; it 
could be God, the people, the young or some other concept (Burgchardt 246).  For 
example, the American colonists relied on the concept of 'freedom from' to explain 
why they were revolting from England. In their speeches and pamphlets, they 
discussed freedom from tyranny and unjust taxes. Frequently, these abstract 
concepts are embedded in the discourse of  the rhetors and may not be visible to, or 
questioned by them. 
In the CDA drama, the Antiobscenity Crusaders rely on the concept of 
'protection of  innocence.' They were interested primarily in protecting children 
from the damaging effects of  obscene speech. Throughout their briefs and 
testimony they discussed how pornography influences the development of 
otherwise normal children, teaching them misleading belief sets about normal 
sexual activity, making them more prone to sex crimes, and leaving them 
"confused, changed, and damaged"  (Enough is Enough).  Once establishing the 
danger of  pornography, they added the threat ofthe internet, "The risk of  that harm 
coming to pass is magnified to an unprecedented degree because of  the accessibility 
to children of  indecent and obscene materials on Internet" (Enough is Enough). 
This links an established danger with a new medium and provides urgency to their 
case. 
In addition to risks presented to children, the Antiobscenity Crusaders 
pointed to the risk to adult women after children have been exposed to internet pornography: 
If  you expose male subjects to six weeks' worth of  standard hard-core 
pornography  ...  you find changes in attitudes toward women.  The 
subjects become more callused towards women.  You find a 
trivialization towards rape ...  As youth consume dramatically greater 
quantities of  pornography, and as the Internet exposes them to a greater 
range of  violent and deviant forms of  sexual conduct than ever before 
available, it is not irrational to fear that the society could regress in its 
sense of  the viciousness and immorality of  rape (ibid). 
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The Antiobscenity Crusaders are able to use this theme of  protection of  innocence 
to explain what they are concerned about, but also to suggest the CDA as the 
solution. They paint a picture of  helpless children being harmed by the insidious 
nature of  pornographic speech. Through their rhetoric, they encourage the Justices 
to imagine children sitting alone in their bedrooms with pornographic images 
leaping off  their computer screens. They invite the Justices to think of  pedophiles 
waiting in cyberspace for children to tum their computers on so that they can be 
prayed upon. Further, they show that these children are so harmed by these 
experiences that they become a danger to adult women. This magnified danger of 
internet pornography makes it seem imperative that they do something to stop this 
threat. 
HERONILLAIN 
Like many stories, fantasy chains have a hero and a villain in constant 
tension, existing to thwart the efforts of  the other. The villain encapsulates all of  the 
things that the group opposes, and therefore must be defeated.  The hero, on the other hand embodies all of  the values the group holds sacred and right with the 
world.  In the fantasy chains of  the Communication Decency Act there are very 
clear hero and villain  interactions. 
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The Antiobscenity Crusaders had a very clear enemy in pornography, and 
by extension, pornographers.  Their rhetoric paints an image of pornographers and 
pedophiles lurking throughout cyberspace waiting to pounce on unsuspecting 
children. Further, the Antiobscenity Crusaders had a lesser villain in the Defenders 
of  Liberty, and particularly the ACLU who they portrayed as protectors of 
pornographers. 
For this group the hero was the Communication Decency Act,  specifically, 
the concept of  cyberzoning. The Antiobscenity Crusaders recognized their 
historical inability to completely prohibit pornography  and instead turned to 
cyberzoning as a way to limit access to adults. This would be accomplished by 
requiring that users of  the internet add technological barriers to their speech if  it 
could be deemed indecent. These barriers included requiring credit card numbers or 
installing screening programs that prevent pages that include particular words from 
being accessed. 
EMOTION 
Storytellers have long recognized that humans respond to the emotion of 
others and that the most effective stories are those that can evoke emotion (Wagner 
7). This appeal to pathos is an effective way to carry people from one section of  the 27 
story to another. 
This holds true in fantasy chains as well.  In analyzing a fantasy chain we 
are concerned with which emotions dominate the drama and create a dynamic 
tension; something to keep the hero and villain at odds.  Emotions are important in 
that fantasy chains, and political action, can continue over a long period of  time. As 
time goes by there is a greater risk of  attrition as people become tired, distracted or 
discouraged.  A way to counter this is to evoke the emotion that drew the members 
to the fantasy chain initially. 
The Antiobscenity Crusaders  rely on the emotions of fear and 
protectiveness.  In the Congressional debates that resulted in the Communication 
Decency Act,  Senator Exon presented the U.S. Senate with a notebook of 
pornographic images that he asserted were available to any child capable of  turning 
on a computer.  He and his supporters presented research showing that sex 
offenders used pornography in the commission of  their crimes. These same fear 
appeals appeared in the Enough is Enough amicus brief. They laid out for the court 
research showing that children would be irreparably harmed by pornographic 
images. They assert that "the scientific research is overwhelming that children are 
harmed by pornography in a multiplicity of  ways" (Enough is Enough). They 
continue that viewing pornography will  "short-circuit the normal development 
process permanently damaging even healthy and innocent children." (ibid). This 
argument carried through to the Supreme Court. In his oral testimony the 
governments' attorney,  Mr. Waxman stated there is a deadly serious point here, and that is ...  that every child in 
this country who has access to a computer and can click a mouse has 
access in his or her own bedroom or home or library to Hustler 
Magazine and Penthouse magazine, and the kind of  indecent speech 
that people sitting in the anonymity of  their own bedrooms 
anywhere in the world or anywhere in the country want to make 
available to them (United States, Oral Argument). 
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By connecting the dangers of  pornography to its availability on the internet, 
this combined appeal to fear and protectiveness  seems reasonable. It also makes it 
rhetorically possible for them to in tum argue for their preferred solution. 
In its entirety, the Antiobscenity Crusaders fantasy theme is: 
pornography is dangerous to the nations children and by extension to adult 
women because it creates sex addicts, criminals and crime victims. Pornography is 
rampant throughout cyberspace and there is nothing to stop it from destroying the 
nations' children. As right thinking adults, we must do all we can to stop this 
threat. Prior efforts to completely ban obscene speech have been unsuccessful, but 
requiring that obscene speech be limited in place and time has been successful. The 
best way to protect the nations children while recognizing the limitations of  the 
past is to require zoning within the technology. The Communication Decency Act 
will accomplish this while providing sanctions to pornographers who violate the 
law. In this way children are protected 
The Antiobscenity Crusaders were comprised ofthe Christian Coalition, the 
Family Research Council, Enough is Enough and the US Congress. They believed 
that pornographic speech was dangerous to children, and that it was widely, and 
easily, available through the internet. This combination of  beliefs were the impetus 29 
and driving force behind the CDA. Through their legal briefs and oral testimony 
they attempted to persuade the Supreme Court that the provisions of  the CDA were 
the logical solution to the problem of  internet pornography being accessed by 
children. 
The opposing viewpoint before the Court was expressed by a group I've 
titled the Defenders of  Liberty. The fantasy themes ofthe Defenders of  Liberty will 
be discussed in the next section. 30 
DEFENDERS OF LIBERTY 
The CDA would effectively place indecency in the same criminal category as child 
pornography and espionage. 
~Reporters Court Brief 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was joined by 47 other 
organizations in their attempt to overturn the CDA.  Among these groups were Stop 
Prisoner Rape, Feminists for Free Expression, the Speech Communication 
Association,  the American Association of  University Professors, Lambda Legal 
Defense, and the Coalition for Positive Sexuality. These groups believe that the 
free speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment applied in this new 
media as it did in others. And as such, speech actions that may offend the 
sensibilities of  some, were still permitted. They recognized that obscene speech 
was prohibited and that that standard would apply in cyberspace as it did in 
physical world. 
Instead, the Defenders of  Liberty were concerned that the CDA would define 
obscenity in a way that was broader than for any other medium. This meant that 
speech that was permitted in other arenas,  would be sanctionabkif  it occurred in 
cyberspace. Further, they were concerned that the CDA would place an undue,  and 
unconstitutional burden on the users of  this technology through the threat of 
criminal sanction: 
Specifically, the CDA makes it a crime, punishable by the two years in 
Specifically, the CDA makes it a crime, punishable by the two years in 
prison, for anyone to use online computer communications to transmit 
or "display in a manner available to minors" any materia! that is "indecent" or "patently offensive." Because there's no way for the vast 
majority oflnternet speakers to distinguish between adults and minors 
in their audience, the CDA is the most restrictive censorship scheme 
imposed any medium (ACLU). 
One group, Feminist for Free Expression conceptualized the dangers of  the 
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CDA a bit differently. Rather than arguing that the CDA would criminialize speech 
available to adults in other arenas, they pointed to threats unique to women. Among 
these were the potential loss of  a genderless realm where women could express 
themselves without concern: 
Few forms of  censorship, however, are as threatening to women's 
interests as the Communications Decency Act's restrictions on 
"indecent" and "offensive" speech on the Internet  ...  Because women 
may speak online without revealing their gender, they may feel more 
free to speak candidly and openly about political, cultural, or moral 
issues involving sex and sexuality without facing social opprobrium. 
Indeed, a woman using the Internet may find her speech being taken 
seriously for the first time-- precisely because the audience does not 
know her gender, and thus does not automatically discount what she 
says (Feminists). 
Other threats were the potential loss of  an opportunity to ask sexually explicit 
questions, an avenue to seek help after a rape, and the loss of  an educational source 
for adults and  children: 
Once establishing with the Court their concerns, the Defenders of  Liberty 
turned their attention to answering the assertions of  the Antiobscenity Crusaders. 
They began by examining the correct analogy for cyberspace, however,  the 
individual members of  the Defenders of  Liberty were unable to agree on an 
analogy. 
They used a strategy of 'not's.' In oral argument, they asserted that the 32 
printed communication standard was incorrect because of  the interactive nature of 
the medium. They also take this opportunity to remind the Court that the internet is 
more than web pages: 
QUESTION: But, look. Let's take printed communications. It is 
certainly lawful -- and we have upheld provisions that require 
pornographic materials to be kept away from minors and not to be sold 
in such a fashion that minors can obtain them. 
MR. ENNIS : Your Honor. . .in case after case, the Court has held  ... that 
the possibility of  a functionally equivalent alternative does not save the 
Government. Here the alternative is not functionally equivalent. Let me 
say why. 
In news groups, chat rooms and listservs, you are engaging in an 
interactive dialogue, a conversation, in which you speak and the 
listeners reply and you can reply to what they say. They can be 
outraged. They can be offended. They can have a good point to make. 
A Web site is static. What the Government is saying is that the 40 
million people who can speak in an interactive dialogue in the other 
modes of  communication on the Internet should post a static message 
on their Web site. And maybe the people who are in the news group 
would come to see it, maybe not. But the speaker would not get any 
feedback. There would be no dialogue  (United States, Oral argument). 
Through this exchange the Defenders of  Liberty hoped to clarify that cyberspace 
was not like printed communications therefore, the laws that applied to printed 
media did not apply. 
In their written brief, the ACLU argued that the Internet was different than 
radio or television in that the internet was interactive and required the user to 
actively seek information rather than having the information come into the home 
unbidden. It is this difference that prevents the laws that govern conduct in radio 
and television inapplicable to cyberspace. 33 
The Speech Communication Association (SCA), now known as the 
National Speech Association, joined the ACLU in their beliefthat cyberspace is 
different than radio or television. They asserted that  "computer-mediated 
communications represent[  s] the next step in the evolution of  electronic 
communication" (SCA) and as such, it was inappropriate to apply the standards of 
broadcast media to cyberspace: 
Participants can react and respond to the communications of  others by 
creating and distributing their own communications that comment 
upon, criticize or build upon the earlier communications. These actions, 
and the ongoing discourse they create, can occur spontaneously and 
inexpensively.  As a result, for the first time, almost any citizen can 
interact and engage in discourse instantaneously with hundreds of  other 
citizens and debate the issues of  the day  ... 
More fundamentally, the CDA seeks to transform the nature of 
communication on the Internet.  Congress based the CDA's regulations 
on the more static model of  communication derived from of  broadcast 
cases such as Pacifica.  As such, the CDA simply ignores the 
multilateral, fluid and participatory model of  communication applicable 
to the Internet (Speech). 
Other members of  this coalition felt that if  an existing media must be chosen, 
it should be print media as this provided the most liberal protections for users. 
Among those arguing this viewpoint were Site Specific, Inc. and freelance writer 
Jon Lebkowski: 
Like print, the Internet is a means for the replication, storage and 
transmission of  huge amounts of  text of  every description on every 
topic.  The Internet is like a giant library of  all human knowledge, and 
imposing broadcast style indecency regUlations would have the same 
profoundly destructive effects as such standards would have if  imposed 
upon the Library of  Congress.  Only by recognizing the analogy 
between Internet and print media will this Court assure the proper 
protection of  the medium likely to become the main conduit for 
personal, political and creative speech in the next century (Site 34 
Specific). 
Having addressed the ways that cyberspace was like or different from other 
forms of  media, the Defenders of  Liberty turned their attention to the concept of 
cyberzoning. The Antiobscenity Crusaders had argued for a way to limit speech 
activities to certain places within cyberspace in much the same way that adult 
bookstores had been limited to parts of  town distant from schools. The 
Antiobscenity Crusaders relied upon prior Supreme Court rulings that allowed 
zoning in cases were secondary effects were seen from the activity. These 
secondary effects, and why they were not applicable in this case was explained by 
Apollomedia: 
[T]he CDA is not a time, place and manner regulation aimed at 
containing the "secondary effects" of  speech. Unlike City of  Renton 
and Young, where the cities sought to control crime and protect retail 
business and property values through geographic zoning of  theaters, the 
CDA criminializes speech because of  its content (Apollomedia). 
Through this argument the Defenders of  Liberty were attempting to get the 
Court to reject the idea that the CDA addressed secondary effects of  speech.  If  they 
were successful, the legal basis for cyberzoning would be removed. 
Last, the Defenders of  Liberty addressed the concept of  community standards 
that are at the heart of  the Miller standard. Through Miller, the Court established 
that a  local community was to determine what was  considered indecent for that 
community.  The Defenders of  Liberty asserted that the CDA was an attempt to 
establish a national standard and as such was a violation of the standard defined in 
Miller v·California: Miller's definition of obscene speech that enjoys no First Amendment 
protection attempted to minimize sUbjectivity by requiring that 
offensiveness be judged by "community standards."  The standards 
have come to be geographic.  Miller itself said that it was permissible 
to use the State of  California as the  "relevant community."  413 U.S. at 
30-31 ...  But the Internet is a non-geographic medium, and online 
communications can and do circulate throughout the nation in the 
world, with a speaker commonly having no idea who might read his or 
her words or in what geographic community readers might live. [11]/ 
In other words, the assumption of  Miller that "patent offensiveness" 
will be judged by the standards of  a given geographic community, 
where the defendant intends to sell the offending film or book, simply 
does not work with  the Internet. Applying geographic community 
standards to speech that is available everywhere reduces all speech to 
what is acceptable in the least tolerant community a prosecutor can find 
(Apollomedia). 
In summary, the Defenders of  Liberty asserted that the CDA's criminal 
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sanctions for speech deemed  'indecent' would have a detrimental effect on the use 
ofthis technology, and at least one group, saw the CDA as a specialized threat to 
women and children. The Defenders of  Liberty believed that the internet was a 
unique media that existing law may, or may not apply to. They were united in their 
assertion that cyberzoning as a concept left a great deal to be desired,  as they were 
in the belief  that a national community standard for indecent speech was legally 
impermissible. 
OVERALL THEME 
Like the Antiobscenity Crusaders, the Defenders of  Liberty used a 
multilayered theme. Their primary theme was that the sacred values of  the First 
Amendment were under attack and that an all out effort must be made to protect it. The threat came from legislation that criminialized particular speech activities 
when they occurred in cyberspace. 
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The second layer built upon the first and asserted that the legislation 
included an arbitrary standard for what was punishable, leaving the speaker in 
jeopardy of  criminal sanction.  Several members of  this group directed the Court to 
the Antiobscenity Crusader legal briefs which showed an inconsistent definition 
from brief  to brief. The Defenders of  Liberty asked the Court to consider how a 
local jury would decide something the supporters of  the law could not even agree 
on.  They continued that this lack of  clarity would have the effect of speakers 
choosing not to engage in what may be legal speech acts. 
Another layer of  this theme was that the CDA was not supported by legal 
precedent. Through the attempt to find the correct analogy for cyberspace, the 
Defenders of  Liberty hoped to show that the cyberspace was unlike other existing 
media. If  they were successful, then the laws that governed speech acts in these 
other arenas would not apply.  Without this precedence, a unique standard would 
have to be developed. 
The final layer of  this theme was that if  allowed to stand, the standards of 
the CDA could be applied to other media through the establishment of  a precedent 
that could be applied to future cases.  This application to other media could then 
criminialize speech acts that are currently legal. This combination of  arguments 
was for them a prima facia case against the CDA.  This multilayered theme was 
able to gain the Defenders of  Liberty a broad base of  support as demonstrated by 37 
the number and types of  organizations that filed Amici briefs (Appendix A). 
The Feminists for Free Expression went a step farther in their theme,  the 
CDA was a much bigger threat to women and children than the obscene speech that 
the Antiobscenity Crusaders were attempting to eliminate.  They stated that the 
Internet was the only place where women could be truly judged based on their 
ideas rather than their gender; that it was one of few places women could ask 
sexual questions they found embarrassing and that it was a unique educational tool 
for parents.  They believed that "the freedom to put forth controversial feminist 
ideas into combat ignorance regarding sexuality, reproduction, and abuse are 
critical to women's rights and well-being" (Feminists).  They stated the feminist 
speech is by its nature political, and that the CDA could be used to limit this 
political speech.  This theme was a direct counterpoint to the themes of  the 
Antiobscenity Crusaders and points to a split within the feminist movement about 
how to address obscene speech. 
ABSTRACT CONCEPT 
The Defenders of Liberty relied on the concepts of  liberty and free 
unmonitored speech as the higher values that justified their action. These values are 
culturally embedded within the First Amendment ofthe U.S. Constitution as 
explained by the Speech Communication Association in their brief  to the Supreme 
Court: 
These technologies represent a return to the Framers' underlying conception ofthe First Amendment.  To the Framers, the expression of 
individual citizens had paramount significance for the First 
Amendment, and formed an essential element of  our constitutional 
system  ...  The Framers intended the First Amendment's protection of 
"the freedom of  speech and of  the press"  to guarantee and stimulate 
discourse among the citizenry, and not merely to protect the editorial 
judgment of  the media (Speech Communication Association). 
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The Defenders of  Liberty invoke the 'Framers' to give added weight to the 
argument that the CDA violates the intent and spirit ofthe First Amendment. In 
effect, ifthe CDA were upheld, it would require the Court to reject the intention of 
the men who created the nations most sacred document, the Constitution. 
HERONILLAIN 
Like the Antiobscenity Crusaders, the Defenders of  Liberty had a clear 
hero/villain interaction. The Defenders of  Liberty saw government restricted speech 
as represented by the Communication Decency Act as the villain.  In their brief, the 
ACLU referred to it as the "most restrictive censorship scheme imposed on any 
medium" (ACLU).  Further, they invoked the Framers of  the Constitution as a part 
of their argument, 
The Framers conceived of  the First Amendment as a means to 
facilitate the ability of  citizens to debate issues of  public concern. 
Participatory citizen discourse on matters of  public interest lies at 
the very core ofthe First Amendment  ...  Here, the CDA 
unnecessarily and severely restricts the ability of  individual citizens 
to participate in the discourse so essential to the Framers' 
conception of  the First Amendment (Speech Communication 
Association). 
Further, the villain of  the CDA seeks to remove the judgment of parents and replace it with the judgment of  the federal government in 
detennining the types of  infonnation that children may access, 
the CDA officiously meddles in what is first and foremost the 
domain of  parents, not government. It overrides parents' wishes and 
criminializes speech that some parents may affinnatively want their 
children to have access to (Apollomedia). 
To stand up to this villain of  censorship was the First Amendment ofthe 
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U.S. Constitution and the men who created it. The Defenders of  Liberty connected 
the intentions of  the framers ofthe Constitution with this new technology, 
These technologies represent a return to the Framers' underlying 
conception of  the First Amendment. To the Framers, the expression 
of  individual citizens had paramount significance for the First 
Amendment, and fonned an essential element of  our constitutional 
system (Speech Communication Association). 
They added a more recent expression of the connection between the First 
Amendment and the political life of  the United States. This voice belonged to 
Supreme Court Justice Thomas ruling in an earlier case, 
At the heart of  the First Amendment is the principle that each person 
should decide for himself or herself the ideas or beliefs deserving of 
expression, consideration and adherence. Our political system and 
cultural life rest upon this ideal (Site Specific). 
Last, they discussed the internet as a critical piece of the modem 
democracy, "by the nature of  the Internet medium [it is] the most democratic 
[medium] ever invented" (Apollomedia).  They argued that censoring it would be at 
the peril of an infonned community at the heart of  a functioning democratic nation, 
according to the government, because ordinary citizens can communicate with each other directly, not as passive recipients of 
programming directed at them by powerful corporations, the 
government is entitled to step in and make criminal the citizen 
speech it disfavors. The perverse result is that the more democratic 
the medium  ...  the greater the governments right to regulate the 
medium. If  the First Amendment means anything, this argument 
must be rejected out of  hand (Apollomedia) 
Through their argument, the Defenders of  Liberty attempt to make it 
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rhetorically difficult for the Supreme Court to find the CDA constitutional without 
violating the intent and 'underlying conception' of Madison and Jefferson. 
EMOTION 
Emotion was salient for the Defenders of Liberty, as it was for the 
Antiobscenity Crusaders. Like the Crusaders they invoked fear however, theirs was 
a fear of  criminal sanction, "the provisions of  the CDA at issue in this case punish 
pure speech as a felony" (Apollomedia). Many ofthe Defenders discuss the chilling 
effect this sanction would have as people opted not to speak in cyberspace rather 
than risk imprisonment. 
Additionally, they were afraid that specific types of  material would be 
politically unpopular and as a result, would be sanctioned.  They pointed to health 
information including safer sex techniques used to prevent HIV transmission, to 
breast-cancer information, to emotional support for sexual assault survivors; and 
political speech like that of  Amnesty International or the ACLU itself. 
The Defenders of Liberty also appeared quite frustrated to be having this 
debate which they likened to debates of  the past. These prior battles, however, gave 41 
strength to the argument that speech in cyberspace was in jeopardy and if  they were 
not diligent, a criminal sanction would be established for engaging in speech. 
In its entirety the Defenders of  Liberty fantasy theme is: 
the First Amendment of  the US Constitution is under attack, again. This time in the 
form of  the CDA which attempts to create speech standards within cyberspace. It is 
however, unclear in stating what violates the law leading to arbitrary enforcement. 
Further, the CDA is an attempt to criminialize speech. These points together 
violate all that was intended in the writing of  the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights. Only through vigilance and by  fighting against laws like the CDA,  can the 
First Amendment be protected. 
The Defenders of  Liberty were a coalition of  over 40 organizations 
and individuals that believed the CDA was unconstitutional. They were concerned 
that the CDA included a broader definition for obscenity than applied to other 
media, while providing for criminal sanction for violating the law. They were 
further concerned that the ambiguous nature of the definition made it difficult to 
know what was permitted, resulting in people self-censoring rather than risking 
criminal penalties. Through their legal briefs and oral testimony they attempted to 
persuade the Supreme Court that the CDA was an unconstitutional burden on 
everyday citizens. 
There is an additional group that was involved in this debate, the users of 
the technology. This group, however, was not able to access the Court and their 
views must be gleaned from within cyberspace. I have titled the users of  the 42 
technology the Homesteaders, and will discuss them in the next section. 43 
HOMESTEADERS 
This posting is not subject to any u.s. governmental agency regulations, nor congressional 
actions, as guaranteed in the US Constitution Bill of  Rights, article 1. 
~Davis 
There was one additional perspective presented,  that of  the users of  the 
technology. This particular viewpoint was not really seen by the court, in part 
because ofthe structure of  the group.  As a group the users of the technology are 
loosely affiliated individuals without the organization or expertise to access the 
Supreme Court. Despite their absence in front of  the Court, they are a rhetorically 
interesting part of  the conversation and are the most likely to be immediately 
impacted by the sanctions ofthe CDA. 
The users of  the space were keenly aware of  the pending legislation and later 
court action. There were a myriad of  views and responses to the legislation, but it 
was clearly unwelcome. It was viewed as a deprivation of  liberty and freedom 
enacted by a group unfamiliar with the technology. The users ofthe technology 
sent their opinions to one another on listservs, web pages, and via email. A sample 
of  these statements illustrate the displeasure of  the self-described 'cyberdenizens': 
The "Communication Decency Act" attached to the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 is now a law, signed by President 
Clinton on Thursday, February 8.  I thought the War on Drugs was bad 
enough.  Now we have a war on speech as well. Legislating morality 
doesn't work, as demonstrated by the failure of  prohibition. Will the 
FCC use tactics against so-called indecency similar to those that the 
DEA has been using against drugs?  Only time will tell (Miller). ALERT! 
Your liberties have been trampled by Congress. 
The United States Congress, operating on the assumption that since the 
Internet wasn't written into the Constitution, it isn't covered by the 
Constitution, has passed a law completely ignoring your First 
Amendment rights (Trojan Democrats). 
I am a Viet Nam veit I fought in I corp Dang and parts north Phi bai 
and i have seen my Friends die and yes I have killed in Viet Nam to 
stay alive and I thought I was fighting for a reason FREEDOM and 
now we have a draf dogeing jerk who wants to take it away? What did 
we fight for? The Land of  the brave Home of  the Free and That means 
Free Speech NO!! I will not stand by while it is stolen right under our 
feet and not say any thing I was willing to kill and be shot at for this 
right and a lot of  my Friends died for this reason And Now some say 
what if  Big brother does not like it He may put you in Jail we when I 
am in front of  GOD I Don't think HE will ask me WHY I went to jail 
But he will ask you WHY You did not go if  you stand by and let this 
happen we are still The Home of  the brave and The Land of  the FREE 
Please don't give up with out a fight OR tell all the vets you're fight was 
in vain we gave it away Stand tall and Fight if  nesseray and remember 
the ones who has came before you to make this Land the Home of  the 
brave A Vietnam Vet  (LeFlore) [Spelling and emphasis remain as in 
original] 
A common belief of  the Homesteaders was that cyberspace was a 
unique community and that the CDA violated the customs of  the space. 
Further, this violation threatened the potential of  this community: 
On the Internet, a networked community, based entirely on speech, 
nothing is more important than freedom from censorship enjoyed up to 
the moment when President Clinton's pen puts an asterisk next to the 
First Amendment, an asterisk that says, "except on-line speech," an 
asterisk it will probably take the Supreme Court months, if  not years to 
erase (Electronic Frontier Foundation). 
44 The Communication Decency Act  ...  has created  a chilling effect on the 
Internet, and is likely  to cause long-term complications if  it remains 
intact. This provision of  the law is overly broad and will cause so much 
chaos the internet will be hard-pressed to grow as a community. The 
vagueness of  the provision will stifle growth and, perhaps more 
importantly, creativity and imagination on all manner of  internet 
project. 
As the present bill reads, 'community standards' will be used, among 
other things, to determine what is 'indecent' or 'morally offensive.' 
This is outrageous. The Internet is a global resource and community, 
and yet  there are so many different sets of  values across this country 
were offensive means different things, let alone in the world  ...  And that 
is really the issue here: the CDA does not define the context of  an 
offense well enough except to specify community standards (Lawless). 
This belief that cyberspace was an autonomous, self-governing community 
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led to an assertion that the world's governments were overstepping their bounds by 
attempting to create laws for this place. This argument is explained by long time 
user and co-founder of  the Electronic Frontier Foundation, John Perry Barlow, in 
his Declaration of  Independence for Cyberspace (Appendix C); 
Governments of  the Industrial World, you weary giants of  flesh and steel, I 
come from cyberspace, the new home of  Mind. On behalf of  the future, I 
ask you of  the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You 
have no sovereignty where we gather (Barlow). 
Through his Declaration of  Independence for Cyberspace John Perry Barlow 
begins to describe the unique nature of  cyberspace.  It is a place of  the mind, where 
people are judged by their comments and dialogue, not their physical presence. 
Cyberspace is the future of  community and conversation, and according to Barlow, 
is outside the reach of  word governments. 
The Homesteaders, like the other two groups had thoughts on the correct analogy for cyberspace, although for them, it came from experience rather than 
legal precedent. First Howard Rheingold, a cyberspace expert and long time user 
used several analogies rather than only one to describe the experience of 
cyberspace: 
Usenet is a place for conversation or publication, like a giant 
coffeehouse with a 1000 rooms; it is also a worldwide digital version of 
the speakers comer in London's Hyde Park, an unedited collection of 
letters to the editor, a floating flea market, a huge vanity publisher, and 
a coalition of  every odd special interest group in the world.  It  is a mass 
medium because any piece information put on the Net has a potential 
worldwide reach of  millions. But it differs from conventional mass 
media in some respects.  Every individual who has the ability to read a 
Usenet posting has the ability to reply or to creating a new posting.  In 
television, newspapers, magazines, films, and radio, a small number of 
people have the power to determine what information should be made 
available to the mass audience.  In Usenet, every member the audience 
is also potentially a publisher (Rheingold 130). 
John Perry Barlow perceived the internet as a frontier village rather 
than a form of  media: 
The WELL (or Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link) is an example the latest 
thing in frontier villages, the computer bulletin board.  In this kind of 
small town, Main Street is a central minicomputer to which  ...  [multiple] 
microcomputers may be connected at one time by phone lines and little 
blinking boxes called modems ... Cyberspace, in its present condition, 
has a lot in common with the 19th-century West.  It is vast, unmapped, 
culturally and legally ambiguous, verbally terse ...  hard to get around in, 
and up for grabs.  Large institutions  already claim to own the place, 
but most of  the actual natives are solitary and independent, sometimes 
to the point of  sociopathy.  It  is, of  course, a perfect breeding ground 
for both outlaws and new ideas about liberty (Ludlow 460). 
Like the other two groups, the Homesteaders searched for an analogy to 
describe and define the space.  Unlike the other groups, the Homesteaders 
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discussed the space as a place they inhabit rather than simply as a technology they 47 
use. As Barlow states, "Cyberspace consists of  transactions, relationships, and 
thought itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of  our communications. 
Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, bl;lt it is not where bodies 
live." (Barlow)  For the Homesteaders, cyberspace was a place that they went for 
conversation, information and friendship. It is not a cold piece of  technology but 
rather, an integral part of  their social lives. 
OVERALL THEME 
The Homesteaders also use multiple layers in their theme, but theirs are tied 
to a deepening meaning of place and community. Their surface theme was that 
their individual freedoms and way of  life were under attack.  They believed that not 
only the ability to send and receive material as they chose was being threatened, but 
also their ability to create their own rules of  conduct. This ability was being 
forcefully taken from them and put into the hands of  the centralized real world 
government.  This view is explained as one of  colonization of  a sovereign nation as 
expressed by John Perry Barlow in his Declaration of  Independence for 
Cyberspace: 
These increasingly hostile and colonial measures place us in the same 
position as those previous lovers of  freedom and self-determination 
who had to reject the authorities of  distant, uninformed powers. We 
must declare our virtual selves immune to your sovereignty, even as we 
continue to consent to your rule over our bodies. We will spread 
ourselves across the Planet so that no one can arrest our thoughts. 
(Barlow). 
Barlow relied on the form of  the United States Declaration of  Independence 48 
to format his Declaration  .. Specifically, he listed the grievances of  the 'colonists,' 
described how the colony was different than the parent country, and made a 
declaration of  independence and sovereignty.  In this way, Barlow was able to 
invoke the image of  the colonists standing up to a tyrannical government. The 
cyber-denizens were frontiersmen defending their way of  life as the early European 
settlers had as they moved throughout North America.  In this wayan image of  a 
vast, open space is evoked as is the idea that 'place' no longer requires a physical 
boundary. 
As the Homesteaders discussed the threats to unfettered, unsupervised 
speech, they inevitably came back to the concept that cyberspace was a free 
community with a unique culture that should be left alone.  This group discussed 
being under siege from all sides, referring not only to the CDA but to similar 
legislation being created around the world. They discussed laws being created for 
them, their conduct and their space, but without their members being consulted. In 
this way, participants from western nations, primarily the United States, shifted 
from being the colonizers to being the colonized. 
Through this multilayered theme, the Homesteaders portrayed cyberspace not 
as a group of  electronic impulses, but as a physical space that they inhabited. As the 
aboriginal people ofthis space they create the rules and the culture. The CDA and 
similar laws were anathema to what was held to be sacred in this new land. These 
themes served to unite the users of  the space to take action, but it was action within 
the space rather than within the courts. Throughout the legislative and Court proceedings, the Homesteaders engaged in self-directed speech acts such as 
po  stings to news groups and using a black background on web pages to express 
their displeasure. 
ABSTRACT CONCEPT 
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At the heart of  the Homesteaders theme are the abstract concepts of  freedom 
and democracy.  As the aboriginal people within the space they had established 
what would be valued within the space. Further, they had developed sanctions for 
violating this value set. Through the CDA, they were being threatened by the 
colonizing forces of a world government; the US Congress was colonizing 
cyberspace and establishing law for its inhabitants.  Through this law the speech 
acts of  the inhabitants now faced criminal sanctions for activity that had previously 
been governed by Homesteaders. 
One ofthe responses to the CDA was the creation of  a cyber-essay titled 24 
Hours of  Democracy, which included this statement, "In this "Brave New World" 
preservation of  freedom of  expression is more essential than ever because in such a 
virtual world there is concern by the narrow minded about wider dissemination of 
views contrary to their own "(Duane). Through his words Duane makes clear that 
for him, and many others,  freedom of  expression is a critical component of 
cyberspace. Howard Rheingold adds that "Democracy is what's at stake. It doesn't 
have anything to do with protecting children from pornography, because there are 
better ways to do that. It's about the power to determine what people are allowed to 50 
say, write and believe" (Rheingold, Democracy) The Homesteaders were 
accustomed to self-determination and had determined that democracy was a desired 
concept, however, the CDA threatened that freedom in a fundamental way, it 
criminialized speech. Rheingold reminded other cyberdenizens that this attack on 
freedom had occurred before in history when the printing press was invented, 
when entire popUlations became capable of  reading and writing 
about the issues that affected their lives, they demanded and won the 
power to determine their fate. There was a long struggle over the 
Crown's power to control the press. The American Revolution was 
founded in that struggle for individual liberties from State 
interference, and freedom of  the press was at the core. This has all 
happened before, with the ultimately doomed effort to control and 
suppress the effects of  the printing press (ibid). 
In doing so, he not only reminds his fellow Homesteaders of  what was at stake, but 
he continues the image of  a young nation standing up to tyranny. In this way, he 
lays also addresses the HeroNillain interaction as seem from cyberspace. 
HERONILLAIN 
Like the Defenders of  Liberty, the Homesteaders drew on the values 
embedded in the First Amendment as their hero.  Additionally, they saw the 
technical structure of  the Internet and the many cyber-communities as additional 
heroes because they were seen as a way to technologically invalidate the CDA. 
They believed that the fact that messages crossed multiple jurisdictional boundaries 
would make enforcement difficult. Further, they saw the utopian communities they 
were creating as the location of  community standard by which the message should 51 
be judged. The Homesteaders saw both the Communication Decency Act and the 
supporters of  the CDA as villains.  They believed than the US Congress, the 
Christian Coalition, Enough is Enough, and other CDA supporters were completely 
unfamiliar with the technology or culture of  cyberspace, though this ignorance in 
no way prevented their willingness to create legislation. 
The Homesteaders saw both the Communication Decency Act and the 
supporters of  the CDA as villains.  They believed than the US Congress, the 
Christian Coalition, Enough is Enough, and other CDA supporters were completely 
unfamiliar with the technology or culture of  cyberspace, though this ignorance in 
no way prevented their willingness to create legislation. 
EMOTION 
As with the other players, emotions played a big role in the fantasy theme of 
the Homesteaders.  Unlike the other two, the Homesteaders did not rely on fear, but 
instead rage.  The Homesteaders were outraged that people who were largely 
unknowledgeable about the dynamics of the culture or the technology were 
attempting to create regulations for its use. They  felt that they needed to protect 
this unique space and culture. They asserted that this legislation would "cause 
chaos and make it [difficult] for the internet to grow" (Lawless).  Further, they 
were angry at what they perceived to be a misuse of  governmental power. Their 
describe the US Congress as egotistical, vain, and narrow minded; everything 
cyberculture propertied to be moving away from. One reminded the US Congress 52 
that he had gone to war to fight for the freedom they were attempting to limit. One 
stated that this was the "last gasp for the first amendment" (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation). Their combined anger was seen in by thousands of  web pages turned 
black in protest (Electronic Frontier Foundation) and in the creation of  a document 
entitled 24 Hours of  Democracy  (Gulker) which chronicled the immediate reaction 
to this legislation. 
In its entirety, the Fantasy Theme ofthe Homesteaders is: 
cyberspace is a unique and sovereign place. As users of  the space we create 
the rules and determine what values will become a part of  the culture.  We will also 
determine what sanctions will be used if  the rules are not  followed.  The 
governments of  the world, and most especially the US Congress, have overstepped 
their authority. They are attempting to govern something they don't understand and 
to address a problem that doesn't exist, at least not in the way they have portrayed. 
They are unwelcome and should  focus on what is theirs to control and leave us 
alone 
The Homesteaders are comprised of  the users ofthe technology. They lack 
the structural ability to access the Supreme Court and as such, were unable to 
present their views on the CDA.  There was one other group that did not present 
their views to the Supreme Court despite having the ability. I have called this group 
the Antipornography Feminists and they will be discussed in the next section. 53 
government and the Christian Coalition, or with the American Civil Liberties 
Union. 
The Antipornography Feminists agree with the Antiobscenity Crusaders that 
p~rnographic speech is harmful. They cite many ofthe same studies to show that it 
contributes to the rape of  women and children, but this group goes a step farther. 
MacKinnon and Dworkin begin, "Pornography is central in creating and 
maintaining the civil inequality of  the sexes. Pornography is a systematic practice 
of  exploitation and subordination based on sex which differentially hanns women" 
(MacKinnon & Dworkin). In their writing they discuss the dehumanization of 
women that occurs as a result of  the consumption of  this material. Andrea Dworkin 
asserts that "(p  )ornography plays a big part in nonnalizing the ways in which we 
are demeaned and attacked, in how humiliating and insulting us is made to look 
natural and inevitable (Dworkin 186). In this way she introduces the idea that 
pornography creates a view of  women that maintains that women want to be treated 
as their counterparts in pornography are.  Catherine MacKinnon 
continues,  "(p  )ornography constructs what a woman is in tenns of  its view of  what 
men want sexually, such that acts of  rape, battery, sexual harassment, prostitution 
and sexual abuse of  children become acts of  sexual equality." (MacKinnon 461) 
Through this change in the way women are viewed, a healthy equally powered 
sexual relationship is indistinguishable from rape and prostitution. 
Dworkin· continues, 
I am describing a process of  dehumanization, a concrete means of 
changing someone into something  ... being turned into an object is a real event; and the pornographic object is a particular kind of  object. 
It  is a target. You are turned into a target...This object wants it. She 
is the only object with a will that says, hurt me. A car does not say, 
bang me up. But she, this nonhuman thing, says hurt me-and the 
more you hurt me, the more I will like it (Dworkin 182). 
It is through this objectification that the real harm is done, 
When we talk about pornography that objectifies women, was are 
talking about the sexualization of  insult, ofhumiliation  ... there is a 
cruelty that does not have in it overt violence  ... (t)here is a cruelty 
that says to you, you are worth nothing in human terms (Dworkin 
184). 
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Once women have been objectified, it is much easier not only to harm them, but to 
dismiss that harm as either imaginary or wanted. MacKinnon explains  "The point 
is not only that when women can be coerced with impunity, the results, when mass 
produced, set standards that are devastating and dangerous for all women." 
(MacKinnon 471) Through this objectification, women are injured, dismissed by 
those who might be able to help them, and learn that they are worthless and should 
expect nothing else. 
The Antiobscenity Crusaders also believed that there was a change in 
. attitude resulting from viewing pornography however, they did not conceptualize 
pornography as something that would have the same far reaching effect. The 
antiobscenity Crusaders discussed the warping of  children's morals who as a result, 
may become crime victims or criminals.  Antipornography Feminists on the other 
hand, believe that pornography not only warps the individual, but also the culture. 
They assert that pornography teaches that women and children want to be 
mistreated and this teaching leads to harassment, discrimination, prostitution, 55 
assault and rape. This different way of  conceptualizing hann, made it difficult for 
the Antipornography-Feminists to rhetorically join with the Antiobscenity 
Crusaders. 
Making this rhetorical joining impossible is that the Antiobscenity 
Crusaders saw zoning as the way to address the availability of  pornography. 
Through the CDA, they would require that legally protected pornographic material 
be placed in areas where minors could not access it.  In contrast, the 
Antipornography Feminists expressly reject zoning because it moves rather than 
addresses the hann. Andrea Dworkin explained this view in her testimony to the 
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography convened by the US Department 
of  Justice, 
Zoning laws do not keep pornography out of  cities. They are an 
official legal permission to traffic in pornography. And as a result 
politicians are able to denounce pornography moralistically while 
protecting it through zoning laws. 
Zoning laws impose pornography on poor neighborhoods, on 
working-class neighborhoods, on neighborhoods where people of 
color live, and all of  those people have to deal with the increase in 
crime, the terrible harassment, the degradation of  the quality of  life 
in their neighborhoods, and the politicians get to protect the property 
values of  the rich. There is an equal protection issue here: why the 
state makes some people pay so other people can profit (Dworkin 
transcript). 
This assertion that zoning is a benefit to pornographers at the expense of  women 
and the poor, eliminates any rhetorical room for the Antipornography Feminists to 
join with the antiobscenity Crusaders in their appearance before the Supreme Court. 
The other group making an appearance before the Court was the Defenders 56 
of  Liberty, led by the ACLU. There is a historical distrust of  the ACLU by the 
Antipornography Feminists. The ACLU is viewed as being partners with racists 
and pornographers at the expense of  every day citizens. Rather than being viewed 
as defenders of  a sacred value, the ACLU and their supporters are seen as defenders 
of  pornographers. In an interview MacKinnon and Dworkin assert that the ACLU 
has economic ties to pornographers, 
The ACLU has taken money for a long time from the pornographers. 
Some money has been raised by showing pornography. The ACLU's 
economic ties with the pornographers take many different forms, 
ranging from taking money from the Playboy Foundation to being 
housed for a nominal rent ($1 per year) in a building owned by 
pornographers (Russe1191). 
Next, they make a connection between racists and pornographers, 
The pornographers rank with Nazis and Klansman in promoting 
hatred and violence. Their targets are always sex-based and 
sometimes race-based. Like the Nazis and the Klansman, they 
commit the acts of  violence they promote. They conduct a war 
against women that spreads terror (ibid). 
Finally they state that the purpose of  the ACLU is sometimes unclear, 
The ACLU's stated commitment is to protect the Bill ofRights  ...  not 
pornography as such, though its hard to tell sometimes. Without a 
commitment to real equality of  same magnitude as its commitment 
to those first ten amendments, the ACLU defends power, not rights 
(ibid). 
Through this conceptualization of  the ACLU as  little more than puppets of 
pornographers, MacKinnon and Dworkin begin to create a rhetorical chasm 
between themselves and the Defenders of  Liberty. 
There is another difference between these two groups, the Antipornography 
Feminists view pornographic speech as harmful on its face.  It  is not viewed as 57 
another speech act, but rather as something that is explicitly about hanning women 
and children. The distinction between obscenity and pornography that is critical to 
the legal case, is deemed artificial.  MacKinnon explains, 
Obscenity is a moral idea; pornography is a political practice. 
Obscenity is abstract; pornography is concrete  ... Sex forced on real 
women so that it can be sold at a profit to be forced on other real 
. women; women's bodies trussed and maimed and raped and made 
into things to be hurt and obtained and accessed and this presented 
as the nature ofwomen  .. ;this is what bothers feminists about 
pornography. Obscenity as such probably does little harm; 
pornography causes attitudes and behaviors of  violence and 
discrimination which define the treatment and status of half of  the 
population.  (Donnerstein 141) 
In examining the Constitutional arguments, they reject the belief  that in this 
case, more speech rather than less will be a remedy, 
The situation in which women presently find themselves with 
respect to the pornography is one in which more pornography is 
inconsistent with the rectifying or even counterbalancing its damage 
through speech, because so long as pornography exists -in the way it 
does there will not be more speech by women. Pornography strips 
and devastates women of  our credibility  ... (w)e are deauthoritized 
and reduced and devalidated and silenced. (MacKinnon 483) 
[original emphasis] 
In effect, MacKinnon is arguing that not only does pornographic speech lead to 
direct physical and sexual harm, but it also effects the way that women are viewed. 
Through this change women are robbed of  the ability to be believed or to have the 
hann done to them seen as real. Through pornography, women are silenced both 
physically and orally. Dworkin is quite concise in explaining this view, 
"pornography is not speech for women, it is the silence of  women." (MacKinnon 
485) Further, MacKinnon asserts that the Miller standard that defines what is 
legally considered obscene, leaves the feminist with more questions than answers, 
Feminism doubts whether the average gender-neutral person exists; 
has more questions about the content and process of  defining what 
community standards are than it does about deviations from them; 
wonders why prurience counts but powerless does not, and why 
sensibilities are better protected from offence than women are from 
exploitation  ... and questions why a body oflaw which has not in 
practice been able to tell the difference between rape and intercourse 
should, without further guidance, be entrusted with telling 
pornography from anything else. (MacKinnon 464) 
For this group of  feminists, the existing legal standards do not recognize or reflect 
the reality of  pornographic speech in the daily lives of  women, and is therefore, 
inadequate.  It  is this daily reality that led MacKinnon and Dworkin to propose a 
civil rights based law to address pornographic speech (Appendix D). 
The ordinance was initially introduced in Minneapolis but was vetoed by 
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the Mayor. It was then introduced in Indianapolis and eventually signed into law. It 
was immediately challenged by the ACLU as an unconstitutional breach of  the First 
Amendment. The Seventh Circuit Court ruled that it was indeed a Constitutional 
violation. The US Supreme Court affirmed the lower court opinion, without 
comment. Subsequently, similar language has been introduced, and upheld, in 
Canada.  Other countries including New Zealand, Germany and the Philippines 
have also introduced legislation that encompasses portions ofthe Minneapolis 
ordinance. 
The ordinance defines pornography rather than obscenity as current United 
States law does. It also does not rely on the Miller standard. Instead the ordinance states, 
the tenn "pornography" shall mean the graphic sexually explicit 
subordination of  women tlt.Iough pictures or words, including by 
electronic or other data retrieval systems, and shall further include 
the presentation of  women's body parts, including but not limited to, 
vaginas, breasts or buttocks, such that women are reduced to such 
parts or the presentation of  women (MacKinnon) 
To explain the need for this definition, the opening statement ofthe ordinance 
reads, 
Pornography is a systematic practice of  exploitation and 
subordination based on sex that differentially harms and 
disadvantages women through dehumanization, psychic assault, 
sexual exploitation, forced sex and prostitution, physical injury and 
social and sexual terrorism and inferiority presented as 
entertainment and existing .  laws have proven inadequate to solve 
such a problem. (ibid). 
This radically different way of viewing pornography and its harm, 
combined with the beliefthat the First Amendment is being used to protect 
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pornographers at the expense of  women and children, presented an ins~ountable 
barrier between the Antipornography Feminists and the Defenders of  Liberty. 
Antipornography  Feminists have invested over 30 years to changing the 
tenns ofthe pornography debate. They have educated an entire generation of 
feminists about the threat that pornography poses to women. They have 
successfully passed legislation that treats the harm of  pornography as a civil rights 
violation. Despite all ofthese accomplishments, they were silent in the debate 
surrounding the availability of  pomography on the internet. One possible reason for 
this silence is that as a group, they lacked a rhetorical place to join the conversation. 
The Antiobscenity Crusaders arguments were similar to what the Antipornography 60 
Feminists have historically argued,  but their solution was inadequate. Further, the 
political and social agendas ofthe Christian Coalition and Family Research Council 
are anathema to feminists. The Defenders of  Liberty were also disliked and 
distrusted, because they were viewed as being little more than agents of  the 
pornographers. The Defenders of  Liberty conceptualized both the problem and the 
solution quite differently than the Antipornography Feminists did. The 
Antipornography Feminists were left to choose between joining with a group that 
they distrusted and that they didn't agree with or with staying silent. They chose 
silence. 61 
ANALYSIS 
As a rhetorician, I am interested in the effect of  persuasion on the intended 
audience.  In this analysis, my interest is in why the rhetor groups used the 
. 
particular fantasy themes they did. I am also interested in how these fantasy themes 
affected a legal decision.  I am, however, limited to the public dialogue and legal 
opinion of  the Court for this analysis as these are all that are available. 
The discussion about obscene speech has been a part ,?fthe American 
culture from the earliest days.  One question in this analysis concerns how the 
debate differed now that it involved a new medium. On the surface, it really was no 
different. Both the Antiobscenity Crusaders and the Defenders of  Liberty structured 
their arguments as they had in the past.  They altered their message slightly to show 
that the old arguments applied to the new medium, but the fantasy themes were 
essentially the same as when these groups have squared off  over other media forms. 
As in the past, the Antiobscenity Crusaders discussed the danger that obscene 
speech posed to children and advocated for limiting that exposure. The Defenders 
of  Liberty on the other hand, discussed the sanctity of  the First Amendment and the 
danger of  government monitored speech. 
It  was a different debate when the presence of  the Homesteaders and the 
absence of the Antipornography Feminists are factored in. The Homesteaders 
change the conversation by asserting that this space is unique in structure, culture 
and ownership. They attempted to change the terms of  the conversation through an 
assertion of  sovereignty and self  governance. If  this assertion had been included in 62 
the fantasy chains of  the other groups, the other groups would have been required to 
fundamentally change their  conception of  the space and the arguments they  made 
about pornographic speech in the space. If, for example, the antiobscenity 
Crusaders integrated the story of  the Homesteaders, they would have had to 
recreate their story such that the threat of  pornographic speech necessarily required 
them to go into a sovereign space and impose a solution. In effect declaring war on 
another sovereign space. This change to the fantasy theme could have far reaching 
effects given that the United States Congress was a key player in the Antiobscenity 
Crusaders.  If  they integrated a theme that encouraged them to invade recognized 
sovereign nations to solve national problems, the place that the United States 
government holds in the international world would be fundamentally different than 
it is.,  This singular change in the fantasy theme would move this from a discussion 
about speech, to' one about foreign policy.  As a foreign policy issue, the US 
Congress would be bound by international law and custom and would have to act 
accordingly. For example, if  there was an interest in regulating commerce, the 
Congress would be required to enter into a treaty with the Homesteaders laying out 
the terms of  the commerce regulations.  If  there were disputes about the 
implementation of  that treaty, the world courts would be the avenue of  redress. 
Additionally, if  cyberspace is a sovereign space, by definition the US Congress can 
not create law for the activities within cyberspace. Any attempt to do so would be 
viewed as an act of  aggression just as it would ifthe US Congress attempted to 
create law for Mexico or Germany. 63 
The religion based members of  the Antiobscenity Crusaders may have fared 
better with viewing cyberspace as sovereign, ,in that they are not limited to what 
governments are able to do.  They would however, have been required to find a 
new hero because the ability to create law would have been removed or 
fundamentally changed by this conception of  sovereignty. The religion based 
groups could have relied on a missionary appeal as they have throughout history. 
This would have allowed them to cross national borders as they did during the 
Crusades. As missionaries, they could discuss the dangers that pornography poses 
to a persons' soul in more concrete teIDls than they are able to when they rely on a 
legislative hero. 
Further, had the Defenders of  Liberty  adopted this theme of  cyberspace as 
sovereign, they would also have had to change their basic theme. It  may in fact, 
have been nullified. The Defenders of  Liberty relied on the United States 
Constitution to give validity and urgency to their arguments,  but this document 
does not apply outside the borders of  the United States. The Defenders of  Liberty 
would  have been required to either find a different hero, or be absent from the 
conversation. 
The Homesteaders were not however, able to affect the conversation in any 
significant way. This group is loosely affiliated and lacks the traditional structure of 
a government or organization preventing them from presenting a united voice in the 
legal or policy arenas. An additional complication for this group is that they inhabit 
both the world of  cyberspace and the physical world. For those that are American 64 
citizens, they have accepted the riotion that the United States Congress has the 
ability and authority to create law to govern their non-cyberspace activities. This 
belief  is challenged by the assertion that cyberspace is sovereign.  For this group to 
fully utilize the theme of  sovereignty they must make the rhetorical leap to 'defense 
of  territory. ,  Through his Declaration of  Independence, John Perry Barlow 
compares the inhabitants of  cyberspace with the American colonists as they sought 
independence from England.  Despite this attempted comparison, there was not a 
conceptual leap by the cyberdenizens to defending a sovereign space. In their 
dialogue throughout cyberspace  this group discussed the structural limitations to 
the implementation of  the law. They did not however, discuss going to war or to 
any of  the international courts to protect their sovereignty. Rhetorically, they appear 
to·still be searching for a definition of  the space. This search may in time, result in 
an assertion of  sovereignty as it did for the American colonists. 
The Antipornography Feminists are also left in a rhetorically difficult 
position. As a group they believe that pornographic speech is one of  the largest 
threats to the safety and well being of  women and children ever created.  They see 
it as a way to teach a belief  that asserting that women and children enjoy and 
request victimization. Further, that it negates the belief  that rape, prostitution, and 
sexual harassment are harmful. Given this fundamental belief  of  the group they are 
expected to be present in this discussion. As a world wide technology, the internet 
has the potential to spread and multiply these harmful teachings. They were not 
however able to find a rhetorical place to enter the legal conversation. Both the 65 
Defenders of  Liberty hero, the First Amendment, and the hero of  antiobscenity 
Crusaders, the CDA were counter to the Hero of  the Antipornography Feminists. 
The Antipornography Feminists are interested in redefining pornography as 
prohibited form of  hate speech. They are not interested having pornography zoned 
into areas because they assert that this zoning not only doesn't address the problem, 
it moves it into poor and minority communities.  These very different 
conceptualizations of  a Hero prevented the Antipornography Feminists from 
entering the legal dialogJle. It  is unclear why they did not engage in self  directed 
speech through feminist journals or other writing. 
The second analytic question is what story did the Supreme Court find 
persuasive? To be persuasive, each ofthe groups  arguments must be embedded in 
a fantasy chain for the Court that includes a particular conception of  community 
that will in tum, lead logically to a description of  the problem and "a solution.  How 
community is conceptualized is critical given that the Miller standard relies on a 
"contemporary community standard" to define the reach of  the law. 
As a part oftheir decision making, the Justices had to decide which of  the 
fantasy chains they found compelling. In the 'give and take' ofthe briefs and oral 
argument, the Court explores two very different conceptualizations of  community. 
In one, community is constructed as a nation of  people.  In the other community is 
viewed as local in nature.  Once the community is defined the solution to the 
problem flows quite logically.  If  a community is national then a person can be 
prosecuted for violating the sensibilities of  people who live in another region of  the 66 
country. If  community is local in nature, then a person can only be prosecuted for 
violating the sensibilities of  their neighbors. 
The legal solution to the problem must be grounded in prior legal decisions. 
The focus on the correct analogy attempted this while solidifying the vision of 
community.  The court, however, did not adopt a particular analogy for cyberspace 
choosing instead to say that it was unlike other media. 
They did address cyberzoning,  a solution that relies on the concept of 
cyberspace as a place where boundaries can be constructed. These boundaries 
would permit speech acts to be limited in time and location in the same way that 
adult television shows or bookstores are. In their ruling the Justices wrote: 
According to the Government, the CDA is constitutional because it 
constitutes a sort of  "cyberzoning" on the Internet.  But the CDA 
applies broadly to the entire universe of  cyberspace.  And the purpose 
ofthe CDA is to the children from the primary effects of  "indecent' and 
"patently offensive" speech, rather than any "secondary" effect of  such 
speech.  Thus, the CDA is a content based blanket restriction on 
speech, and as such can not be properly analyzed as a form oftime, 
place, and manner regulation (Supreme Court). 
By writing this one paragraph, the Court rejected that the CDA provides the 
mechanism for a zoneable community.  They state that instead, the CDA is too 
broad in its reach.  In doing so, they remove the heart of  the Antiobscenity 
Crusaders fantasy theme.  The Antiobscenity Crusaders are left without a solution 
that applies to the community that the Supreme Court views as relevant. 
Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist wrote a concurrent opinion and addressed 
the concept of  cyberzoning which they believe may be constitutional in theory, but not as constructed in the CDA : 
Our precedent indicates that the creation of  such zones can be 
Constitutionally sound.  Despite the soundness of  its purpose, however, 
portions ofthe CDA are unconstitutional because they stray from the 
blueprint our prior cases have developed for constructing a "zoning 
law" that passes constitutional muster  ...  The Court in Ginsberg 
concluded that the New York law created a constitutionally adequate 
adult zone simply because, on its face, it denied access only to minors. 
The court did not question--and therefore necessarily assumed--that an 
adult zone, once created, would succeed in preserving adults' access 
while denying minors' access to the regulated speech.  Before today, 
there was no reason to question this assumption, for the Court has 
previously only considered laws that operated in the physical world, a 
world with two characteristics that make it possible to create "adult 
zones:" geography and identity ...  The electronic world is 
fundamentally different.  Because it is no more than the interconnection 
of  electronic pathways, cyberspace allows speakers and listeners to 
mask their identities ...  Cyberspace differs from the physical world in 
another basic way: Cyberspace is malleable.  Thus it is possible to 
construct barriers in cyberspace and use them to screen for identity, 
making cyberspace more like the physical world and consequently, 
more amenable to zoning laws (Supreme Court). 
Through their minority opinion Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist 
recognized that cyberspace is a unique space. Unlike the physical world, a user of 
this space can hide their age and identity making it difficult to create or enforce a 
zoning law based on ones used in neighborhoods and conimunities. Further, they 
recognized that the space can be changed from what was presented to the Court; 
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walls can be constructed, barriers can be created that reshapes an open space to one 
that can be zoned. They also leave a rhetorical opportunity for the Antiobscenity 
Crusaders to try again. 
The Defenders of  Liberty not only had to show the Court that cyberzoning 
was unworkable, but that it also violated principles of  the Constitution. The same 68 
Constitution that the Justices have sworn to protect.  Throughout the fantasy chain, 
the Defenders of  Liberty focus on everyday citizens being sent to prison for 
engaging in speech acts. They argued that the only way to know what was 
sanctionable was to violate the law and be prosecuted. They reminded the Justices 
that the Supreme Court has a 40 year history of  defending the rights of  everyday of 
people to engage in unpopular speech. Further, the Defenders of  Liberty pointed to 
their interest and efforts to uphold these same values.  This combination of 
arguments were ultimately successful in drawing the Court into the same rhetorical 
community as the Defenders of  Liberty. In the end, the Supreme Court ruled 
unanimously that the CDA was a violation of  the First Amendment, invalidating 
the Communication Decency Act. 
In accepting the fantasy chain of  the Defenders of  Liberty, the Supreme Court 
established that the concepts embedded in the First Amendment apply to 
cyberspace. Further, they established a legal precedent for the ability of  the United 
States government to create laws for the users of  the technology. In this way, they 
reject the concept of  cyberspace as a sovereign, self-regulating space. that 
CONCLUSION 
Legal theorist Geoffery Klinger asserts that a law is a moral taxonomy, and 
Each of  the points on a moral map represent a situated discourse, or a 
contingent decision, one that reflects the mores of  a particular culture. 
These principles, statutes and cases, in turn, are not the product of 
divine  intervention with timeless legitimacy, but they are the product 
of  a contingent social paradigm. They arise as a reflection ofthe values 
that a particular social community endears (Klinger 238). 
His observations hold true in the debate surrounding the constitutionality and 
existence of  the Communication Decency Act.  In their own way, each ofthe 
players in this discussion were attempting to define the community known as 
"cyberspace" and to set the values that the community would engender. The 
Antiobscenity Crusaders were attempting to have the values of the Christian 
Coalition and its allies adopted, as they had been with the 104th Congress. 
Through the Communication Decency Act the Antiobscenity Crusaders were 
attempting to return to a national standard of  indecent speech. 
The Defenders 'of  Liberty were trying to establish that the values they held 
sacred specifically; those of  the Bill of  Rights as expressed in the First and Fifth 
Amendments, would be applied not only to this new technology, but also to a 
community without physical boundary. They wanted to extend their values into a 
new comrllunity. 
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The Homesteaders were interested in having the First Amendment values in 
the realm of  cyberspace, not because the law had been expressly adopted, but rather 70 
because it was held to be valuable by the users ofthe technology.  They warited to 
continue to develop a unique community with its own set of  rules; a community 
that included places that were objectionable to some. They were interested in the 
continued creation of  community rather than the creation oflaw. The Homesteaders 
were most interested in maintaining their sovereignty from outside forces 
attempting to define and recreate their space. 
Each of  these value sets were discussed in what Bormann calls fantasy 
chains. Each fantasy chain reflects the rhetorical reality of  the members. Through 
the telling and retelling of  this fantasy chains a rhetorical community is formed of 
people who accept the 'truth' of the rhetorical reality. Both the Defenders of 
Liberty and the Antiobscenity Crusaders presented their fantasy chain to the 
Supreme Court and  through the judicial process, invited them into their rhetorical 
community. The Homesteaders were unable to access the Court and as such, were 
\  , 
unable to present their rhetorical community. Ultimately, the Court accepted the 
fantasy chain of  the Defenders of  Liberty and overturned the CDA. 
The Supreme Court ruling on the Constitutionality of  the CDA occurred 
during the 10S
th Congress. Both the 10S
th and 106
th  Congresses introduced 
legislation similar to the CDA.  The Defenders of  Liberty and Homesteaders have 
reacted to these new bills much as they did to the CDA. The attempts to define the 
space known as 'cyberspace' continues. 71 
Bibliography 
ACLU et al v Reno. 117 S. Ct. 2329. US Supreme Court, 1996 
American Library Association. Amicus Curiae ACLU v Reno 117 S. Ct. 2329, US 
Supreme Court, 1996 
Anonymous. "My Thought About Free Speech" available at:  <http://www-
hsc.usc.edul-masayukilFreeSpeech.html> 
-- Untitled.  available at <http://mutated.com> 
Apollomedia Corporation and Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom. Amicus 
Curiae ACLU v Reno No. 117 S. Ct. 2329.  US Supreme Court, 1996 
Barlow, John Perry. "Declaration of  Independence of  Cyberspace." Available at: 
<http://www.ef£org/pub/publications/John  _Perry  _ Barlowlbarlow  _ 0296. 
declaration> 
Black,  Henry.  Black's Law Dictionary,  5
th ed.  St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 
1979. 
Bormann, Earnest G. "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: Ten Years Later."  Quarterly 
Journal of  Speech. 68.3 (1982): 288-305. 
"Symbolic Convergence Theory and Communication in Group Decision 
Making." Communication and Group Decision Making,  Randy Hirokawa 
and Marshall Scott Poole., ed.  2
nd ed. London: Sage Publications. 1996.81-
113. 
Burgchardt, Carl R.; ed. Readings in Rhetorical Criticism.  Pennsylvania: Strata 
Publishing Co., 1995. 
Center for Democracy & Technology, News release: Justice Department Opinion 
on S314,.May 1995. 
--- position paper: CDT analysis of  revised Exon indecency legislation (S314), 
March 1995. Available at: <http://www.cdt.org/policy/322analysis.html> 
Cerolo, Karen A. "Reframing Sociological Concepts for a Brave New (Virtual?) 
World." Sociological Inquiry 67.1 (1997).48-58. 
Chaffee,  Zechariah Free Speech in the United States. 381 (1941) Christian Coalition, Position paper: Restricting pornography. May 1995 
--- Contract with American Families. 1995. Available at: 
<http://www.cc.org/publications/  ca/speech/  contract.html> 
Com-Revere, Robert. Cato Policy Analysis No. 232  "New Age Comstockery: 
Exon vs. the Internet."  June 1995 Available at:  <http://www.cato.org/ 
pUbs/pas/pa232es.html > 
DeGrazia, Edward, Censorship Landmarks. New York: R.R. Bowker Company, 
1969. 
72 
Donnerstein, Edward, Daniel Linz, and Steven Penrod. The Question of 
Pornography: Research Findings and Policy Implications. MacMillan, Inc.: 
New York. 1987. 
Duane. Letter.  February 25, 1996. Available at: 
<http://www.webcom.comlduane/inetessy.html> 
Dutton, William H. "Network rules of  order: Regulating speech in public electronic 
fora." Media Culture & Society 18.2 (1996).  ' 
Dworkin, Andrea. "Pornography Happens to Women." The Price We Pay: The 
Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda, and Pornography. Lederer, 
Laura, Richard Delgado (eds.). Hill and Wang: New York. 1995. 
--- "Testimony."  Attorney General's Commission' on Pornography. Washington 
DC: 1988. Available at: 
<http://wWw.igc.org/womensnetidworkinlWarZoneChaptIVFl.html> 
Enough is Enough et al. Amicus Curiae ACLU v Reno No. 117 S. Ct. 2329. US 
Supreme Court, 1996. 
Feminists for Free Expression. Amicus Curiae ACLU v Reno No. 117 S. Ct. 2329. 
US Supreme Court, 1996. 
Fernback, Jan & Brad Thompson Virtual Communities: Abort, Retry, Failure?  May 
1995 . Available at: <http://www.well.comiuserlhlr/textsN  ccivil.html> 
Fisher, Walter R. "Rhetorical Fiction and the Presidency." Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 66.2 (1980): 119-26. 
Foss, Sonya K. Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration & Practice. Illinois: Waveland 
Press, Inc., 1989. 73 
Foster, Derek.' "Community and Identity in the Electronic Village"  Porter, David 
ed.  Internet Culture  New York: Routledge, 1997. 
Gulker. "24 Hours in Cyberspace." Available at: <http://www.gulker.com> 
Hensley, Carl Wayne. "Rhetorical Vision and the Persuasion of  a Historical 
Movement: The Disciples of  Christ in Nineteenth Century American 
Culture." Quarterly Journal of  Speech 61.3 (1975): 250-64. 
Klinger, Geoffery D. "Law as Communicative Praxis: Toward a Rhetorical 
Jurisprudence." Argumentation & Advocacy 30 (94): 236-47. 
Kochmer, Jonathan. Internet Passport: NorthWestNet's Guide to Our World Online. 
Bellevue: NorthWestNet, 1993. 
Lanham, Richard A. The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts. 
Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1993. 
LeFlore, Ricky. "HOW DARE WE NOT STAND UP FOR WHAT WE HAVE 
FOUGHT FOR AND DIE." March 26, 1996. Available at: <http:// 
.www.gulker.com> 
Littlejohn, Stephen \"'1.  Theories of  Human Communication. 3rd ed. California: 
Wadsworth Publishing, 1989. 
Linz, Daniel et al. "Estimating Community Standards: The use of  Social Evidence 
on an Obscenity Prosecution" Public Opinion Quarterly. 55 (1991): 80-112. 
Ludlow, Peter ed. High Noon on the Electronic Frontier.  Cambridge:  The MIT 
Press 1996. 
MacKimlon, Catherine. "Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech." Pornography: 
Women, Violence and Civil Liberties. Itzen, Catherine ed. Oxford: Oxford 
UP. 1993. 
MacKinnon, Catherine, Andrea Dworkin. Pornography and Civil Rights: A New 
Day for Women's Equality.  1988. 
Mandel, Thomas and Gerard Van der Leun. Rules of  the Net. New York: Hyperion 
Publishing. 1996. 
Meese Commission Exposed, Proceedings of  a National Coalition Against 
Censorship Public Information Briefing, New York: January 1986. 
Miller, Steven E. Civilizing Cyberspace: Policy, Power, and the Information 
, Superhighway.  New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. 1996. 
Miller v California 413 U. S. 15. Supreme Court Reporter. 93A St. Paul: "Vest 
Publishing Co., 1975. 
Mohrmann, G. P. "Fantasy Theme Criticism: A Peroration." Quarterly Journal of 
Speech. 68.3 (1982): 306-13. 
---. "An Essay on Fantasy Theme Criticism." Quarterly Journal of  Speech. 68.2 
(1982): 109-32. 
Morality in Media, News release: Morality in media calls for rejection of  Senator 
Exon's "Communications Decency Act." March 1995. 
Rheingold, Howard. The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic 
Community. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1993. 
---, "Democracy is About Communication" Available at: <http://www.well.coml 
userlhlr/textsl  democracy  .html> 
Shields, Donald C. and C. Thomas Preston. "Fantasy Theme Analysis in 
Competitive Rhetorical Criticism." National Forsenic Journal. Fall 1985. 
102-115. 
Site Specific et al.  Amicus Curiae ACLU v Reno 117 S. Ct. 2329. US Supreme 
Court, 1996. 
Speech Communication Association. Amicus Curiae ACLU v Reno 117 S. Ct. 
2329.  US Supreme Court, 1996. 
Stephans  on, Anders. Manifest Destiny. New York: Hill and Wang. 1995. 
Stoltenberg, John. "The Triangular Politics of  Pornography." The Price We Pay: 
The Case Against Racist Speech. Hate Propaganda. and Pornography. 
Lederer, Laura, Richard Delgado (eds.). Hill and Wang: New York. 1995. 
Strate, Lance, et al. ed.  Communication and Cyberspace: Social Interaction in an 
Electronic Environment.  New Jersey: Hampton Press Inc. 1996. 
Strossen, Nadine. Defending Pornography: Free Speech. Sex. and the Fight for 
Women's Rights. New York: Scribner, 1995 
74 
Tedford, Thomas L. Freedom of  Speech in the United States. New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1993. Telecommunications Act of  1996. Pub. L. 104-104.8 February 1996. 
Tribe, Laurence H. "The Constitution in Cyberspace." Keynote address: First 
Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy_ 1991 
Trojan Democrats. "Your Rights are Being Trampled"  Available at: 
<http://www.gulker.com> 
75 
United States Congress, 104th Session, S314: A Bill to protect the public from the 
misuse of  the telecommunications network and telecommunications devices 
and  facilities. 
--- "Congressional Quarterly." Washington: GPO February 1995. 
--- "Contract with America." Washington: GPO February 1995. 
United States Department of  Justice. ACLU v Reno 117 S. Ct. 2329. US Supreme 
Court, 1996 
United States Supreme Court. Oral Argument. ACLU v Reno 117 S. Ct. 2329.  US 
Supreme Court  March 19, 1997.  Available at: 
<http://supctJaw.comell.edu/supctlhtm1l96-511.ZX.htm> 
Wagman, Robert W. The First Amendment Book. New York: World Almanac, 
1991. 
Weiss, Penny A. and Marilyn Friedman, ed. Feminism and Community. 
Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1995. 
Wilbur, Shawn P. "An Archaeology ofCyberspaces: Virtuality, Community, 
Identity"  Internet Culture Porter, David ed  .. New York: Routledge, 1997. 76 
APPENDICES 77 
Appendix A 
Amici Curiae Filed 
Amici Curiae briefs are 'friend of  the court' briefs and are filed in support of  a main 
brief. The primary Antiobscenity Crusader brief  was filed by the Department of 
Justice. The primary Defender of  Liberty brief  was filed by the American Civil 
Liberties Union. 
ANTIOBSCENITY CRUSADERS 
Brief  for Members of  Congress 
SENATORS 
Dan Coats (R) 
Jesse Helms (R) 
Christopher Bond (R) 
Rick Santorum (R) 
REPRESENTATIVES 
Henry Hyde (R) 
Bob Goodlatte(R) 
Jim Sensenbrenner(R) 
Steve Schiff  (R) 
Chris Smith (R) 
Duncan Hunter (R) 
Roscoe Bartlett (R) 
James Exon (R) 
Charles Grassley (R) 
James Inhofe (R) 
Rod Grams (R) 
Dave Weldon (R) 
Tony Hall (D) 
Jim Ryun (R) 
Steve Largent (R) 
Mark Souder (R) 
Sherwood Boehlert (R) 
Walter Jones (R) 
AMICI CURIAE FOR Enough is Enough 
The Salvation Anny 
National Political Congress of  Black Women, Inc. 
The National Council of  Catholic Women 
Victims' Assistance Legal Organization 
CHILDHELP USA 
Legal Pad Enterprises, Inc. 
Focus on  the Family 
,The National Coalition for the Protection of  Children and Families 
Citizens for Family Friendly Libraries (Georgia) Computer Power Corporation 
D/TEX Investigative Consulting 
Family Friendly Libraries 
Focus on the Family Help Us Regain the Children (H.U.R.T) 
JuriNet, Inc. 
Kidz Online 
Laura Lederer, J.D 
Log-on Data Corporation 
Legal Pad Enterprises, Inc. 
Mothers Against Sexual Abuse 
National Association of  Evangelicals 
Omaha for Decency 
One Voice/The American Coalition for Abuse 
Oklahomans for Childien and Families 
Religious Alliance Against Pornography 
Weitzman, Lenore, Ph.D., 
WheelGroup 
DEFENDERS OF LIBERTY 
American Association of  University Professors 
American Society of  Journalists and Authors 
Authors Guild, California Museum ofPhotographylUniversity of  California at 
Riverside 
Coalition for Positive Sexuality 
Creative Coalition of  Artists 
Tri Dang Do 
Margarita LaCabe 
LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education Fund 
Maggie LaNoue 
LOD Communications 
Peter Ludlow 
Chuck More 
PEN American Center 
Philadelphia Magazine 
PSINet Inc. 
Eric S. Raymond 
Don Rittner 
The Sexuality Information and Education Council ofthe United States 
Lloyd K. Stires 
Peter J. Swanson 
Kirsti Thomas 
WEB Communications 
78 Miryam Ehrlich Williamson 
ApolloMedia Corp 
Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom 
Association of  National Advertisers and the Media Institute 
Chamber of  Commerce of  the United States of  America 
Feminists for Free Expression 
National Association of  Broadcasters 
ABC Inc. 
CBS Inc. 
National Broadcasting Company 
Playboy Enterprises Inc 
Reporters Committee for Freedom ofthe Press 
Student Press Law Center 
Site Specific, Inc. and John Lebkowski 
Speech Communication Association 
Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts 
79 AppendixB 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, et al. v. 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION et aL 
appeal from the united states district court for the eastern district of  pennsylvania 
No. 96-511. Argued March 19, 1997-Decided June 26, 1997 
80 
Two provisions of  the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA or Act) seek to 
protect minors from harmful material on the Internet, an international network of 
interconnected computers that enables millions of  people to communicate with one 
another in "cyberspace" and to access vast amounts of  information from around the 
world. Title 47 U. S. C. A. §223(a)(I)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1997) criminalizes the 
"knowing" transmission of"  obscene or indecent" messages to any recipient under 
18 years of  age. Section 223(  d) prohibits the "knowin[g]" sending or displaying to a 
person under 18 of  any message "that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or 
excretory activities or organs." Affirmative defenses are provided for those who 
take "good faith, ... effective ... actions" to restrict access by minors to the 
prohibited communications, §223(e)(5)(A), and those who restrict such access by 
requiring certain designated forms of  age proof, such as a verified credit card or an 
adult identification number, §223(e)(5)(B). A number of  plaintiffs filed suit 
challenging the constitutionality of  §§223(a)(1) and 223(d). After making extensive 
findings of  fact, a three~judge District Court convened pursuant to the Act entered a 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of  both challenged provisions. The 
court's judgment enjoins the Government from enforcing §223(a)(I)(B)'s 
prohibitions insofar as they relate to "indecent" communications, but expressly 
preserves the Government's right to investigate and prosecute the obscenity or child 
pornography activities prohibited therein. The injunction against enforcement of 
§223(  d) is unqualified because that section contains no separate reference to 
obscenity or child pornography. The Government appealed to this Court under the 
Act's special review provisions, arguing that the District Court erred in holding that 
the CDA violated both the First Amendment because it is overbroad and the Fifth 
Amendment because it is vague. 
Held: The CDA's "indecent transmission" and "patently offensive display" 
provisions abridge "the freedom of  speech" protected by the First Amendment. Pp. 
17-40. 
(a) Although the CDA's vagueness is relevant to the First Amendment overbreadth 
inquiry, the judgment should be affirmed without reaching the Fifth Amendment 
issue. P. 17. 81 
(b) A close look at the precedents relied on by the Government-Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U. S. 629; FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726; and Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41-raises, rather than relieves, doubts about the 
CDA's constitutionality. The CDA differs from the various laws and orders upheld 
in those cases in many ways, including that it does not allow parents to consent to 
their children's use of  restricted materials; is not limited to commercial transactions; 
fails to provide any definition of  "indecent" and omits any requirement that 
"patently offensive" material lack socially redeeming value; neither limits its broad 
categorical prohibitions to particular times nor bases them on an evaluation by an 
agency familiar with the medium's unique characteristics; is punitive; applies to a 
medium that, unlike radio, receives full First Amendment protection; and cannot be 
properly analyzed as a form of  time, place, and manner regulation because it is a 
content-based blanket restriction on speech. These precedents, then, do not require 
the Court to uphold the CDA and are fully consistent with the application ofthe 
most stringent review of  its provisions. Pp. 17-21. 
(c) The special factors recognized in some of  the Court's cases as justifying 
regulation of  the broadcast media-the history of  extensive government regulation 
of  broadcasting, see, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,395 U. S. 367,399-
400; the scarcity of  available frequencies at its inception, see, e.g., Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 637-638; and its "invasive" 
nature, see Sable Communications of  Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S.  115, 128-are 
not present in cyberspace. Thus, these cases provide no basis for qualifying the 
level of  First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to the Internet. Pp. 22-24. 
(d) Regardless of  whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth 
. . Amendment, the many ambiguities concerning the scope of  its coverage render it 
problematic for First Amendment purposes: For instance, its use of  the undefined 
terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" will provoke uncertainty among speakers 
about how the two standards relate to each other and just what they mean. The 
vagueness of  such a content-based regulation, see, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of 
Nev., 501 U. S.  1030, coupled with its increased deterrent effect as a criminal 
statute, see, e.g:, Dombrowskiv. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, raise special First 
Amendment concerns because of  its obvious chilling effect on free speech. 
Contrary to the Government's argument, the CDA is not saved from vagueness by 
the fact that its "patently offensive" standard repeats the second part ofthe three-
prong obscenity test set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U. S.  15,24. The second 
Miller prong reduces the inherent vagueness of  its own "patently offensive" term by 
requiring that the proscribed material be "specifically defined by the applicable 
state law." In addition, the CDA applies only to "sexual conduct," whereas, the 
CDA prohibition extends also to "excretory activities" and "organs" of  both a 
sexual and excretory nature. Each of  Miller's other two prongs also critically limits 
the uncertain sweep of  the obscenity definition. Just because a definition including 82 
three limitations is not vague, it does not follow that one of  those limitations, 
standing alone; is not vague. The CDA's vagueness undermines the likelihood that 
it has been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of  protecting minors from 
potentially harmful materials. Pp. 24-28. 
(e) The CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute 
regulates the content of  speech. Although the Government has an interest in 
protecting children from potentially harmful materials, see, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U. 
S., at 639, the CDA pursues that interest by suppressing a large amount of  speech 
that adults have a constitutional right to send and receive, see, e.g., Sable, supra, at 
126. Its breadth is wholly unprecedented. The CDA's burden on adult speech is 
unacceptable if  less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in 
achieving the Act's legitimate purposes. See, e.g., Sable, 492 U. S., at 126. The 
Government has not proved otherwise. On the other hand, the District Court found 
that currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective 
method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing material which 
the parents believe is inappropriate will soon be widely available. Moreover, the 
arguments in this Court referred to possible alternatives such as requiring that 
indecent material be "tagged" to facilitate parental control, making exceptions for 
messages with artistic or educational value, providing some tolerance for parental 
choice, and regUlating some portions ofthe Internet differently than others. 
Particularly in the lig~t of  the absence of  any detailed congressional findings, or 
even hearings addressing the CDA's special problems, the Court is persuaded that 
the CDA is not narrowly tailored. Pp. 28-33. 
(f) The Government's three additional arguments for sustaining the CDA's 
affirmative prohibitions are rejected. First, the contention that the Act is 
constitutional because it leaves open ample "alternative channels" of 
communication is unpersuasive because the CDA regulates speech on the basis of 
its content, so that a "time, place, and manner" analysis is inapplicable. See, e.g., 
Consolidated Edison Co. ofN. Y. v. Public Servo Comm'n ofN. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 
536. Second, the assertion that the CDA's "knowledge" and "specific person" 
requirements significantly restrict its permissible application to communications to 
persons the sender knows to be under 18 is untenable, given that most Internet 
forums are open to all comers and that even the strongest reading ofthe "specific 
person" requirement would confer broad powers of  censorship, in the form of  a 
"heckler's veto," upon any opponent of  indecent speech. Finally, there is no textual 
support for the submission that material having scientific, educational, or other 
redeeming social value will necessarily fall outside the CDA's prohibitions. Pp. 33-
35. 
(g) The §223(  e  )(5) defenses do not constitute the sort of  "narrow tailoring" that 
would save the CDA. The Government's argument that transmitters may take 
protective "good faith actio[n]" by "tagging" their indecent communications in a 83 
way that would indicate their contents, thus permitting recipients to block their 
reception with appropriate software, is illusory, given the requirement that such 
action be "effective": The proposed screening software does not currently exist, but, 
even ifit did, there would be no way of  knowing whether a potential recipient 
would actually block the encoded material. The Government also failed to prove 
that §223(b  )(5)'s verification defense would significantly reduce the CDA's heavy 
burden on adult speech. Although such verification is actually being used by some 
commercial providers of  sexually explicit material, the District Court's findings 
indicate that it is not economically feasible for most noncommercial speakers. Pp. 
35-37. 
(h)  The Government's argument  that this Court should preserve the CDA's 
constitutionality by honoring its severability clause, §608, and by construing 
nonseverable terms narrowly, is acceptable in only one respect. Because obscene 
speech may be banned totally, see Miller, supra, at 18, and §223(a)'s restriction of 
"obscene" material enjoys a textual manifestation separate from that for "indecent" 
material, the Court can sever the term "or indecent" from the statute, leaving the 
rest of  §223(a) standing. Pp. 37-39. 
(i) The Government's argument that its "significant" interest in fostering the 
Internet's growth provides an independent basis for upholding the CDA's 
constitutionality is singularly unpersuasive. The dramatic expansion ofthis new 
forum contradicts the factual basis underlying this contention: that the unregulated 
availability of  "indecent" and "patently offensive" material is driving people away 
from the Internet. P. 40. 
929 F. Supp. 824, affirmed. 
Stevens, J.,delivered the opinion of  the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, 
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. O'Connor, 1., filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., 
joined. 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 
preliminary print of  the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the 
Reporter of  Decisions, Supreme Court ofthe United States, Wash-ington, D.C. 
20543, of  any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be 
made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 96-511 
JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, et aI., 
APPELLANTS v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION et al. 
on appeal from the united states district court for the eastern district of pennsylvania 
[June 26, 1997] 
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of  the Court. 
At issue is the constitutionality of  two statutory provisions enacted to protect 
minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive" communications on the Internet. 
Notwithstanding the legitimacy and importance of  the congressional goal of 
protecting children from harmful materials, we agree with the three-judge District 
Court that the statute abridges "the freedom of  speech" protected by the First 
Amendment.  (1 ) 
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The District Court made extensive findings offact, most of  which were based on a 
detailed stipulation prepared by the parties. See 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-849 (ED Pa. 
1996).(2) The findings describe the character and the dimensions of  the Internet, the 
availability of  sexually explicit material in that medium, and the problems 
confronting age verification for recipients of  Internet communications. Because 
those findings provide the underpinnings for the legal issues, we begin with a 
summary of  the undisputed facts. 
The Internet 
The Internet is an international network of  interconnected computers. It  is the 
outgrowth of  what began in 1969 as a military program called "ARPANET,  "  (3) 
which was designed to enable computers operated by the military, defense 
contractors, and universities conducting defense-related research to communicate 
with one another by redundant channels even if  some portions of  the network were 
damaged in a war. \Vhile the ARPANET no longer exists, it provided an example 
for the development of  a number of  civilian networks that, eventually linking with 
each other, now enable tens of  millions of  people to communicate with one another 
and to access vast amounts of  information from around the world. The Internet is "a 
. unique and wholly new medium of  worldwide human communication."(4) 
The Internet has experienced "extraordinary growth. "(5) The number of  "host" 
computers-those that store information and relay communications-increased 
from about 300 in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by the time of  the trial in 1996. 
Roughly 60% of  these hosts are located in the United States. About 40 million 
people used the Internet at the time of  trial, a number that is expected to mushroom 
to 200 million by 1999. 
Individuals can obtain access to the Internet from many different sources, generally 85 
. hosts themselves or ,entities with ~  host affiliation. Most colleges and.universities 
provide access for their students and faculty; many corporations provide their 
employees with access through an office network; many communities and local 
libraries provide free access; and an increasing number of  storefront "computer 
coffee shops" provide access for a small hourly fee. Several major national "online 
services" such as America Online, CompuServe, the Microsoft Network, and 
Prodigy offer access to their own extensive proprietary networks as well as a link to 
the much larger resources ofthe Internet. These commercial online services had 
almost 12 million individual subscribers at the time of  trial. 
Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of  a wide variety'of 
communication and information retrieval methods. These methods are constantly 
evolving and difficult to categorize precisely. But, as presently constituted, those 
most relevant to this case are electronic mail ("e-mail"), automatic mailing list 
services ("mail exploders," sometimes referred to as "listservs"), "newsgroups," 
"chat rooms," and the  "World Wide Web." All of  these methods can be used to 
transmit text; most can transmit sound, pictures, and moving video images. Taken 
together, these tools constitute a unique medium-known to its users as 
"cyberspace"-located in no particular geographical location but available to 
anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet. 
E-mail enables an individual to send an electronic message-generally akin to a 
note or letter-to another individual or to. a group of  addressees. The message is 
generally stored electronically, sometimes waiting for the recipient to check her 
"mailbox" and sometimes making its receipt known through some type of  prompt. 
A mail exploder is a sort of  e-mail group. Subscribers can send messages to a 
common e-mail address, which then forwards the message to the group's other 
subscribers. Newsgroups also serve groups of  regular participants, but these 
po  stings may be read by others as well. There are thousands of  such groups, each 
serving to foster an exchange of  information or opinion on a particular topic 
running the gamut from, say, the music of  Wagner to Balkan politics to AIDS 
prevention to the Chicago Bulls. About 100,000 new messages are posted every 
day. In most newsgroups, po  stings are automatically purged at regular intervals. In 
addition to posting a message that can be read later, two or more individuals 
wishing to communicate more immediately can enter a chat room to engage in real-
time dialogue-in other words, by typing messages to one another that appear 
almost immediately on the others' computer screens. The District Court found that 
at any given time "tens ofthousands of  users are engaging in conversations on a 
huge range of  subjects. "(6) It  is "no exaggeration to conclude that the content on 
the Internet is as diverse as human thought."(7) 
The best known category of  communication over the Internet is the World Wide 
Web, which allows users to search for and retrieve information stored in remote 
computers, as well as, in some cases, to communicate back to designated sites. In 86 
concrete tenns, the Web consists of  a vast number of  documents stored in different 
computers all over the world. Some ofthese documents are simply files containing 
infonnation. However, more elaborate documents, commonly known as Web 
"pages,  II are also prevalent. Each has its own address-"  rather like a telephone 
number."(8) Web pages frequently contain infonnation and sometimes allow the 
viewer to communicate with the page's (or "site's") author. They generally also 
contain II links  " to other documents created by that site's author or to other 
(generally) related sites. Typically, the links are either blue or underlined text-
sometimes images. 
Navigating the Web is relatively straightforward. A user may either type the 
address of  a known page or enter one or more keywords into a commercial "search 
engine" in an effort to locate sites on a subject of  interest. A partiCUlar Web page 
may contain the infonnation sought by the "surfer," or, through its links, it may be 
an avenue to other documents located anywhere on the Internet. Users generally 
explore a given Web page, or move to another, by clicking a computer "mouse" on 
one of  the page's icons or links. Access to most Web pages is freely available, but. 
some allow access only to those who have purchased the right from a commercial 
provider. The Web is thus comparable, from the readers' viewpoint, to both a vast 
library including millions of  readily available and indexed pUblications and a 
sprawling mall offering goods and services. 
From the publishers' pointofview, it constitutes a vast platfonn fromwhich to 
address and hear from a world-wide audience of  millions of  readers, viewers, 
researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization with a computer connected to 
the Internet can "publish" infonnation. P.ublishers include government agencies, 
educational institutions, commercial entities, advocacy groups, and individuals.(9) 
Publishers may either make their material available to the entire pool of  Internet 
users, or confine access to a selected group, such as those willing to pay for the 
privilege. "No single organi zation controls any membership in the Web, nor is 
there any centralized point from which individual Web sites or services can be 
blocked from the Web."(IO) 
Sexually Explicit Material 
Sexually explicit material on the Internet includes text, pictures, and chat and 
"extends from the modestly titillating to the hardest-core. "(1 I) These files are 
created, named, and posted in the same manner as material that is not sexually 
explicit, and may be accessed either deliberately or unintentionally during the 
course of  an imprecise search. "Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it 
cannot prevent that content from entering any community."(12) Thus, for example, 
"when the VCR/California Museum of  Photography posts to its Web site nudes by 
Edward Weston and Robert Mapplethorpe to announce that its new exhibit will 
travel to Baltimore and New York City, those images are available not only in Los Angeles, Baltimore, and New York City, but also in Cincinnati, Mobile, or 
Beijing-wherever Internet users live. Similarly, the safer sex instructions that 
Critical Path posts to its Web site, written in street language so that the teenage 
receiver can understand them, are available not just in Philadelphia, but also in 
Provo and Prague."(13) 
Some of  the communications over  t.~e Internet that originate in foreign countries 
are also sexually explicit.(14) 
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though such material is widely available, users seldom encounter such content 
accidentally. "A document's title or a description of  the document will usually 
appear before the document itself ...  and in many cases the user will receive 
detailed information about a site's content before he or she need take the step to 
access the document. Almost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings 
as to the content."(15) For that reason, the "odds are slim" that a user would enter a 
sexually explicit site by accident.(16) Unlike communications received by radio or 
television, "the receipt of  information on the Internet requires a series of  affirmative 
steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial. A child requires some 
sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve material and thereby to  use the 
Internet unattended."  (17) 
Systems have been developed to help parents control the material that may be 
available on a home computer with Internet access. A system may either limit a 
computer's access to an approved list of  sources that have been identified as 
containing no adult material, it may block designated inappropriate sites, or it may 
attempt to block messages containing identifiable objectionable features. "Although 
parental control software currently can screen for certain suggestive words or for 
known sexually explicit sites, it cannot now screen for sexually explicit 
images."(18) Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that "a reasonably effective 
method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing sexually 
explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their 
children will soon be available."(19) 
Age Verification 
The problem of  age verification differs for different uses of  the Internet. The 
District Court categorically determined that there "is no effective way to determine 
the identity or the age of  a user who is accessing material through e-mail.mail 
exploders, newsgroups or chat rooms."(20) The Government offered no evidence 
that there was a reliable way to screen recipients and participants in such fora for 
age. Moreover, even if  it were technologically feasible to block minors' access to 
news  groups and chat rooms containing discussions of  art, politics or other subjects 
that potentially elicit "indecent" or "patently offensive" contributions, it would not 
be possible to block their access to that material and "still allow them access to the remaining content, even ifthe overwhelming majority of  that content was not 
indecent."  (21) 
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Technology exists by which an operator of  a Web site may condition access on the 
verification of  requested information such as a credit card number or an adult 
password. Credit card verification is only feasible, however, either in connection 
with a commercial transaction in which the card is used, or by payment to a 
verification agency. Using credit card possession as a surrogate for proof of  age 
would impose costs on non-commercial Web sites that would require many of  them 
to shut down. For that reason, at the time of  the trial, credit card verification was 
"effectively unavailable to a substantial number of  Internet content providers." Id., 
at 846 (finding 102). Moreover, the imposition of  such a requirement "would 
completely bar adults who do not have a credit card and lack the resources to obtain 
one from accessing any blocked material."(22) 
Commercial pornographic sites that charge their users for access have assigned 
them passwords as a method of  age verification. The record does not contain any 
evidence concerning the reliability of  these technologies. Even if  passwords are 
effective for commercial purveyors of  indecent material, the District Court found 
that an adult password requirement would impose significant burdens on 
noncommercial sites, both because they would discourage users from accessing 
their sites and because the cost of  creating and maintaining such screening systems 
would be "beyond their reach. "(23) 
In sum, the District Court found: 
"Even if  credit card verification or adult password verification were implemented, 
the Government presented no testimony as to how such systems could ensure that 
the user of  the password or credit card is in fact over 18. The burdens imposed by 
credit card verification and adult password verification systems make them 
effectively unavailable to a substantial number of  Internet content providers." Ibid. 
(finding 107). 
II 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, was an 
unusually important legislative enactment. As stated on the first of  its 103 pages, its 
primary purpose was to reduce regulation and encourage "the rapid deployment of 
new telecommunications technologies." The major components of  the statute have 
nothing to do with the Internet; they were designed to promote competition in the 
local telephone service market, the multichannel video market, and the market for 
over-the-air broadcasting. The Act includes seven Titles, six of  which are the 
product of  extensive committee hearings and the subject of  discussion in Reports 
prepared by Committees of  the Senate and the House of  Representatives. By 89 
contrast, Title V-known as the "Communications Decency Act of  1996" (CDA)-
contains provisions that were either added in executive committee after the hearings 
were concluded or as amendments offered during floor debate on the legislation. 
An amendment offered in the Senate was the source of  the two statutory provisions 
challenged. in this case.(24) They are informally described as the "indecent 
transmission" provision and the "patently offensive display" provision.(25) 
The first, 47 U. S. C. A. §223(a) (Supp. 1997), prohibits the knowing transmission 
of  obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of  age. It  provides 
in pertinent part: 
"ea) Whoever-
"(1) in interstate or foreign communications-
"(B) by means of  a telecommunications device knowingly-
n(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and 
n(ii) initiates the transmission of, 
nany comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication 
which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of  the communication is 
under 18 years of  age, 'regardless of  whether the maker of  such communication 
placed the call or initiated the communication; ..... 
"(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be 
used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for 
such activity, 
n  shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 
The second provision, §223(  d), prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of 
patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years 
of  age. It  provides: 
"(d) Whoever-. 
"(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
"(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons. 
under 18 years of  age, or 
nCB) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a 
person under 18 years of  age, 90 
"any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, 
in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, 
regardless of  whether the user of  such service placed the call or initiated the 
communication; or 
"(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control 
to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used 
for such activity, 
"shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 
The breadth of  these prohibitions is qualified by two affirmative defenses. See 
§223(e)(5).(26) One covers those who take "good faith, reasonable, effective, and 
appropriate actions" to restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications. 
§223(e)(5)(A). The other covers those who restrict access to covered material by 
requiring certain designated forms of  age proof, such as a verified credit card or an 
adult identification number or code. §223(e)(5)(B). 
III 
On February 8, 1996, immediately after the President signed the statute, 20 
plaintiffs(27) filed suit against the Attorney General of  the United States and the 
Department of  Justice challenging the constitutionality of  §§223(a)(1) and 223(d). 
A week later, based on his conclusion that the term "indecent" was too vague to 
provide the basis fora criminal prosecution, District Judge Buckwalter entered a 
temporary restraining order against enforcement of §223(a)(1)(B)(ii) insofar as it 
applies to indecent communications. A second suit was then filed by 27 additional 
plaintiffs,(28) the two cases were consolidated, and a three-judge District Court was 
convened pursuant to §561 of  the Act.(29) After an evi dentiary hearing, that Court 
entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of  both of  the challenged 
provisions. Eachofthe three judges wrote a separate opinion, but their judgment 
was unanimous. 
Chief  Judge Sloviter doubted the strength of  the Government's interest in regulating 
"the vast range of  online material covered or potentially covered by the CDA," but 
acknowledged that the interest was "compelling" with respect to some of  that 
material. 929 F. Supp., at 853. She concluded, nonetheless, that the statute "sweeps 
more broadly than necessary and thereby chills the expression of  adults" and that 
the terms "patently offensive" and "indecent" were "inherently vague." Id., at 854. 
She also determined that the affirmative defenses were not "technologically or 
economically feasible for most providers," specifically considering and rejecting an 
argument that providers could avoid liability by "tagging" their material in a 91 
manner that would allow potential readers to screen out unwanted transmissions. 
Id., at 856. Chief  Judge Sloviter also rejected the Government's suggestion that the 
scope ofthe statute could be narrowed by construing it to apply only to commercial 
pornographers. Id., at 854-855. 
Judge Buckwalter concluded that the word "indecent" in §223(a)(1)(B) and the 
terms "patently offensive" and "in context" in §223(d)(1) were so vague that 
criminal enforcement of  either section would violate the "fundamental 
constitutional principle" of  "simple fairness," id., at 861, and the specific 
protections of  the First and Fifth Amendments, id., at 858. He found no statutory 
basis for the Government's argument that the challenged provisions would be 
applied only to "pornographic" materials, noting that, unlike obscenity, "inde cency 
has not been defined to exclude works of  serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value." Id., at 863. Moreover, the Government's claim that the work must 
be considered patently offensive "in context" was itself  vague because the relevant 
context might "refer to, among other things, the nature of  the communication as a 
whole, the time of  day it was conveyed, the medium used, the identity ofthe 
speaker, or whether or not it is accompanied by appropriate warnings." Id., at 864. 
He believed that the unique nature of  the Internet aggravated the vagueness of  the 
statute. Id., at 865, n. 9.  ' 
Judge Dalzell's review of  "the special attributes of  Internet communication" 
disclosed by the evidence convinced him that the First Amendment denies 
Congress the power to regulate the content of  protected speech on the Internet. Id., 
at 867. His opinion explained at length why he believed the Act would abridge 
significant protected speech, particularly by noncommercial speakers, while 
"[p  ]erversely, commercial pornographers would remain relatively unaffected." Id., 
at 879. He construed our cases as requiring a "medium-spe~ific" approach to the 
analysis of  the regulation of  mass communication, id., at 873, and concluded that 
the Internet-as "the most participatory form of  mass speech yet developed," id., at 
883-is entitled to "the highest protection from governmental intrusion," ibid.(30) 
The judgment of  the District Court enjoins the Government from enforcing the 
prohibitions in §223(a)(1)(B) insofar as they relate to "indecent" communications, 
but expressly preserves the Government's right to investigate. and prosecute the 
obscenity or child pornography activities prohibited therein. The injunction against 
enforcement of  §§223(d)(1) and (2) is unqualified because those provisions contain 
no separate reference to obscenity or child pornography. 
The Government appealed under the Act's special review provisions, §561, 110 
Stat. 142-143, and we noted probable jurisdiction, see 519 U. S. _  (1996). In its 
appeal, the Government argues that the District Court erred in holding that the. 
CDA violated both the First Amendment because it is overbroad and the Fifth 
Amendment because it is vague. While we discuss the vagueness ofthe CDA 92 
because of  its relevance to the First Amendment overbreadth inquiry, we conclude 
that the judgment should be affirmed without reaching the Fifth Amendment issue. 
We begin our analysis by reviewing the principal authorities on which the 
Government relies. Then, after describing the overbreadth of  the CDA, we consider 
the Government's specific contentions, including its submission that we save 
portions of  the statute either by severance or by fashioning judici~llimitations on 
the scope of  its coverage.  . 
IV 
In arguing for reversal, the Government contends that the CDA is plainly 
constitutional under three of  our prior decisions: (1) Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. 
S. 629 (1968); (2) FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978); and(3) 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 47SU. S. 41  (1986). A close look at these cases, 
however, raises-rather than relieves-doubts concerning the constitutionality of 
theCDA. 
In Ginsberg, we upheld the constitutionality of  a New York statute that prohibited 
selling· to minors under 17 years of  age material that was considered obscene as to 
them even if  not obscene as to adults. We rejected the defendant's broad submission 
that "the scope ofthe constitutional freedom of  expression secured to a citizen to 
read or see material concerned with sex cannot be made to depend on whether the 
citizen is an adult or a minor." 390 U. S., at 636. In rejecting that contention, we 
relied not only on the State's independent interest in the well-being of  its youth, but 
also on our consistent recognition of  the principle that "the parents' claim to 
authority in their oWn household to direct the rearing of  their children is basic in the 
structure of  our society. "(31) In four important respects, the statute upheld in 
Ginsberg was narrower than the CDA. First, we noted in Ginsberg that "the 
prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from 
purchasing the magazines for their children." Id., at 639. Under the CDA, by 
contrast, neither the parents' consent-nor even their participation-in the 
communication would avoid the application of  the statute.(32) Second, the New 
York statute applied only to commercial transactions, id., at 647, whereas the CDA 
contains no such limitation. Third, the New York statute cabined its definition of 
material th;lt is harmful to minors with the requirement that it be "utterly without 
redeeming social importance for minors." Id., at 646. The CDA fails to provide us 
with any definition of  the term "indecent" as used in §223(a)(I) and, importantly, 
omits any requirement that the "patently offensive" material covered by §223(  d) 
lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Fourth, the New York 
statute defined a minor as a person under the age of 17, whereas the CDA, in 
applying to all those under 18 years, includes an additional year of  those nearest 
majority. 
In Pacifica, we upheld a declaratory order of  the Federal Communications 93 
Commission, holding that the broadcast of  a recording of  a 12-minute monologue 
entitled "Filthy Words" that had previously been delivered to a live audience "could 
have been the subject of  administrative sanctions." 438 U. S., at 730 (internal 
quotations omitted). The Commission had found that the repetitive use of  certain 
words referring to excretory or sexual activities or organs "in an afternoon 
broadcast when children are in the audience was patently offensive" and concluded 
that the monologue was indecent "as broadcast." Id., at 735. The respondent did not 
quarrel with the finding that the afternoon broadcast was patently offensive, but 
contended that it was not "indecent" within the meaning of  the relevant statutes 
because it contained no prurient appeal. After rejecting respondent's statutory 
arguments, we confronted its two constitutional arguments: (1) that the 
Commission's construction of  its authority to ban indecent speech was so brmtd that 
its order had to be set aside even ifthe broadcast at issue was unprotected; and (2) 
that since the recording was not obscene, the First Amendment forbade any 
abridgement of  the right to broadcast it on the radio. 
In the portion of  the lead opinion not joined by Justices Powell and Blackmun, the 
plurality stated that the First Amendment does not prohibit all governmental 
regulation that depends on the content of  speech. Id., at 742-743. Accordingly, the 
availability of  constitutional protection for a vulgar and offensive monologue that 
was not obscene depended on the context ofthe broadcast. Id., at 744-748. Relying 
on the premise that "of  all forms of  communication" broadcasting had received the 
most limited First Amendment protection, id., at 748-749, the Court concluded that 
the ease with which children may obtain access to broadcasts, "coupled with the 
concerns recognized in Ginsberg," justified special treatment of  indecent 
broadcasting. Id., at 749-750. 
As with the New York statute at issue in Ginsberg, there are significant differences 
between the order upheld in Pacifica and the CDA. First, the order in Pacifica, 
issued by an agency that had been regulating radio stations for decades, targeted a 
specific broadcast that represented a rather dramatic departure from traditional 
program content in order to designate when-rather than whether~it  would be 
permissible to air such a program in that particular medium. The CDA's broad 
categorical prohibitions are not limited to particular times and are not dependent on 
any evaluation by an agency familiar with the unique characteristics of  the Internet. 
Second, unlike the CDA, the Commission's declaratory order was not punitive; we 
expressly refused to decide whether the indecent broadcast "WOUld justify a 
criminal prosecution." Id., at 750. Finally, the Commission's order applied to a 
medium which as a matter of  history had "received the most limited First 
Amendment protection," id., at 748, in large part be cause warnings could not 
adequately protect the listener from unexpected program content. The Internet, 
however, has no comparable history. Moreover, the District Court found that the 
risk of  encountering indecent material by accident is remote because a series of 
affirmative steps is required to access specific material. 94 
In Renton, we upheld a zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theatres out of 
residential neighborhoods. The ordinance was aimed, not at the content of  the films 
shown in the theaters, but rather at the "secondary effects"-such as crime and 
deteriorating property values-that these theaters fostered:  '"  It is th[  e] secondary 
effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of 
"offensive" speech.'" 475 U. S., at 49 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, 
Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 71, n.34 (1976)). According to the Government, the CDA is 
constitutional because it constitutes a sort of  "cyberzoning" on the Internet. But the 
,CDA applies broadly to the entire universe of  cyberspace. And the purpose of  the 
CDA is to protect children from the primary effects of  "indecent" and "patently 
offensive" speech,rather than any "secondary" effect of  such speech. Thus, the 
CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on speech, and, as such, cannot be 
"properly analyzed as a form of  time, place, and manner regulation." 475 U. S., at 
46.,See also Boosv. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 321 (1988) ("Regulations that focus on 
the direct impact of  speech on its audience" are not properly analyzed under 
Renton); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U. S. 123, 134 (1992) 
(,'Listeners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation"). 
These precedents, then, surely do not require us to uphold the CDA and are fully 
consistent with the application of  the most stringent review of  its provisions. 
v 
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 557 (1975), we 
observed that "[  e  ]ach medium of  expression ...  may present its own problems." 
Thus, some of  our cases have recognized special justifications for regulation of  the 
broadcast media that are not applicable to other speakers, see Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 
U. S. 726 (1978). In these cases, the Court relied on the history of  extensive 
government regulation ofthe broadcast medium, see, e.g., Red Lion, 395 U. S., at 
399-400; the scarcity of  available frequencies at its inception, see, e.g., Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 637-638 (1994); and its 
"invasive" nature, see Sable Communications of  Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 
128 (1989). 
Those factors are not present in cyberspace. Neither before nor after the enactment 
of  the CDA have the vast democratic fora of  the Internet been subject to the type of 
government supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.(33) 
Moreover, the Internet is not as "invasive" as radio or television. The District Court 
specifically found that "[c]ommunications over the Internet do not 'invade' an 
individual's home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden. Users seldom 
encounter content 'by accident.'"  929 F. Supp., at 844 (finding 88). It  also found 
that "[a]lmost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the 95 
content," and cited testimony that "'odds are slim' that a user would come across a 
sexually explicit sight by accident." Ibid. 
We distinguished Pacifica in Sable, 492 U. S., at 128, on just this basis. In Sable, a 
company engaged in the business of  offering sexually oriented prerecorded 
telephone messages (popularly known as "dial-a-porn") challenged the 
. constitutionality of  an amendment to the Communications Act that imposed a 
blanket prohibition on indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone 
messages. We held that the statute was constitutional insofar as it applied to 
obscene messages but invalid as applied to indecent messages. In attempting to 
justify the complete ban and criminalization of  indecent commercial telephone 
messages, the Government relied on Pacifica, arguing that the ban was necessary to 
prevent children from gaining access to such messages. We agreed that "there is a 
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of 
minors" which extended to shielding them from indecent messages that are not 
obscene by adult standards, 492 U. S., at 126, but distinguished our "emphatically 
narrow holding" in Pacifica because it did not involve a complete ban and because 
it involved a different medium of  communication, id., at 127. We explained that 
"the dial-it medium requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the 
communication." Id_, at 127-128. "Placing a telephone call," we continued, "is not 
the same as turning on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message." 
Id., at 128. 
Finally, unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized 
regulation of  the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a 
"scarce" expressive commodity. It  provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity 
for communication of  all kinds. The Government estimates that "[a]s many as 40 
million people use the Internet today, and that figure is expected to grow to 200 
million by 1999."(34) This dynamic, multifaceted category of  communication 
includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and still 
images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of  chat rooms, 
any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates 
farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of  Web pages, mail 
exploders, and news  groups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. As the 
District Court found, "the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought." 
929 F. Supp., at 842 (finding 74). We agree with its conclusion that our cases 
provide no basis for qualifying the level of  First Amendment scrutiny that should 
be applied to this medium. 
VI 
Regardless of  whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment, 
the many ambiguities concerning the scope of  its coverage render it problematic for 
purposes ofthe First Amendment. For instance, each of  the two parts ofthe CDA 
uses a different linguistic form. The first uses the word "indecent," 47 U. S. C. A. 96 
§223(a) (Supp. 1997), while the second speaks of  material that "in context, depicts 
or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community 
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs," §223(  d). Given the absence of  a 
definition of  either term,(35) this difference in language will provoke uncertainty 
among speakers about how the two standards relate to each other(36) and just what 
they mean.(37) Could a speaker confidently assume that a serious discussion about 
birth control practices, homosexuality, the First Amendment issues raised by the 
Appendix to our Pacifica opinion, or the consequences of  prison rape would not 
violate the CDA? This uncertainty undermines the likelihood that the CDA has 
been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of  protecting minors from 
potentially harmful materials. 
The vagueness ofthe CDA is a matter of  special concern for two reasons. First, the 
CDA is a content-based regulation of  speech. The vagueness of  such a regulation 
raises special First Amendment concerns because of  its obvious chilling effect on 
free speech. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of  Nev., 501 U. S. 1030, 1048-1051 
(1991). Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and 
stigma of  a criminal conviction, the CDA threatens violators with penalties 
including up to two years in prison for each act of  violation. The severi ty of 
criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than 
communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images. See, e.g., 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479,494 (1965). As a practical matter, this 
increased deterrent effect, coupled with the "risk of  discriminatory enforcement" of 
vague regulations, poses greater First Amendment concerns than those implicated 
by the civil regulation reviewed in Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications 
Consortium~ Inc. v. FCC, 518 U. S. _  (1996). 
The Government argues that the statute is no more vague than the obscenity 
standard this Court established in Miller v. California, 413 U. S.  15 (1973). But that 
is not so. In Miller, this Court reviewed a criminal conviction againsta commercial 
vendor who mailed brochures containing pictures of  sexually explicit activities to 
individuals who had not requested such materials. Id., at 18. Having struggled for 
some time to establish a definition of  obscenity, we set forth in Miller the test for 
obscenity that controls to this day: 
"(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (  c) whether the work, taken as 
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id., at 24 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Because the CDA's flpatently offensive" standard (and, we assume arguendo, its 
synonymous "indecent" standard) is one part of  the three-prong Miller test, the 97 
Government reasons, it cannot be unconstitutionally vague. 
The Government's assertion is incorrect as a matter of  fact. The second prong ofthe 
Miller test-the  purported ly analogous standard--contains a critical requirement 
that is omitted from the CDA: that the proscribed material be "specifically defined 
by the applicable state law." This requirement reduces the vagueness inherent in the 
open-ended term "patently offensive" as used in the CDA. Moreover, the Miller 
definition is limited to "sexual conduct," whereas the CDA extends also to include 
(1) "excretory activities" as well as (2) "organs" of  both a sexual and excretory 
nature. 
The Government's reasoning is also flawed. Just because a definition including 
three limitations is not vague, it does not follow that one of  those limitations, 
standing by itself, is not vague.(38) Each of  Miller's additional two prongs-(l) 
that, taken as a whole, the material appeal to the "prurient" interest, and (2) that it 
"lac[k] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"--critically limits the 
uncertain sweep of  the obscenity definition. The second requirement is particularly 
important because, unlike the "patently offensive" and "prurient interest" criteria, it 
is not judged by contemporary community standards. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U. S. 
497, 500 (1987). This "societal value" requirement, absent in the CDA, allows 
appellate courts to impose some limitations and regularity on the definition by 
setting, as a matter of  law, a national floor for socially redeeming value. The 
Government's contention that courts will be able to give such legal limitations to 
the CDA's standards is belied by Miller's own rationale for having juries determine 
whether material is "patently offensive" according to community standards: that 
such questions are essentially ones of  fact. (39) 
In contrast to Miller and our other previous cases, the CDA thus presents a greater 
threat of  censoring speech that, in fact, falls outside the statute's scope. Given the 
vague contours ofthe coverage of  the statute, it unquestionably silences some 
speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection. That 
danger provides further reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The 
CDA's burden on protected speech cannot be justified if  it could be avoided by a 
more carefully drafted statute. 
VII 
We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment 
requires when a statute regulates the content of  speech. In order to deny minors 
access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large 
amount of  speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to 
one another. That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if  less restrictive 
alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that 
the statute was enacted to serve. 98 
In evaluating the free speech rights of  adults, we have made it perfectly clear that 
"[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First 
Amendment." Sable, 492 U. S., at 126. See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 
431 U. S. 678, 701  (1977) ("[W]here obscenity is not involved, we have 
consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does 
.  not justify its suppression"). Indeed, Pacifica itself admonished that "the fact that 
society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it." 438 
U. S., at 745. 
It  is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting 
children from harmful materials. See Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 639; Pacifica, 438 U. 
S., at 749. But that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of 
speech addressed to adults. As we have explained, the Government may not 
"reduc[  e] the adult population ...  to ...  only what is fit for children." Denver, 518 
U. S., at _  (slip op., at 29) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sable, 492 
U. S., at 128).(40) "[R]egardless ofthe strength of  the government's interest" in 
protecting children, "[t]he level of  discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be 
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox." Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 74-75 (1983). 
The District Court was correct to conclude that the CDA effectively resembles the 
ban on "dial-a-porn" invalidated in Sable. 929 F. Supp., at 854. In Sable, 492 U. S., 
at 129, this Court rejected the argument that we should defer to the congressional 
judgment that nothing less than a total ban would be effective in preventing 
. enterprising youngsters from gaining access to indecent communications. Sable 
thus made clear that the mere fact that a statutory regulation of  speech was enacted 
for the important purpose of  protecting children from exposure to sexually explicit 
material does not foreclose inquiry into its validity.(  41) As we pointed out last 
Term, that inquiry embodies an "over-arching commitment" to make sure that 
Congress has designed its statute to accomplish its purpose "without imposing an 
unnecessarily great restriction on speech." Denver, 518 U. S., at _  (slip op., at 
11). 
In arguing that the CDA does not so diminish adult communication, the 
Government relies on the incorrect factual premise that prohibiting a transmission 
whenever it is known that one of  its recipients is a minor would not interfere with 
adult-to-adult communication. The findings of  the District Court make clear that 
this premise is untenable. Given the size of  the potential audience for most 
messages, in the absence of  a viable age verification process, the sender must be 
charged with kndwing that one or more minors will likely view it. Knowledge that, 
for instance, one or more members of  a 100-person chat group will be minor-and 
therefore that it would be a crime· to send the group an indecent message-would 
surely burden communication among adults.(  42) 99 
The District Court fotuld that at the time of  trial existing technology did not include 
any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to its 
commtulications on the Internet without also denying access to adults. The Court 
found no effective way to determine the age of  a user who is accessing material 
through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, or chat rooms. 929F. Supp., at 845 
(findings 90-94). As a practical matter, the Court also found that it would be 
prohibitively expensive for noncommercial-as well as some commercial-
speakers who have Web sites to verify that their users are adults. Id., at 845-848 
(findings 95-116).(43) These limitations must inevitably curtail a significant 
amount of  adult communication on the Internet. By contrast, the District Court 
found that "[d]espite its limitations, currently available user-based software 
suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their 
children from accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents may 
believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be widely available." Id., at 842 
(finding 73) (emph~es  added). 
The breadth of  the CDA's coverage is wholly unprecedented. Unlike the regulations 
upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the scope ofthe CDA is not limited to commercial 
speech or commercial entities: Its open-ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit 
entities and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own 
computers in the presence of  minors. The general, undefined terms "indecent" and 
"patently offensive" cover large amounts of  nonpornographic material with serious 
educational or other value.(44) Moreover, the "community standards" criterion as 
applied to the Internet means that any communication available to a nation-wide 
audience will be judged by the standards of  the community most likely to be 
offended by the message.(45) The regulated subject matter includes any of  the 
seven "dirty words" used in the Pacifica monologue, the use of  which the 
Government's expert acknowledged could constitute a felony. See Olsen Test., Tr. 
Vol. V, 53:16-54:10. It may also extend to discussions about prison rape or safe 
sexual practices, artistic images that include nude subjects, and arguably the card 
catalogue oftheCamegie Library. 
For the purposes of  our decision, we need neither accept nor reject the 
Government's submission that the First Amendment does not forbid a blanket 
prohibition on all "indecent" and "patently offensive" messages communicated to a 
17-year old-no matter how much value the message may contain and regardless of 
parental approval. It is at least clear that the strength of  the Government's interest in 
protecting minors is not equally strong throughout the coverage of  this broad 
statute. Under the'CDA,a parent allowing her 17-year-old to use the family 
computer to obtain information on the Internet that she, in her parental judgment, 
deems appropriate could face a lengthy prison term. See 47 U. S. C. A. §223(a)(2) 
(Supp. 1997). Similarly, a parent who sent his 17-year-old college freshman 
information on birth control via e-mail could be incarcerated even though neither 100 
he, his child, nor anyone in their home community, found the material "indecent" or 
"patently offensive," if  the college town's community thought otherwise. 
The breadth of  this content-based restriction of  speech imposes an especially heavy 
burden on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be 
as effective as the CDA. It  has not done so. The arguments in this Court have 
referred to possible alternatives such as requiring that indecent material be "tagged" 
in a way that facilitates parental control of  material coming into their homes, 
making exceptions for messages with artistic or educational value, providing some 
tolerance for parental choice, and regUlating some portions of  the Internet-such as 
commercial web sites-differently than others, such as chat rooms. Particularly in 
the light of  the absence of  any detailed findings by the Congress, or even hearings 
addressing the special problems ofthe CDA, we are persuaded that the CDA is not 
narrowly tailored if  that requirement has any meaning at all. 
VIII 
In an attempt to curtail the CDA's facial overbreadth, the Government advances 
three additional arguments for sustaining the Act's affirmative prohibitions: (1) that 
the CDA is constitutional because it leaves open ample "alternative channels" of 
communication; (2) that the plain meaning of  the Act's "knowledge" and "specific 
person" requirement significantly restricts its permissible applications; and (3) that 
the Act's prohibitions are "almost always" limited to material lacking redeeming 
social value. 
The Government first contends that, even though the CDA effectively censors 
discourse on many of  the Internet's modalities-such as chat groups, newsgroups, 
and mail exploders-it is nonetheless constitutional because it provides a 
"reasonable opportunity" for speakers to engage in the restricted speech on the 
World Wide Web. Brief  for Appellants 39. This argument is unpersuasive because 
the CDA regulates speech on the basis of  its content. A "time, place, and manner" 
analysis is therefore inapplicable. See Consolidated Edison Co. ofN. Y. v. Public 
Servo Comm'n ofN. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 536 (1980). It is thus immaterial whether 
such speech would be feasible on the Web (which, as the Government's own expert 
acknowledged, would cost up to $10,000 if  the speaker's interests were not 
accommodated by an existing Web site, not including costs for database 
management and age verification). The Government's position is equivalent to 
arguing that a statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as individuals 
are free to publish books. In invalidating a number of  laws that banned leafletting 
on the streets regardless of  their content-we explained that "one is not to have the 
exercise of  his liberty of  expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that 
it maybe exercised in some other place." Schneider v. State (Town of  Irvington), 
308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939). 101 
The Government also asserts that the "knowledge" requirement of  both §§223(a) 
and (d), especially when coupled with the "specific child" element found in 
§223(d), saves the CDA from overbreadth. Because both sections prohibit the 
dissemination of  indecent messages only to persons known to be under 18, the 
Government argues, it does not require transmitters to "refrain from communicating 
indecent material to adults; they need only refrain from disseminating such 
materials to persons they know to be under 18." Brief  for Appellants 24. This 
argument ignores the fact that most Internet fora-including chat rooms, 
newsgroups, mail exploders, and the Web-are open to all comers. The 
Government's assertion that the knowledge requirement somehow protects the 
communications of  adults is therefore untenable. Even the strongest reading of  the 
"specific person" requirement of  §223(d) cannot save the statute. It  would confer 
broad powers of  censorship, in the fonn of  a "heckler's veto," upon any opponent of 
indecent speech who might simply log on and infonn the would-be discoursers that 
his 17-year-old child-a "specific person ...  under 18 years of  age," 47 U. S. C. A. 
§223(d)(I)(A) (Supp. 1997)-would be present. 
Finally, we find no textual support for the Government's submission that material 
having scientific, educational, or other redeeming social value will necessarily fall 
outside the CDA's "patently offensive" and "indecent" prohibitions. See also n. 37, 
supra. 
IX, 
The Government's three remaining arguments focus on the defenses provided in 
§223(e)(5).(46) First, relying on the "good faith, reasonable, effective, and 
appropriate actions" provision, the Government suggests that "tagging" provides a 
defense that saves the constitutionality ofthe Act. The suggestion assumes that 
transmitters may encode their indecent communications in a way that would 
indicate their contents, thus pennitting recipients to block their reception with 
appropriate software. It  is the requirement that the good faith action must be 
"effective" that makes this defense illusory. The Government recognizes that its 
proposed screening software does not currently exist. Even if  it did, there is no way 
to know whether a potential recipient will actually block the encoded material. 
Without the impossible knowledge that every guardian in America is screening for 
the "tag," the transmitter could not reasonably rely on its action to be "effective." 
For its second and third arguments concerning defenses-which we can consider 
together-the Government relies on the latter half  of  §223 (e)(5), which applies 
when the transmitter has restricted access by requiring use of  a verified credit card 
or adult identification. Such verification is not only technologically available but 
actually is used by commercial providers of  sexually explicit material. These 
providers, therefore, would be protected by the defense. Under the findings of  the 
District Court, however, it is not economically feasible 'for most noncommercial 102 
speakers to employ such verification. Accordingly, this defense would not 
significantly narrow the statute's burden on noncommercial speech. Even with 
respect to the commercial pornographers that would be protected by the defense, 
the Government failed to adduce any evidence that these verification techniques 
actually preclude minors from posing as adults. (  47) Given that the risk of  criminal 
sanctions "hovers over each content provider, like the proverbial sword of 
Damocles,"(4S) the District Court correctly refused to rely on unproven future 
technology to save the statute. The Government thus failed to prove that the 
proffered defense would significantly reduce the heavy burden on adult speech 
produced by the prohibition on offensive displays. 
We agree with the District Court's conclusion that the CDA places an unacceptably 
heavy burden on protected speech, and that the defenses do not constitute the sort 
of  "narrow tailoring". that will save an otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional 
provision. In Sable, 492 U. S., at 127, we remarked that the speech restriction at 
issue there amounted to "'burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.'"  The CDA, casting a 
far,darker shadow over, free speech, threatens to torch a large segment ofthe 
Internet community..  . 
x 
At oral argument, the Government relied heavily on its ultimate fall-back position: 
If  this Court should conclude that the CDA is insufficiently tailored, it urged, we 
should save the statute's constitutionality by honoring the severability clause, see 47 
U. S. C. §60S, and construing nonseverable terms narrOWly. In only one respect is 
this argument acceptable. 
A severability clause requires textual provisions that can be severed. We will 
follow §60S's guidance by leaving constitutional textual elements of  the statute 
intact in the one place· where they are, in fact; severable. The "indecency" provision, 
47 U. S. C. A. §223(a) (Supp. 1997), applies to "any comment, request, suggestion, 
proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent." (Emphasis 
added.) Appellees do not challenge the application of  the statute to obscene speech, 
which, they acknowledge, can be banned totally because it enjoys no First 
Amendment protection. See Miller, 413 U. S., at IS. As set forth by the statute, the 
restriction of  "obscene" material enjoys a textual manifestation separate from that 
for "indecent" material, which we have held unconstitutional. Therefore, we will 
sever the term "or indecent" from the statute, leaving the rest of  §223 (a) standing. 
In no other respect, however, can §223(a) or §223(d) be saved by such a textual 
surgery. 
The Government also draws on an additional, less traditional aspect ofthe CDA's 
severability clause, 47 U. S. C., §60S, which asks any reviewing court that holds 
the statute facially unconstitutional not to invalidate the CDA in application to 
"other persons or circumstances" that might be constitutionally permissible. It 103 
further invokes this Court's admonition that, absent "countervailing considerations," 
a statute should "be declared invalid to the extent it reaches too far, but otherwise 
left intact." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 503-504 (1985). 
There are two flaws in this argument. 
First, the statute that grants our jurisdiction for this expedited review, 47 U. S. C. 
A.  §561 (Supp. 1997), limits that jurisdictional grant to actions challenging the 
CDA "on its face." Consistent with §561, the plaintiffs who brought this suit and 
the three-judge panel that decided it treated it as a facial challenge. We have no 
authority, in this particular posture, to convert this litigation into an "as-applied" 
challenge. Nor, given the vast array of  plaintiffs, the range of  their expressive 
activities, and the vagueness of  the statute, would it be practicable to limit our 
holding toa  judicially defined set of  specific applications. 
Second, one of  the "countervailing considerations" mentioned in Brockett is presen~ 
here. In considering a facial challenge, this Court may impose a limiting 
construction on a statute only if  it is "readily susceptible" to such a construction. 
Virginia v. American Bookseller's Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383, 397 (1988). See also 
Erznoznik, v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216 (1975) ("readily subject" to 
narrowing construction). The open-ended character of  the CDA provides no 
guidance what ever for limiting its coverage. 
This case is therefore unlike those in which we have construed a statute narrowly 
because the text or other source of  congressional intent identified a clear line that 
this Court could draw. Cf., e.g., Brockett, 472 U. S., at 504-505 (invalidating 
obscenity statute only to the extent that word "lust" was actually or effectively 
excised from statute); United States v. Grace, 461 U. S.  171,180-183 (1983) 
(invalidating federal statute banning expressive displays only insofar as it extended 
to public sidewalks when clear line could be drawn between sidewalks and other 
grounds that comported with congressional purpose of  protecting the building, 
grounds, and people therein). Rather, our decision in United States v. Treasury 
Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 479, n. 26 (1995), is applicable. In that case, we 
declined to "dra[  w] one or more lines between categories of  speech covered by an 
overly broad statute, when Congress has sent inconsistent signals as to where the 
new line or lines should be drawn" because doing so "involves a far more serious 
invasionofthe legislative domain."(49) This Court "will not rewrite a ...  law to 
conform it to constitutional requirements." American Booksellers, 484 U. S., at 
397.(50) 
XI 
In this Court, though not in the District Court, the Government asserts that-in 
addition to its interest in protecting children-its "[e]qually significant" interest in 
fostering the growth of  the Internet provides an independent basis for upholding the 104 
constitutionality of  the CDA. Brief  for Appellants 19. The Government apparently 
assumes that the unregulated availability of  "indecent" and "patently offensive" 
material on the Internet is driving countless citizens away from the medium 
because of  the risk of  exposing themselves or their children to harmful material. 
We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The dramatic expansion of  this new 
marketplace of  ideas contradicts the factual basis of  this contention. The record 
demonstrates that the growth of  the Internet has been and continues to be 
. phenomenal. As a matter of  constitutional tradition, in the absence of  evidence to 
the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of  the content of  speech is 
more likely to interfere with the free exchange of  ideas than to encourage it. The 
interest in encouraging freedom of  expression in a democratic society outweighs 
any theoretical but unproven benefit of  censorship. 
F or the foregoing reasons, the judgment of  the district court is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
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Justice O'Connor, with whom. The Chief  Justice joins, concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part. 
I write separately to explain why I view the Communications Decency Act of  1996 
(CDA) as little more than an attempt by Congress to create "adult zones" on the 
Internet.· Our precedent indicates that the creation of  such zones can be 
constitutionally sound. Despite the soundness of  its· purpose, however, portions of 
the CDA are unconstitutional because they stray from the blueprint our prior cases 
have developed for constructing a "zoning law" that passes constitutional muster. 
Appellees bring a facial challenge to three provisions of  the CDA. The first, which 
the Court describes as the "indecency transmission" provision, makes it a crime to 
knowingly transmit an obscene or indecent message or image to a person the sender 
knows is under 18 years old. 47 U. S. C. A. §223(a)(I)(B) (May 1996 Supp.). What 
the Court classifies as a single "'patently offensive display'"  provision, see ante, at 
11, is in reality two separate provisions. The first of  these makes it a crime to 
knowingly send a patently offensive message or image to a specific person under 105 
the age of 18 ("specific person" provision). §223(d)(I)(A). The second criminalizes 
the display of  patently offensive messages or images "in a[ny] manner available" to 
minors ("display" provision). §223(d)(1)(B). None of  these provisions purports to 
keep indecent (or patently offensive) material away from adults, who have a First 
Amendment right to obtaIn this speech. Sable Communications of  Cal., Inc. v. 
FCC, 492 U: S. 115, 126 (1989) ("Sexual expression which is indecent but not 
obscene is protected by the First Amendment"). Thus, the undeniable purpose of 
the CDA is to segregate indecent material on the Internet into certain areas that 
minors cannot access. See S. Coni Rep. No. 104-230, p. 189 (1996) (CDA 
imposes "access restrictions ...  to protect minors from exposure to indecent 
material") .. 
The creation of  "adult zones" is by no means a novel concept. States have long 
denied minors access to certain establishments frequented by adults. (1 ) States have 
also denied minors access to speech deemed to be "harmful to minors.  "  (2) The 
Court has previously sustained such zoning laws, but only if  they respect the First 
Amendment rights of  adults and minors. That is to say, a zoning law is valid if  (i) it 
does not unduly restrict adult access to the material; and (ii) minors have no First 
Amendment right to read or view the banned material. As applied to the Internet as 
it exists in 1997, the "display" provision and some applications of  the "indecency 
transmission" and "specific person" provisions fail to adhere to the first ofthese 
limiting principles by restricting adults' access to protected materials in certain 
circumstances. Unlike the Court, however, I would invalidate the provisions only in 
those circumstances. 
I 
Our cases make clear that a "zoning" law is valid only if  adults are still able to 
obtain the regulated speech. If  they cannot, the law does more than simply keep 
children away from speech they have no right to obtain-it interferes with the 
rights of  adults to obtain constitutionally protected speech and effectively 
"reduce[  s] the adult population ...  to reading only what is fit for children." Butler 
. v. Michigan, 352 U: S. 380, 383 (1957). The First Amendment does not tolerate 
such interference. See id., at 383 (striking down a Michigan criminal law banning 
sale of  books-to minors or adults-that contained words or pictures that 
"'tende[d] to ...  corrup[t] the morals of  youth"'); Sable Communications, supra 
(invalidating federal law that made it a crime to transmit indecent, but nonobscene, 
commercial telephone messages to minors and adults); Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 74 (1983) (striking down a federal law prohibiting 
the mailing of  unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives). If  the law does not 
unduly restrict adults' access to constitutionally protected speech, however, it may 
be valid. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629,634 (1968), for example, the 
Court sustained a New York law that barred store owners from selling pornographic 
magazines to minors in part because adults could still buy those magazines. 106 
The Court in Ginsberg concluded that the New York law created a constitutionally 
adequate adult zone simply because, on its face, it denied access only to minors. 
The Court did not question-and therefore necessarily asstimed-that an adult 
zone, once created, would succeed in preserving adults' access while denying 
minors' access to the regulated speech. Before today, there was no reason to 
question this assumption, for the Court has previously only considered laws that 
operated in the physical world, a world that with two characteristics that make it 
possible to create "adult zones": geography and identity. See Lessig, Reading the 
Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 Emory L. J. 869,886 (1996). A minor can see an 
adult dance show only ifhe enters an establishment that provides such 
entertainment. And should he attempt to do so, the minor will not be able to 
conceal completely his identity (or, consequently, his age). Thus, the twin 
characteristics of  geography and identity enable the establishment's proprietor to 
prevent children from entering the establishment, but to let adults inside. 
The electronic world is fundamentally different. Because it is no more than the 
interconnection of  electronic pathways, cyberspace allows speakers and listeners to 
mask their identities. Cyberspace undeniably reflects some form of  geography; chat 
rooms and Web sites, for example, exist at fixed "locations" on the Internet. Since 
users can transmit and receive messages on the Internet without revealing anything 
about their identities or ages, see Lessig, supra, at 901, however, it is not currently 
possible to exclude persons from accessing certain messages on the basis of  their 
identity. 
Cyberspace differs from the physical world in another basic way: Cyberspace is 
malleable. Thus, it is possible to construct barriers in cyberspace and use them to 
screen for identity, making cyberspace more like the physical world and, 
consequently, more amenable to zoning laws. This transformation of  cyberspace is 
already underway. Lessig, supra, at 888-889. Id., at 887 (cyberspace "is moving ... 
from a relatively unzoned place to a universe that is extraordinarily well zoned"). 
Internet speakers (users who post material on the Internet) have begun.to zone 
cyberspace itself  through the use of  "gateway" technology. Such technology 
requires Internet users to enter information about themselves-perhaps an adult 
identification number or a credit card number-before they can access certain areas 
of  cyberspace, 929 F. SUpp. 824, 845 (ED Pa. 1996), much like a bouncer checks a 
person's driver's license before admitting him to a nightclub. Internet users who 
access information have not attempted to zone cyberspace itself, but have tried to 
limit their ownpower to access information in cyberspace, much as a parent 
controls whather children watch on television by installing a lock box. This user-
based zoning is accomplished through the use of  screening software (such as Cyber 
Patrol or SurfWatch) or browsers with screening capabilities, both of  which search 
addresses and text for keywords that are associated with "adult" sites and, if  the 
user wishes, blocks access to such sites. Id., at 839-842. The Platform for Internet 
Content Selection (PICS) project is designed to facilitate user-based zoning by encouraging Internet speakers to rate the content of  their speech using codes 
recognized by all screening programs. Id., at 838-839. 
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Despite this progress, the transfonnation of  cyberspace is not complete. Although 
gateway technology has been available on the World Wide Web for some time 
now, id., at 845; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916,933-934 (SDNY 1996), it is not 
available to all Web speakers, 929 F. Supp., at 845-846, and is just now becoming 
technologically feasible for chat rooms and USENET newsgroups, Brief  for Federal 
Parties 37-38. Gateway technology is not ubiquitous in cyberspace, and because 
without it "there is no means of  age verification," cyberspace still remains largely 
unzoned-and unzoneable. 929 F. Supp., at 846; Shea, supra, at 934. User-based 
zoning is also in its infancy. For it to be effective, (i) an agreed-upon code (or 
"tag") would have to exist; (ii) screening software or browsers with screening 
capabilities would have to be able to recognize the "tag"; and (iii) those programs 
would have to be widely available-and widely used-by Internet users. At 
present, none of  these conditions is true. Screening software "is not in wide use 
today" and "only a handful of  browsers have screening capabilities." Shea, supra, at 
945-946. There is, moreover, no agreed-upon "tag" for those programs to 
recognize. 929 F. Supp., at 848; Shea, supra, at 945. 
Although the prospects for the eventual zoning of  the Internet appear promising, I 
agree with the Court that we must evaluate the constitutionality of  the CDA as it 
applies to the Internet as it exists today. Ante, at 36. Given the present state of 
cyberspace, I agree with the Court that the "display" provision cannot pass muster. 
Until gateway technology is available throughout cyberspace, and it is not in 1997, 
a speaker cannot be reasonably assured that the speech he displays will reach only 
adults because it is impossible to confine speech to an "adult zone." Thus, the only 
way for a speaker to avoid liability under the CDA is to refrain completely from 
using indecent speech. But this forced silence impinges on the First Amendment 
right of  adults to make and obtain this speech and, for all intents and purposes, 
"reduce[  s] the adult popUlation [on the Internet] to reading only what is fit for 
children." Butler, 352 U. S., 'at 383. As a result, the "display" provision cannot 
withstand scrutiny. Accord, Sable Communications, 492 U. S., at 126-131; Bolger 
v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S., at 73-75. 
The "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions present a closer 
issue, for they are not unconstitutional in all of  their applications. As discussed 
above, the "indecency transmission" provisio:q makes it a crime to transmit 
knowingly an indecent message to a person the sender knows is under 18 years of 
age. 47 U. S. C. A. §223(a)(1)(B) (May 1996 Supp.). The "specific person" 
provision proscribes the same conduct, although it does not as explicitly require the 
sender to know that the intended recipient of  his indecent message is a minor. 
§223(d)(1)(A). Appellant urges the Court to construe the provision to impose such 
a knowledge requirement, see Brief  for Federal Parties 25-27, and I would do so. 
'I 
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See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf  Coast Building & Constr.'Trades 
Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction 
of  a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the 
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the 
intent of  Congress"). 
So construed, both provisions are constitutional as applied to a conversation 
involving only an adult and one or more minors-e.g., when an adult speaker sends 
an e-mail knowing the addressee is a minor, or when an adult and minor converse 
by themselves or with other minors in a chat room. In this context, these provisions 
are no different from the law we sustained in Ginsberg. Restricting what the adult 
may say to the minors in no way restricts the adult's ability to communicate with 
other adults. He is not prevented from speaking indecently to other adults in a chat 
room (because there are no other adults participating in the conversation) and he 
remains free to send indecent e-mails to other adults. The relevant universe contains 
only one adult, and the adult in that universe has the power to refrain from using 
indecent speech and consequently to keep all such speech within the room in an 
"adult" zone. 
The analogy to Ginsberg breaks down, however, when more than one adult is a 
party to the conversation. If  a minor enters a chat room otherwise occupied by 
adults, the CDA effectively requires the adults in the room to stop using indecent 
speech. If  they did not, they could be prosecuted under the "indecency 
transmission" and "specific person" provisions for any indecent statements they 
make to the group, since they would be transmitting an indecent message to 
specific persons, one of  whom is.a minor. Accord, ante, at 30. The CDA is 
therefore akin to a law that makes it a crime for a bookstore owner to sell 
pornographic magazines to anyone once a minor enters his store. Even assuming 
such a law might be constitutional in the physical world as a reasonable alternative 
to excluding minors completely from the store, the absence of  any means of 
excluding minors from chat rooms in cyberspace restricts the rights of  adults to 
engage in indecent speech in those rooms. The "indecency transmission" and 
"specific person" provisions share this defect. 
But these two provisions do not infringe on adults' speech in all situations. And as 
discussed below, I do not find that the provisions are overbroad in the sense that 
they restrict minors' access to a substantial amount of  speech that minors have the 
right to read and view. Accordingly, the CDA can be applied constitutionally in 
some situations. Normally, this fact would require the Court to reject a direct facial 
challenge. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge 
to a legislative Act [succeeds only if] the challenger ...  establish[es] that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid"). Appellees' claim arises 
under the First Amendment, however, and they argue that the CDA is facially 
invalid because it is "substantially overbroad"-that is, it "sweeps too broadly ... 109 
[and] penaliz[  es] a substantial amount of  speech that is constitutionally protected," 
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U. S.  123, 130 (1992). See Brief  for 
Appellees American Library Association et al. 48; Brief  for Appellees American 
Civil Liberties Union et al. 39-41. I agree with the Court that the provisions are 
overbroad in that they cover any and all communications between adults and 
minors, regardless of  how many adults might be part of  the audience to the 
communication. 
This conclusion does not end the matter, however. Where, as here, "the parties 
challenging the statute are those who desire to engage in protected speech that the 
overbroad statute purports to punish ... [t]he statute may forthwith be declared 
invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact." Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 504 (1985). There is no question that 
Congress intended to prohibit certain communications between one adult and one 
or more minors. See 47 U. S.c. A. §223(a)(I)(B) (May 1996 Supp.) (punishing 
"[w]hoever ... initiates the transmission of  [any indecent communication] 
knowingly that the recipient of  the communication is under 18 years of  age"); 
§223(  d)(1 )(A) (punishing "[  w  ]hoever ... send[  s] to a specific person or persons 
under 18 years of  age [a patently offensive message  ]"). There is also no question 
that Congress would have enacted a narrower version of  these provisions had it 
known a broader version would be declared unconstitutional. 47 U. S. C. §608 ("If . 
. . the application [ofany provision of  the CDA] to any person or circumstance is 
held invalid, ...  the application of  such provision to other persons or circumstances 
shall not be affected thereby"). I would therefore sustain the "indecency 
transmission" and "specific person" provisions to the extent they apply to the 
transmission ofInternet communications where the party initiating the 
communication knows that all of  the recipients are minors. 
II 
.  Whether the CDA substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of 
minors, and thereby runs afoul of  the second characteristic of  valid zoning laws, 
presents  "a closer question. In Ginsberg, the New York law we sustained prohibited 
the sale to minors of  magazines that were "harmful to minors." Under that law, a 
magazine.was "harmful to minors" only ifit was obscene as to minors. 390 U. S., at 
632-633. Noting that obscene speech is not protected by the First Amendment, 
Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 485 (1957), and that New York was 
constitutionally free to adjust the definition of  obscenity for minors, 390 U. S., at 
638, the COlli1: concluded that the law did not "invad[e] the area of  freedom of 
expression constitutionally secured to minors." Id., at 637. New York therefore did 
not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of  minors. Cf. Erznoznikv. 
Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 213 (1975) (striking down city ordinance that banned 
nudity that was not "obscene even as to minors"). 110 
The Court neither "accept[  s] nor reject[  s]" the argument that the CDA is facially 
overbroad because it substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of 
minors. Ante, at 32. I would reject it. Ginsberg established that minors may 
constitutionally be denied access to material that is obscene as to minors. As 
Ginsberg explained, material is obscene as to minors if  it (i) is "patently offensive 
to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is 
suitable ... for minors"; (ii) appeals to the prurient interest of  minors; and (iii) is 
"utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." 3  90 U. S., at 633. 
Because the CDA denies minors the right to obtain material that is "patently 
offensive"-even if  it has some redeeming value for minors and even if  it does not 
appeal to their prurient interests-Congress' rejection of  the Ginsberg "harmful to 
minors" standard means that the CDA could ban some speech that is "indecent" 
(i.e., "patently offensive") but that is not obscene as to minors. 
I do not deny this possibility, but to prevail in a facial challenge, it is not enough 
for a plaintiff  to show "some" overbreadth. Our cases require a proof  of  "real" and 
"substantial" overbreadth, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615 (1973), and 
appellees have not carried their burden in this case. In my view, the universe of 
speech constitutionally protected as to minors but banned by the CDA-i.e., the 
universe of  material that is "patently offensive," but which nonetheless has some 
redeeming value for minors or does not appeal to their prurient interest-is a very 
small one. Appellees cite no examples of  speech falling within this universe and do 
not attempt to explain why that universe is substantial "in relation to the statute's 
plainly legitimate sweep." Ibid. That the CDA might deny minors the right to 
obtain material that has some "value," see ante, at 32-33, is largely beside the 
point. While discussions about prison rape or nude art, see ibid., may have some 
, redeeming education value for adults, they do not necessarily have any such value 
for minors, and under Ginsberg, minors only have a First Amendment right to 
obtain patently offensive material that has "redeeming social importance for 
minors," 390 U. S., at 633 (emphasis added). There is also no evidence in the 
record to support the contention that "many [e  ]-mail transmissions from an adult to 
a minor are conversations between family members," ante, at 18, n. 32, and no 
support for the legal proposition that such speech is absolutely immune from 
regulation. Accordingly, in my view, the CDA does not burden a substantial 
amount of  minors' constitutionally protected speech. 
Thus, the constitutionality of  the CDA as a zoning law hinges on the extent to 
which it substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of  adults. Because 
the rights of  adults are infringed only by the "display" provision and by the 
"indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions as applied to 
communications involving more than one adult, I would invalidate the CDA only to 
that extent. Insofar as the "indecency transmission" and "specific person" 
provisions prohibit the use of  indecent speech in communications between an adult 
and one or more minors, however, they can and should be sustained. The Court 111 
reaches a contrary conclusion, and from that holding that I respectfully dissent. 
Notes (opinion) 
(1 )"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of  speech." U. S. Const., 
Arndt. 1. 
(2)The Court made 410 findings, including 356 paragraphs of  the parties' 
stipulation and 54 findings based on evidence received in open court. See 929 F. 
Supp.at 830,n.9, 842,n. 15. 
(3)An acronym for the network developed by the Advanced Research Project 
Agency. 
(4)Id., at 844 (finding 81). 
(5)Id., at 831 (finding 3). 
(6)Id., at 835 (finding 27). 
(7)Id., at 842 (finding 74). 
(8)Id., at 836 (finding 36). 
(9)"Web publishing is simple enough that thousands of  individual users and small 
community organizations are using the Web to publish their own personal 'home 
pages,' the equivalent of  individualized newsletters about the person or 
organization, which are available to everyone on the Web." Id., at 837 (fmding 42). 
(lO)Id., at 838 (finding 46). 
(ll)Id., at 844 (finding 82). 
(l2)Ibid. (finding 86). 
(13)Ibid. (finding 85). 
(14)Id., at 848 (finding 117). 
(l5)Id., at 844-845 (finding 88). 
(16)Ibid. 
(17)Id., at 845 '(finding 89). (18)Id., at 842 (finding 72). 
(19)Ibid. (finding 73). 
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(20)Id., at 845 (finding 90): "An e-mail address provides no authoritative 
information about the addressee, who may use an e-mail .alias. or an anonymous 
remailer. There is also no universal or reliable listing of  e-mail addresses and 
corresponding names or telephone numbers, and any such listing would be or 
rapidly become incomplete. For these reasons, there is no reliable way in many 
instances for a sender to know if  the e-mail recipient is an adult or a minor. The 
difficulty of  e-mail age verification is compounded for mail exploders such as 
listservs, which automatically send information to all e-mail addresses on a sender's 
list. Government expert Dr. Olsen agreed that no current technology could give a 
speaker assurance that only adults were listed in a particular mail exploder's 
mailing list." . 
(21)Ibid. (finding 93). 
(22)Id., at 846 (finding 102). 
(23)Id., at 847 (findings 104-106): 
"At least some, ifnot almost all, non-commercial organizations, such as the ACLU, 
Stop Prisoner Rape or Critical Path .AJDS Project, regard charging listeners to 
access their speech as contrary to their goals of  making their materials available to a 
wide audience free of  charge. 
"There is evidence suggesting that adult users, partiCUlarly casual Web browsers, 
would be discouraged from retrieving information that required use of  a credit card 
or password. Andrew Anker testified that HotWired has received many complaints 
from its members about HotWired's registration system, which requires only that a 
member supply a name, e-mail address and self-created password. There is concern 
by commercial content providers that age verification requirements would decrease 
advertising and revenue because advertisers depend on a demonstration that the 
sites are widely available and frequently visited." 
(24)See Exon Amendment No. 1268, 141 Congo Rec. 88120 (June 9, 1995). See 
also id., at S8087. This amendment, as revised, became §502 ofthe 
Communications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 133,47 U. S. C. A. §§223(a)-(e) (Supp. 
1997). Some Members of  the House of  Representatives opposed the Exon 
Amendment because they thought it "possible for our parents now to child-proof 
the family computer with these products available in the private sector." They also 
thought the Senate's approach would "involve the Federal Government spending 
vast sums of  money trying to define elusive terms that are going to lead to a flood 113 
of  legal challenges while our kids are unprotected." These Members offered an 
amendment intended as a substitute for the Exon Amendment, but instead enacted 
as an additional section ofthe Act entitled "Online Family Empowerment." See 110 
Stat. 137,47 U. S. C. A. §230 (Supp. 1997); 141 Congo Rec. H8468-H8472. No 
hearings were held on the provisions that became law. See S. Rep. No.1  04-23 
(1995), p. 9. After the Senate adopted the Exon amendment, however, its Judiciary 
Committee did conduct a one-day hearing on "Cyberporn and Children." In his 
opening statement at that hearing, Senator Leahy observed: 
"It really struck me in your opening statement when you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, 
that it is the first ever hearing, and you are absolutely right. And yet we had a major 
debate on the floor, passed legislation overwhelmingly on a subject involving the 
Internet; legislation that could dramatically change-some would say even wreak 
havoc-on the Internet. The Senate went in willy-nilly, passed legislation, and 
never once had a hearing, never once had a discussion other than an hour or so on 
the floor." Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of  the Problem, The State of  the 
Technology, and the Need for Congressional Action, Hearing on S. 892 before the 
Senate Committee on,the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8 (1995). 
(25) Although the Government and the dissent break §223(d)(I) into two separate 
"patently offensive" and "display" provisions, we follow the convention of  both 
parties below, as well the District Court's order and opinion, in describing 
§223(  d)(1) as one provision. 
(26)In full, § 223(e)(5) provides: 
'''(5) It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or (d) ofthis section, 
or under subsection (a)(2) of  this section with respect to the use of  a facility for an 
activity under subsection (a)(l)(B) of  this section that a person-
"(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under 
the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication 
specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to 
restrict minors from such communications, including any method which is feasible 
under available technology; or 
"(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of  a verified 
credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification 
number." 
(27)American Civil Liberties Union; Human Rights Watch; Electronic Privacy 
Information Center; Electronic Frontier Foundation; Journalism Education 
Association; Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility; National Writers 
Union; Clarinet Communications Corp.; Institute for Global Communications; Stop 114 
Prisoner Rape; AIDS Education Global Infonnation System; Bibliobytes; Queer 
Resources Directory; Critical Path AIDS Project, Inc.; Wildcat Press, Inc.; Declan 
McCullagh dba Justice on Campus; Brock Meeks dba Cyberwire Dispatch; John 
Troyer dba The Safer Sex Page; Jonathan Wallace dba The Ethical Spectacle; and 
Planned Parenthpod Federation of  America, Inc. 
(28)AmericanLibrary Association; America Online, hIC.; American Booksellers 
Association, Inc.; American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression; American 
Society of  Newspaper Editors; Apple Computer, Inc.; Association of  American 
Publishers, Inc.; Association' of  Publishers, Editors and Writers; Citizens Internet 
Empowennent Coalition; Commercial Internet Exchange Association; CompuServe 
Incorporated; Families Against Internet Censorship; Freedom to Read Foundation, 
Inc.; Health Sciences Libraries Consortium; Hotwired Ventures LLC; Interactive 
Digital Software Association; Interactive Services Association; Magazine 
Publishers of  America; Microsoft Corporation; The Microsoft Network, L. L. C.; 
National Press Photographers Association; Netcom On-Line Communication 
Services, Inc.; Newspaper Association of  America; Opnet, Inc.; Prodigy Services 
Company; Society of  Professional Journalists; Wired Ventures, Ltd. 
(29)110 Stat. 142-143, note following 47 U. S. C. A. §223 (Supp. 1997). 
(30)See also 929 F. Supp., at 877: "Four related characteristics of  Internet 
communication have a transcendent importance to our shared holding that the CDA 
is unconstitutional on its face. We explain these characteristics in our Findings of 
fact above, and I only rehearse them briefly here. First, the Internet presents very 
low barriers to entry. Second, these barriers to entry are identical for both speakers 
and listeners. Third, as a result of  these low barriers, astoundingly diverse content is 
available on the Internet. Fourth, the Internet provides significant access to all who 
wish to speak in the medium, and even creates a relative parity among speakers." 
According to Judge Dalzell, these characteristics and the rest of  the District Court's 
findings "lead to the conclusion that Congress may not regulate indecency on the 
Internet at all." Ibid. Because appellees do not press this argument before this 
Court, we do not consider it. Appellees also do not dispute that the Government 
generally has a compelling interest in protecting minors from "indecent" and 
"patently offensive" speech. 
(31)390 U. S., at 639. We quoted from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 
(1944): "It is cardinal with us that the cu~tody, care and nurture of  the child reside 
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." 
(32)Given the likelihood that many E-mail transmissions from an adult to a minor 
are conversations between family members, it is therefore incorrect for the dissent 
to suggest that the provisions ofthe CDA, even in this narrow area, "are no 115 
different from the law we sustained in Ginsberg." Post, at 8. 
(33)Cf. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F. 2d 9, 36 (CADC 1977) (Levanthal, l, 
dissenting), rev'd, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). When 
Pacifica was decided, given that radio· stations were allowed to operate only 
pursuant to federal license, and that Congress had enacted legislation prohibiting 
licensees from broadcasting indecent speech, there was a risk that members of  the 
radio audience might infer some sort of  official or societal approval of  whatever 
was heard over the radio, see 556 F. 2d, at 37, n. 18. No such risk attends messages 
received through the Internet, which is not supervised by any federal agency. 
(34)Juris. Statement 3 (citing 929 F. Supp., at 831  (finding 3». 
(35)"Indecent" does not benefit from any textual embellishment at all. "Patently 
offensive" is qualified only to the extent that it involves "sexual or excretory 
activities or organs" taken "in context" and "measured by contemporary community 
standards." 
(36)See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 404 (1991) ("Where 
Congress includes particular language in one section of  a statute but omits it in 
another section of  the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion and exclusion") (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
(37)The statute does not indicate whether the "patently offensive" and "indecent" 
determinations should be made with respect to minors or the population as a whole. 
The Government asserts that the appropriate standard is "what is suitable material 
for minors." Reply Brief  for Appellants 18, n. 13 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U. S. 629,633 (1968». But the Conferees expressly rejected amendments that 
would have imposed such a "harmful to minors" standard. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 
104-230, p. 189 (1996) (S. Conf. Rep.), 142 Congo Rec. H1145, H1l65-1166 (Feb. 
1, 1996). The Conferees also rejected amendments that would have limited the 
proscribed materials to those lacking redeeming value. See S. Conf. Rep., at 189, 
142 Congo Rec. H1l65-1l66 (Feb. 1, 1996).  . 
(38)Even though the word "trunk," standing alone, might refer to luggage, a 
swimming suit, the base of  a tree, or the long nose of  an animal, its meaning is clear 
when it is one prong of  a three-part description of  a species of  gray animals. 
(39)4l3 U. S., at 30 (Determinations of  "what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is 
'patently offensive' ....  are essentially questions of  fact, and our Nation is simply 
too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could 
be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the 
prerequisite consensus exists"). The CDA, which implerpents the "contemporary 116 
community standards" language of  Miller, thus conflicts with the Conferees' own 
assertion that the CDA was intended "to establish a unifonn national standard of 
content regulation." S. Conf. Rep., at 191. 
(40)Accord, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957) (ban on sale to adults of 
books deemed harmful to children unconstitutional); Sable Communications of 
Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S.  115, 128 (1989) (ban on "dial-a-porn" messages 
unconstitutional); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 73 (1983) 
(ban on mailing of  unsolicited advertisement for contraceptives unconstitutional). 
(41)The lack oflegislative attention to the statute at issue in Sable suggests another 
parallel with this case. Compare 492 U. S., at 129-130 ("[A]side from conc1usory 
statements during the debates by proponents of  the bill, as well as similar assertions 
in hearings on a substantially identical bill the year before, ...  the congressional 
record presented to us contains no evidence as to how effective or ineffective the 
FCC's most recent regulations were or might prove to be  ....  No Congressman or 
Senator purported to present a considered judgment with respect to how often or to 
what extent minors could or would circumvent the rules and have access to dial-a-
porn messages") with n. 24, supra. 
(42)The Government agrees that these provisions are applicable whenever "a sender 
transmits a message to more than one recipient, knowing that at least one of  the 
specific persons receiving the message is a minor." Opposition to Motion to Affinn 
and Reply to Juris. Statement 4-5, n.  1. 
(43)The Government asserts that "[t]here is nothing constitutionally suspect about 
requiring commercial Web site operators ...  to shoulder the modest burdens 
associated with their use." Brief  for Appellants 35. As a matter of  fact, however, 
there is no evidence that a '_'modest burden" would be effective. 
(44)Transmitting obscenity and child pornography, whether via the Internet or other 
means, is already illegal under federal law for both adults and juveniles. See 18 U. 
S. C. §§1464-1465 (criminalizing obscenity); §2251 (criminalizing child 
pornography). In fact, when Congress was considering the CDA, the Government 
expressed its view that the law was unnecessary because existing laws already 
authorized its ongoing efforts to prosecute obscenity, child pornography, and child 
solicitation. See 141 Congo Rec. S8342 (June 14, 1995) (letter from Kent Markus, 
Acting Assistant Attorney General, U. S. Department of  Justice, to Sen. Leahy). 
(45)Citing Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. V. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993), 
among other cases, appellees offer an additional reason why, in their view, the 
CDA fails strict scrutiny. Because so much sexually explicit content originates 
overseas, they argue, the CDA cannot be "effective." Brief  for Appellees American 
Library Association et al. 33-34. This argument raises difficult issues regarding the 
intended, as well as the pennissible scope of, extratenitorial application ofthe 117 
CDA. We find it unnecessary to address those issues to dispose of  this case. 
(46)For the full text of  §223(e)(5), see n. 26, supra. 
(47)Thus, ironically, this defense may significantly protect commercial purveyors 
of  obscene postings while providing little (or no) benefit for transmitters of 
indecent messages that have significant social or artistic value. 
(48)929 F. Supp.,at 855-856. 
(49)As this Court long ago explained, "It would certainly be dangerous if  the 
Legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders and leave it 
to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully be detained and who 
should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the 
legislative department of  the government." United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 
221 (1876). In part because of  these separation of  powers concerns, we have held 
that a severability clause is "an aid merely; not an inexorable command." Dorchy v. 
Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 (1924). 
(50)See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U. S. 103, 121 (1990) (judicial rewriting of 
statutes would derogate Congress's "incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the 
first place"). 
Notes (concurrence) 
(I)See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. §11.66.300 (1996) (no minors in "adult 
entertainment" places); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-3556 (1989) (no minors in places 
where people expose themselves); Ark. Code Ann. §§5-27-223, 5-27-224 (1993) 
(no minors in poolrooms and bars); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-7.:....502(2) (1986) (no 
minors in places displaying movies or shows that are "harmful to children"); Del. 
Code Ann., Tit. 11, §1365(i)(2) (1995) (same); D. C. Code Ann. §22-
2001(b)(1)(B) (1996) (same); Fla. Stat. §847.013(2) (1994) (same); Ga. Code Ann. 
§16-12-103(b) (1996) (same); Haw. Rev. Stat. §712-1215(1)(b) (1994) (no minors 
in movie houses or shows that are "pornographic for minors"); Idaho Code § 18-
1515(2) (1987) (no minors in places displaying movies or shows that are "harmful 
to minors"); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:91.11(B) (West 1986) (no minors in places 
displaying movies that depict sex acts and appeal to minors' prurient interest); Md. 
Ann. Code, Art. 27, §416E (1996) (no minors in establishments where certain 
enumerated acts are performed or portrayed); Mich. Compo Laws §750.141 (1991) 
(no minors without an adult in places where alcohol is sold); Minn. Stat. §617.294 
(1987 and Supp. 1997) (no minors in places displaying movies or shows that are 
"harmful to minors"); Miss. Code Ann. §97-5-11 (1994) (no minors in poolrooms, 
billiard halls, or where alcohol is sold); Mo. Rev. Stat. §573.507 (1995) (no minors 
in adult cabarets); Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-809 (1995) (no minors in places displaying 118 
movies or shows that are "harmful to minors"); Nev. Rev. Stat. §201.265(3) (1997) 
(same); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §571-B:2(II) (1986) (same); N. M. Stat. Ann. §30--
37-3 (1989) (same); N. Y. Penal Law §235.21(2) (McKinney 1989) (same); N. D. 
Cent. Code §12.1-27.1-03 (1985 and Supp. 1995) (same); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§5903(a) (Supp. 1997) (same); S. D. Compo Laws Ann. §22-24-30 (1988) (same); 
Tenn. Code Ann. §39-17-91l(b) (1991) (same); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §2802(b) 
(1974) (same); Va. Code Ann. §18.2-391 (1996) (same). 
(2)See, e.g., Ala. Code §13A-12-200.5 (1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-3506 
(1989); Ark. Code Ann. 5-68-502 (1993); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §313.1 (West 
Supp. 1997); Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-7-502(1) (1986); Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a-196 
(1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §  1365(i)(I) (1995); D. C. Code Ann. §22-
2001(b)(I)(A) (1996); Fla. Stat. §847.012 (1994); Ga. Code Ann. §16-12-103(a) 
(1996); Haw. Rev. Stat. §712-1215(1) (1994); Idaho Code §18-1515(1) (1987); Ill. 
Compo Stat., ch. 720, §5/11-21 (1993); Ind. Code §35-49-3-3(1) (Supp. 1996); 
Iowa Code §728.2 (1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-4301c(a)(2) (1988); La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §14:91.11(B) (West 1986); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §416B (1996); Mass. 
Gen. Laws, ch. 272, §28 (1992); Minn. Stat. §617.293 (1987 and Supp. 1997); 
Miss. Code Ann. §97-5-11 (1994); Mo. Rev. Stat. §573.040 (1995); Mont. Code 
Ann  .. §45-8-206 (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-808 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§§201.265(1), (2) (1997); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §571-B:2(I) (1986); N. M. Stat. 
Ann. §30--37-2 (1989); N. Y. Penal Law §235.21(1) (McKinney 1989); N. C. Gen. 
Stat. §14-190.15(a) (1993); N. D. Cent. Code §12.1-27.1-O3 (1985 and Supp. 
1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2907.31(A)(I) (Supp. 1997); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, 
§1040.76(2) (Supp. 1997); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5903(c) (Supp. 1997); R. I. Gen. 
Laws §1I-31-10(a)(1996); S. C. Code Ann. §16-15-385(A) (Supp. 1996); S.D. 
Compo Laws Ann. §22-24-28 (1988); Tenn. Code Ann. §39-17-911(a) (1991); 
Tex Penal Code Ann. §43.24(b) (1994); Utah Code Ann. §76-1 0-1206(2) (1995); 
Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §2802(a) (1974); Va. Code Ann. §18.2-391 (1996); Wash. 
Rev. Code §9.68.060 (1988 and Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat. §948.11(2) (Supp. 1995). 
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AppendixC 
A Declaration of  the Independence of  Cyberspace 
Governments ofthe Industrial World, you weary giants offlesh and steel, I come 
from cyberspace, the new home of  Mind. On behalf of  the future, I ask you of  the 
past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty 
where we gather. 
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you 
with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare 
the global social space we are building to be naturally  independent ofthe tyrannies 
you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess 
any methods of  enforcement we have true reason to fear. 
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of  the governed. You have 
neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor 
do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think 
that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It 
is an act of  nature andit grows itself through our collective actions. 
You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you create 
the wealth of  our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics, or the 
unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could be obtained 
by any of  your impositions. 
You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use this claim 
as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of  these problems don't exist. Where 
there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them and address 
them by our means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance will 
arise according to the conditions of  our world, not yours. Our world is different. 
Cyberspace consists of  transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a 
standing wave in the web of  our communications. Ours is a world that is both 
everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live. 
We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice accorded 
by race, economic power, military force, or station of  birth. 
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no 
matter how singUlar, without fear of  being coerced into silence or conformity. Your legal concepts of  property, expression, identity, movement, and context do 
not apply to us. They are based on matter, There is no matter here. 
Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain order by physical 
coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the 
commonwealth, our governance will emerge. Our identities may be distributed 
across many of  your jurisdictions. The only law that all our constituent cultures 
would generally recognize is the Golden Rule. We hope we will be able to build 
our particular solutions on that basis. B~t  we cannot accept the solutions you are 
attempting to impose. 
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In the United States, you have today created a law, the Telecommunications 
Reform Act, which repudiates your own Constitution and insults the dreams of 
Jefferson, Washington, Mill, Madison, DeToqueville, and Brandeis. These dreams 
must now be born anew in us. 
You are terrified of  your own children, since they are natives in a world  where you 
will always be immigrants. Because you fear them, you entrust your bureaucracies 
with the parental responsibilities you are too cowardly to confront yourselves. In 
our world, all the sentiments and expressions of  humanity, from the debasing to the 
angelic, are parts of  a seamless whole, the global conversation of  bits. We cannot 
separate the air that chokes from the air upon which wings beat. 
In China, Germany, France, Russia, Singapore, Italy and the United States, you are 
trying to ward off  the virus of  liberty by erecting guard posts at  the frontiers of 
Cyberspace. These may keep out the contagion for a small  time, but they will not 
work in a world that will soon be blanketed in bit-bearing media. 
Your increasingly obsolete information ~ndustries would perpetuate themselves by 
proposing laws, in America and elsewhere, that claim to own speech itself 
throughout the world. These laws would declare ideas to be another industrial 
product, no more noble than pig iron. In our world, whatever the human mind may 
create can be reproduced and distributed infinitely at no cost. The global 
conveyance of  thought no longer requires your factories to accomplish. 
These increasingly hostile and colonial measures place us in the same position as 
those previous lovers of  freedom and self-determination who had to reject the 
authorities of  distant, uninformed powers. We must declare our virtual selves 
immune to your sovereignty, even as we continue to consent to your rule over our 
bodies. We will spread ourselves across the Planet so that no one can arrest our 
thoughts. 
We will create a civilization of  the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more humane 
and fair than the world your governments have made before. Davos, Switzerland 
February 8, 1996 
John Perry Barlow 
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[This bill, based on the Model Antipornography Civil Rights Ordinance co-
authored by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine A. MacKinnon, was introduced into 
the Judiciary Committee of  the Commonwealth of  Massachusetts in 1992.] 
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By Ms. Hildt of  Amesbury, petition of  Barbara Hildt, Mary Jeanette Murray, Nancy 
H. Evans, Marc D. Draisen, Barbara Gardner and Sally P. Kerans for legislation to 
protect the civil rights of  women and children from pornography and sex 
discrimination. The Judiciary. 
The Commonwealth of  Massachusetts 
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety-Two 
AN ACT TO PROTECT THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of  Representatives in General Court 
assembled, and by the authority ofthe same, as follows: 
SECTION 1. It is hereby found and declared that pornography is a practice of  sex 
discrimination which exists in the commonwealth and threatens the health, safety, 
peace, welfare and equality of  its citizens. Pornography is a systematic practice 
of  exploitation and subordination based on sex that differentially harms and 
disadvantages women through dehumanization, psychic assault, sexual 
exploitation, forced sex and prostitution, physical injury and social and sexual 
terrorism and inferiority presented as entertainment and existing laws have proven 
inadequate to solve such problem. 
It  is further found that the  bigotry and contempt which pornography promotes and 
the acts of  aggression which it fosters: 
(a) diminish opportunities for equality of  rights in employment, education, 
property, public accommodations, and public services; 
(b) create public and private harassment, persecution, and denigration; promote 
injury and degradation such as rape, battery, sexual abuse of  children, and 
prostitution, and inhibit just enforcement of  laws against these acts; 
(c) demean the reputations and diminish the occupational opportunities of 
individuals and groups on the basis of  sex; 
(d) expose individuals who appear in pornography against their will to contempt, 
ridicule, hatred, humiliation, and embarrassment and target them for abuse and 
physical aggression; 
(e) lower the human dignity, worth, and civil status of  women and damage mutual 
respect between the sexes; 123 
(f) contribute significantly to restricting women in particular from full exercise of 
citizenship and participation in the life of  the community; and 
(g) undermine women's equal exercise of  rights to speech and action guaranteed to 
all citizens under the laws and constitution of  the commonwealth. 
SECTION 2. The General Laws are hereby amended by inserting after chapter 
151E the following. chapter: 
CHAPTER 151F. PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN SEX DISCRIMINATION. 
Section 1. As used in this chapter, the term "pornography" shall mean the graphic 
sexually explicit subordination of  women through pictures or words,·including by 
electronic or other data retrieval systems, and shall further include the presentation 
of  women's body,parts, including but not limited to, vaginas, breasts or buttocks, 
such that women are reduced to such parts or the presentation of  women: 
(a) as dehumanized sexual objects, things or commodities; 
(b) "as sexual objects who enjoy humiliation or pain; 
(c) as sexual objects experiencing sexual pleasure in rape, incest or other sexual 
assault; 
(d) as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated, bruised or physically hurt; 
(  e) in postures or positions of  sexual submission, servility or display; 
(f) being penetrated by objects or animals; or 
(g) in scenarios of  degradation, humiliation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or 
inferior, bleeding; bruised or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual. 
(h)  The use of  men, children or transsexuals in the place of  women shall also be 
deemed to be pornography for purposes of  this  definition. 
Section 2.(a). It shall be sex discrimination to coerce, intimidate or fraudulently 
induce any person into performing for pornography. The injury incurred hereunder 
may occur upon any appearance or sale of  any product resulting from such 
performance. The maker, seller, exhibitor or distributor of  said  pornography may 
be liable for damages and subject to an injunction to prohibit or eliminate such 
product from the public view. For purposes of  this subsection proof  of  the 
following facts 
shall not, singly or in combination, disprove coercion: 
(1) the person is a woman or a girl; 
(2) the person is or has been a prostitute; 
(3) the person has attained the age of  majority; 
(4) the person is connected by blood or marriage to anyone involved in or related to 
the making of  the pornography; 
(5) the person has previously had, or been thought to have had, sexual relations 
with anyone, including anyone involved in or related to the making of  the 
pornography; 
(6) the person has previously posed for sexually explicit pictures with or for 
anyone, including anyone involved in or related to the making ofthe pornography; I· 
(7) anyone else, including a spouse or other relative, has given permission on the 
person's behalf; 
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(8) the person actually consented to a use of  a perfonnance that is then changed into 
pornography; 
(9) the person knew that the purpose of  the acts or events in question was to make 
pornography; 
(10) the person showed no resistance or appeared to cooperate actively in the 
photographic sessions or events that produced the pornography; 
(11) the person signed a contract, or made statements affirming a willingness to 
cooperate in the production ofthe pornography; 
(12) no physical force, threats, or weapons were used in the making of  the 
pornography; or . 
(13) the person was paid or otherwise compensated. 
(b) It shall be sex discrimination to force pornography on a person in any place of 
employment, education, home, or any public place. Complaints may be brought 
only against the perpetrator of  the force or the entity or institution responsible for 
the force. 
(c) It shall be sex discrimination to assault, physically attack, or injure any person 
in a way that is directly caused by specific pornography. Complaints may be 
brought against the perpetrator of  the assault or attack, or against the maker, 
distributor, seller, or exhibitor of  the specific pornography. 
(d) It shall be sex discrimination to defame any person through  the unauthorized 
use in pornography of  their proper name, image, or recognizable personal likeness. 
For purposes of  this subsection, public figures shall be treated as private persons. 
Authorization once given may be revoked in writing any time prior to any 
publication. 
(e) It shall be sex discrimination to produce, sell, exhibit, or distribute pornography, 
including through private clubs. This subsection applies only to pornography made 
using live or dead human beings or animals. Isolated parts shall not be the sole 
basis 
for complaints under this subsection. 
City, state, and federally funded public libraries or private and public university and 
college libraries in which pornography is available for study, including on open 
shelves but excluding special display presentations, shall not be construed to be 
trafficking in pornography. 
Any woman may bring a complaint hereunder as a woman acting against the 
subordination of  women. Any man, child, or transsexual who alleges injury, by 
pornography in the way women are injured by it may also complain. 
Section 3. It shall not be a defense to a complaint brought under this chapter that 
the respondent did not know or intend that the materials at issue were pornography 
or sex discrimination. 125 
No damages or compensation for losses shall be recoverable under subsection (e) of 
section two, or other than against the perpetrator of  the assault or attack under 
subsection (c) of  section two, unless the defendant knew or had reason to know that 
the materials were pornography. 
Section 4. Any person who has a cause of  action under this chapter, or their state, 
may complain directly to a court of  competent jurisdiction for relief. 
Any person who has a cause of  action under this chapter, or their estate, may seek 
nominal, compensatory, punitive damages without limitation, including for loss, 
pain, suffering, reduced enjoyment of  life, and special damages, as well as for 
reasonable costs, including attorneys' fees and costs of  investigation. In claims 
under subsection (e) of  section two, or other than against the perpetrator of  the 
assault or attack under subsection (c) of  section two, no damages or compensation 
for losses shall be recoverable against a maker for pornography made, against a 
distributor for pornography distributed, against a seller for pornography sold, or 
against an exhibitor for pornography exhibited, prior to the effective date of  this 
chapter. 
Any person who violates this law may be enjoined except that: 
(a) In actions under subsection (e) of  section two, and other than against the 
perpetrator of  the assault or attack under  subsection (c) of  section two, no 
temporary or permanent injunction shall issue prior to a final judicial determination 
that the challenged activities constitute a violation of  this law. 
(b) No temporary or permanent injunction shall extend beyond such pornography 
that, having been described with reasonable specificity by said order, is determined 
to be validly proscribed under this chapter. 
Section 5. The availability of  relief  under this chapter is not intended to be 
exclusive and shall not preclude, or be precluded by, the seeking of  any other relief, 
whether civil or criminal. 
Section 6. Complaints pursuant to this chapter shall be brought within six years of 
the accrual of  the cause of  action or from when the complainant reaches the age of 
majority, whichever is later. 